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Abstract 
China has recently undergone extensive reforms in its basic urban old-age pension policy, 
which intends to benefit all urban workers, including internal rural-to-urban migrant workers. In 
2011, the Social Security Law, the first comprehensive law of China attempting to remedy social 
inequality, came into force. China has established pension schemes for both rural and urban workers. 
All workers employed in urban regions are entitled to the urban pension scheme, which offers 
pension benefits based on the cost of living in cities. However, implementation of the system and 
loopholes in the legislation have resulted in very low participation by migrant workers in the basic 
urban old-age pension scheme. As of the end of 2013, the migrant worker coverage rate of the old-
age pension scheme remained less than 20% (NBS, 2014a). This gives rise to the following 
question: What implementation gaps hinder migrant workers from taking up this old-age scheme? 
Implementation gaps may occur throughout the entire policy implementation process, in which 
stakeholders at all levels (including policy makers, bureaucrats and recipients) play a role in the 
success of the policy. This thesis examined the implementation gap in the urban pension scheme at 
the bottom level, where rural-urban migrant workers constitute the potential recipients. 
Conceptualised using Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1983) implementation theory and the 
theory of bounded rationality, the study focused on factors that influenced migrant workers’ 
intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme and their perceptions of taking up the scheme. 
The research adopted a mixed-method approach with quantitative survey and qualitative interview 
data collected and analysed sequentially. 
In Phase 1, over 200 migrant workers were surveyed in Shenzhen, China, on their 
understanding of the urban pension scheme (including their intentions to join) and on factors that 
might influence their intentions to join (individual, land, settlement, and employment). Bivariate 
analysis and multiple regression models were used to statistically examine the main factors that 
influenced migrant workers’ intentions to join the scheme. This analysis showed that workers’ 
settlement plans (the likelihood to settle in cities and the decision to go back to their rural 
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hometown) and land expropriation experience significantly influenced the intention to participate in 
the urban pension system. Furthermore, approximately 85% of survey participants did not 
understand the basics of the urban old-age pension scheme. 
Phase 2 consisted of semi-structured interviews with 12 migrant workers, which were 
designed to explore their perceptions of joining the urban old-age pension scheme. Based on 
preliminary results from the quantitative study, six migrant workers with land expropriation 
experience and six without were selected from the survey participants. Interview transcripts were 
subjected to thematic analysis. The rich elaborations in these interviews provided a detailed picture 
of the processes by which migrant workers perceive participation in the urban pension scheme—in 
both subjective and objective environments shaped by China’s unique social institutions. The 
results of the interviews shed light on the reasoning behind the intentions of migrant workers who 
had experienced land expropriation to settle in cities and join the old-age urban pension scheme. In 
addition, the interviews explored other factors that may influence their intention to join, such as 
experience of land expropriation, Communist propaganda, children and risk management 
considerations. The exploration of participants’ perceived feasibility of joining the urban pension 
scheme also showed that barriers such as lack of information, distrust of local governments, and 
sense of inferiority caused by the household registration system hindered participants from joining 
the scheme. 
Overall, this research suggested that for migrant workers to reap the full benefits of the 
urban old-age pension policy, the Chinese Government might need to better promote the scheme, 
especially among land-expropriated migrant workers and those who plan to permanently settle in 
cities. Promotion of the scheme would need to consider how China’s unique social, cultural and 
political environment influences policy implementation and migrant workers as recipients of the 
policy. 
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Chapter 1: Rural-Urban Migrant Workers and Their Denied Rights 
1.1 Background 
The Chinese Dream proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2012 has become a new signature 
ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which stirs hopes and sets expectations.1 The 
overarching vision of the Chinese Dream not only expresses China’s collective aspirations for 
prosperity and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, but also embraces individual dreams of achieving 
empowered, secure and happy lives. However, the concept of the Chinese Dream is at odds with 
millions of rural-urban migrant workers who dream of equal treatment and secure lives in the cities. 
Some rural-urban migrant workers viewed reforms in the name of the Chinese Dream as ‘painting a 
pancake to assuage hunger’, showing their absence of trust in the Party’s claimed political will to 
ensure their wellbeing (X. Lin, 2013).2 In the past three decades, China has experienced significant 
economic advancement and made a profound impact on the global economy as the world’s factory. 
Lured towards better economic development by double-digit gross domestic product (GDP) growth, 
the Chinese Government has overlooked, for decades, the economic and social disadvantages 
experienced by the builders of its economic miracle—the rural-urban migrant workers (Afgeh, 
2014). 
Initially driven up by the demand for urban labour after the reform and opening up in 1978, 
the migrant worker population hit 263 million in 2012, with an average annual growth of 3.9% 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China [NBS], 2012). However, these large-scale populations are 
notoriously marginalised. Due to limited education and skills, the majority of migrant workers do 
                                                             
1 China’s Xi Jinping first mentioned the ‘Chinese Dream’ when he was promoted to the top CCP post in November 
2012. After becoming China’s president in 2013, he started promoting it as a political slogan. Xi has described the 
dream as ‘national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society, and 
military strengthening’ (Kuhn, 2014). 
2  The Chinese Government has been claiming to reform its unpopular household registration and aims to extend 
education and social security services to anyone who has a legitimate job in a city, regardless of their registered place of 
residency (Qi, 2014). The political slogan ‘Chinese Dream’ places the hukou system as one of President Jinping Xi’s 
political agenda. 
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mainly low-status jobs (such as manual labour, factory work and service jobs which are looked 
upon with disdain by local residents in informal sectors (Kumar & Li, 2007; D. Wong, He, Leung, 
Lau, & Chang, 2008). In 2008, the migrant worker’s average monthly wage was less than 60% of 
that of an urban worker (Mendes & Srighanthan, 2009) and is likely to be similar today. To make 
up for low hourly wages, many migrant workers work much longer hours than urban workers, work 
in hazardous environments, and live in inferior neighbourhoods, suffering from serious social 
exclusion (Y. Huang & Yi, 2004). 
As with internal Chinese migrants, similar barriers to employment, civic engagement and 
social services are experienced by international migrants the world over. However, in China, the 
hukou or household registration system, which is regarded as a quasi-apartheid system that allows 
routine discrimination against rural-urban migrants by bureaucrats and urban residents, heavily 
intensifies these barriers (K. W. Chan, 2009). The migrant worker’s position within this 
discriminatory system makes them vulnerable to unfair treatment in cities, while allowing 
authorities to dispose of them according to the demands of the economy. Without urban hukou 
status, rural-urban migrant workers are not eligible for the minimum living allowance or 
unemployment benefits3 in the cities in which they work. When migrant workers reach working age, 
they can make a living in the city on the strength of their youth. However, when they are older and 
lose their ability to work, they may no longer earn an income in the cities—and their 
marginalisation worsens. 
Among all the fragmented old-age pension systems4 in China stand three major ones: the 
urban old-age pension system, the new rural social pension scheme, and the special pension scheme 
for employees from government bodies and institutions. As rural citizens, migrant workers are also 
                                                             
3 The minimum living allowance and unemployment programs in China are used by the government for poverty relief 
purposes. Only urban hukou holders with permanent registration in cities meet the requirement of the programs and are 
eligible to apply for these allowances (Yan, 2009). 
4 Owing to the institutional issue of localisation in China’s political system (see Section 2.1), the design of some social 
security programs such as the regional pension are also localised in different regions. 
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entitled to join the new rural social pension scheme, which offers a basic pension of RMB55 
(around AU $10)5 per month (B. Lu, 2012). However, the rural pension benefit level is too low for 
migrant workers who wish to retire in cities. 
With rapid ageing throughout China’s society, it is no surprise migrant workers are ageing 
too. A report by the National Health and Family Planning Commission of the People’s Republic of 
China (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2014) showed the average age of 
migrant workers increased from 33 years in 2011 to 34 years at the end of 2013. In the next three 
decades, most of China’s 263 million migrant workers will reach 60 years of age. Providing them a 
secure and adequate retirement income is essential. However, as of 2014, less than 20% of rural-
urban migrant labourers were covered by China’s urban old-age pension scheme (State Council of 
the PRC, 2014; S. Zhang, 2012). Despite recent pension policy reforms intended to benefit migrant 
workers, the coverage rate has remained low. This could suggest an implementation failure of the 
recent pension policy changes in enabling migrant workers to join the urban pension scheme (W. 
Lin, 2012). 
Research has been conducted on migrant workers’ use of the basic urban old-age pension 
scheme (X. Huang & Cao, 2012; P. Liu, Liu, & Liang, 2012; Q. Zhang & Huang, 2011), yet few 
studies have viewed this issue from the perspective of public policy implementation (W. Lin, 2012). 
Consequently, previous research neglected the role and perspective of migrant workers as recipients 
of the urban pension policy. In this doctoral thesis, I aim to address this gap in the literature. I use 
Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1983) theory of implementation to place migrant workers in the context 
of policy implementation and to associate them with the goals of the basic urban old-age pension 
scheme. 
Some scholars might argue that not all migrant workers want to settle in cities in their old 
age and that seasonal migrant workers would eventually return to their rural hometowns prior to 
                                                             
5 The payment of RMB55 is the baseline of the new rural pension. This amount might be higher than the baseline in 
developed provinces. 
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their retirement. Thus, accessing the basic urban old-age pension scheme in cities would not be 
important for all rural-urban migrant workers. In this research, I recognise that a single old-age 
pension scheme in China would not suit all migrant workers with different experiences and 
migration purposes. However, retirement decision-making is a complicated process by which 
migrants’ decisions to join a social security scheme depends not solely on their settlement intentions, 
but also on factors associated with their individual situations, such as demography and ownership of 
the firms or factories where they work. In addition, their decisions might reflect China’s social 
context, such as the experience of land expropriation that is part of the massive, on-going 
urbanisation. Thus, in this research, I examine the implementation gap of the basic urban old-age 
pension at the migrant worker level and explore how China’s unique social and economic 
environment, shaped by previous political traditions and public policies, influences policy 
implementation and migrant workers as recipients of the policy. 
1.2 Key Concept and Definitions 
The concepts used in this research relate to household registration, rural-urban migrant 
workers and the basic urban old-age pension scheme. 
1.2.1 Population Ageing 
According to the United Nations (UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division’s (2013) definition, population ageing is growth in the proportion of the 
elderly population (aged 60 years or older) accompanied by decline in the proportion of the youth 
population (aged 15 years or younger). By 1998, this unprecedented phenomenon of population 
ageing had already occurred in more-developed countries; by 2050, the world’s elderly population 
is expected to outweigh the youth population for the first time in human history. 
The increase in population aging is faster in less-developed countries than it is in more-
developed countries (UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2013). 
The reason is not only that developed countries have already experienced population aging, but also 
that the mortality and fertility levels have fallen in developing countries (UN,2013, p.3). From 2010 
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to 2040, rapid population ageing will take place mainly in developing countries. In particular, over 
this 30-year duration, China will have the fastest growth in ageing population in the world, at a pace 
of 15.7 percentage points in the proportion of persons aged 60 years or over, compared to an 
expected rate of 8.8 percentage points in the more-developed regions. The parlous growth in 
China’s ageing population poses a challenge to its old-age pension system (Y. Cai & Cheng, 2014; 
England, 2005; Flaherty, 2007; Leibold & Voelpel, 2006; J. Liu, 2014; Powell & Chen, 2012; Zeng 
& Wang, 2014). 
1.2.2 Hukou or Household Registration System 
The hukou system was designed in the 1940s when China followed in the footsteps of the 
Soviet Union and adopted rapid industrialisation and collectivised agriculture centred on heavy 
industry and agricultural surplus. This Stalinist strategy required adequate numbers of peasants in 
the rural areas to produce the agricultural surplus that would allow industrialisation (K. W. Chan, 
1989, 2010). Therefore, in 1958, the Chinese Government promulgated a mechanism to prevent 
rural outflow. This system gives each person a household registration status (hukou) and separates 
the population into two groups: those with rural and those with urban hukou. The system decreed 
that rural people seeking to move to urban areas had to apply through the relevant bureaucracies. 
Besides stemming rural-to-urban labour mobility, hukou became a form of segregation by 
preventing rural peoples from enjoying the same social services and welfare entitlements as their 
urban counterparts (Sia, 2010; Smith, 2014). 
The hukou system of residency permits remains in place, despite the reforms and opening up 
of China in recent decades. However, in the 1970s, the country’s demand for cheap labour led to the 
removal of the migratory controls. When China became the ‘world’s factory’ in the 1980s, the state 
adopted a strategy that allowed peasant agricultural workers to meet industry’s needs in cities 
(Afridi, Li, & Ren, 2015; J. Becker, 2015; Gamer, 2008). However, hukou is still an institutional 
constraint that excludes rural migrants from some urban services and welfare such as public 
education and health care, despite the removal of controls on rural exodus. 
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1.2.3 Rural-Urban Migrant Workers 
The concept of migrant workers in this thesis refers to workers who internally migrate from 
rural regions to urban regions of China. Owing to the hukou system, which officially identifies each 
citizen as a resident of a specific administrative unit, migrant workers in cities do not enjoy equal 
rights with their urban counterparts, as their registered permanent residences remain their rural 
hometowns. Thus, there are significant disadvantages for people who migrate from rural to urban 
communities to work. Without a local household registration, migrant labourers are second-class 
citizens in cities and suffer from various forms of exploitation and discrimination (L. Shi, 2010; 
Solinger, 1999; K. Wong, Fu, Li, & Song, 2007). Studies have revealed that migrant labourers 
averaged 11 hours of work each day and 26 days per month (L. Fan, 2011), whereas the standard 
working hours in China are 8 hours each day and 21.75 days per month (A. Chan, Human Rights 
Now, & Labour Action China, 2015). In another survey, more than half of migrant labourers 
received delayed payment of wages, and only 43% had a written employment contract (X. Li & 
Freeman, 2014). 
1.2.4 Old-Age Pension System 
The old-age pension system provides a life annuity from the date of retirement until the 
recipient’s death. This has two major purposes. The first is to smooth consumption over the 
recipient’s lifecycle, so that the income stream continues into retirement after work ceases, in 
exchange for pension contributions (Bagliano, Fugazza, & Nicodano, 2009). The second is to 
provide insurance, especially against the uncertainty of an individual’s life expectancy (Nishiyama 
& Smetters, 2014). Social and public policy might have two additional objectives for pension 
schemes. One would be to alleviate poverty by enabling the elderly to maintain at least a minimum 
living standard after retirement (Collins, Podger, & Dong, 2014). The other would be to redistribute 
social resources. That is, a society might wish to direct additional resources above the poverty line 
to disadvantaged social members such as family caregivers and people with disabilities (Blair, 2014; 
R. Taylor, 2014). 
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Currently, old-age pension systems in China are multi-track and fragmented (B. Li, 2014). 
China’s pension systems vary between urban and rural, and in government and private sectors.6 The 
urban and government pension systems were established in 1997 and 1991, respectively, and the 
New Rural Pension Program (NRPP) was implemented in 2009. Compared with more-developed 
regions, China has many more ageing challenges but less experience in operating old-age pension 
systems (F. Cai, 2008). 
1.2.5 Basic Urban Old-Age Pension Insurance System 
To provide income security for workers in their retirement, China adopted a combined social 
pooling and individual account pension system in urban regions in 1997,7 with employers paying a 
premium contribution rate of 20% and workers paying around 12% of their wages to finance the 
pension portion of the social security system. Whereas all urban workers are eligible to join this 
scheme, regardless of household registration location, the coverage rate among migrant workers 
remained low (P. Liu et al., 2012; L. Wang, 2011). In order to improve migrant workers’ social 
rights, the central government carried out several reforms of the urban pension system, including 
enabling transfer of pension accounts between cities, with the view to increasing pension coverage 
among migrant workers (see Chapter 2 for further details on China’s urban pension scheme and 
welfare system). To be eligible for pension benefits under China’s Social Security Law, if a 
                                                             
6 The special old-age pension system for China’s civil servants and employees of government-sponsored institutions 
originally required no dedicated revenue source; the government simply paid retiree benefits out of general fiscal 
revenue. Owing to the Chinese public’s criticism of these excess benefits for civil servants, the Chinese Government 
decided to curb public outrage by cancelling this contribution exemption in January 2015 (Ren, 2015; Wildau, 2015). 
After the ‘Document No. 2 reform of the pension system for employees in public sectors’ took effect on 14 January 
2015 (State Council of the PRC, 2015), employees from public sectors were requested to contribute 8% of their salaries 
to their pension funds and employers to contribute 20% (B. Zheng, 2015). 
7 The basic urban old-age insurance pension (BOAI) system城镇企业职工基本养老保险 is normally referred to as the 
‘basic urban old-age pension’, ‘urban old-age pension’, or ‘urban pension’ in international academia (Y. Guo, 2014; X. 
Sun, 2014; Y. Zhao & Xu, 2002). Thus, in this thesis, these names for pension insurance all refer to the BOAI system. 
Another pension scheme called the ‘pension system for urban residents’ 城镇居民社会养老保险 shared a similar name, 
but it targeted unemployed urban residents and has been integrated into the new rural old-age pension programme since 
1 July 2014. 
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citizen’s permanent registered residence is not the same place where they joined the pension scheme, 
they must pay into their pension account for 10 consecutive years in the place of pension 
participation. 
1.3 Rationale and Significance 
The primary rationale for this study is to understand migrant workers’ perspectives on the 
urban old-age pension scheme. In particular, the fact that migrant workers very low rates of 
membership in the scheme, despite their eligibility and the potential benefits for them, appears to be 
a policy failure or implementation gap. Understanding the drivers of migrant workers’ intentions to 
join the scheme and their perceptions of barriers and facilitators to joining can be an important 
contribution to analysing the policy and its implementation, in order to achieve the policy objective. 
The academic and practical significance of this research is outlined below. 
The topic of retirement pensions for mobile populations has come into global prominence in 
recent years, as population ageing begins to pose a challenge for inflow areas. Most previous 
studies have been in the context of developed countries, such as the United States (US) (Hoerder & 
Faires, 2011; Reimers, 2007) and in Europe (Kopnina, 2005; Morokvasic-Müller, Anthias, & 
Kontos, 2013; Mulcahy, 2011; A. Smith, 2002). Less research has been conducted in the context of 
developing nations with uneven economic development and fragmented, less-developed pension 
systems. The present study on the old-age pension of China’s migrant workers could have long-
term implications for studies of pension policies for migrants in other developing countries. 
This research also addresses the practical challenges that migrant workers confront with 
China’s economy, to which they make enormous contributions. This study documents rural-urban 
migrant workers’ perceptions about a pension scheme in cities, giving voice to this marginalised 
group in a country with strict censorship of views that reflect policy failures under the Communist 
regime. China has used censorship largely as a measure to maintain government control over the 
nation. It imposes control over all Chinese media and prevents people from expressing opinions 
about the Party’s policy failures that could generate public distrust of the government (Lorentzen, 
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2014). Instead of addressing the causes of social disadvantage and policy failure, China’s response 
has often been additional censorship and repression of the policy realities (Hesketh, Jun, Lu & Mei, 
2008). Through direct probing into the experiences of rural citizens who are also urban workers, 
this project reports the perceptions of a group whose points and rights are typically unrecognised 
and neglected. In particular, this thesis concerns itself with the effect of China’s unique social and 
political environment on migrant workers’ attitudes towards public policy. The thesis touches on 
some sensitive social issues in China, such as the corruption of local officials during land 
expropriation and the rural citizens’ sense of inferiority caused by the discriminatory hukou system. 
Furthermore, by using the research to inform refinements in policy and administration, this 
research could, in the medium and long terms, assist in reducing deprivation and in improving 
migrant workers’ living conditions in urban China. According to a recent study, the difference 
between the income poverty rate of migrant households and that of local-resident urban families is 
relatively small (Park & Wang, 2010). This outcome comes at a cost. Migrant workers’ hourly 
wages are much lower than those of local residents; hence, migrant workers must work longer hours 
and have higher labour force participation rates. Significant differences between migrant and local 
residents are also found in non-income welfare indicators, such as access to social pension 
programmes (W. W. Wang & Fan, 2012). Thus, pension reform will be expected to help reduce 
urban marginalisation. 
Moreover, the research findings might be conducive for driving economic growth 
domestically and internationally because supporting the migrant workforce is of great economic 
importance for the Chinese and world economies. In the last three decades, China and the world 
significantly benefited from China’s productive-age population, achieving remarkable economic 
growth commonly referred to as the demographic dividend (Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2003; F. 
Cai, 2014; Ladusingh, Narayana, & Asian Development Bank, 2011; J. G. Williamson & Centre for 
Economic Policy, 2013). The demographic dividend has long been known as a strong impetus for 
economic development, particularly in developing countries (F. Cai & Wang, 2005; F. Lu, 2010; F. 
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Wang & Mason, 2005). According to previous research (Yoshihara, Sylva, & Eberstadt, 2012), 
China’s demographic dividend will disappear around 2015 due to the increasing rate of population 
ageing. 
However, one expert (Oizumi, 2011) argued that the fast growth in labour input caused by 
the migration of surplus labour from rural regions into cities should be considered when assessing 
China’s demographic dividend. A large number of labourers from rural regions have moved to 
cities. Migrant labourers comprise nearly 47% of employees in secondary and tertiary industries (F. 
Cai, 2011). Cheap labour costs resulting from surplus labour has made China the growth engine for 
the world factory and global economy (C. H. Smith, 2012). If this mass migration continues, the 
demographic dividend will continue to benefit the Chinese and the world economies for longer than 
had been assessed based on population dynamics (Oizumi, 2011). This scenario makes policies to 
attract rural migrant workers essential. According to the new economics of migration, the 
government can influence incentives for migration not only by its labour market policies, but also 
by programmes that shape the insurance market, such as pension schemes (Stark, Taylor, & 
Yitzhaki, 1986). Therefore, improving the pension system for migrant workers could be of great 
importance in sustaining China’s demographic dividend and economic stability. 
1.4 Policy Context 
China’s pension policy must be understood in relation to its fundamental political change in 
economic management: the transition from a Maoist centralised economy to a more marketised 
system under Deng Xiaoping in 1978 (Agarwala & World Bank, 1997; Dorfman, Holzmann, & 
O’Keefe, 2013). China’s old-age pension system can be traced back to the planned economy era 
(1949–1978). 
During this period, old-age welfare primarily relied on two pillars: informal, family-based 
eldercare provided mainly by adult children; and the ‘iron rice bowl’ of state-owned enterprises 
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(SOEs) that provided employees with enterprise-based retirement pensions.8 To provide an iron rice 
bowl for employees, SOEs ran a defined benefit (DB) pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system 
funded by profits (Jackson, Nakashima, & Howe, 2009). After the reform and the opening up of 
China’s economy in 1978, this pension system—funded solely by employers—became a significant 
financial burden and disadvantage for large SOEs in their competition with new companies with 
fewer retired employees. Furthermore, this traditional pension did not cover workers in enterprises 
with newly emerging ownership forms, such as private and joint venture enterprises (Brødsgaard & 
Li, 2013). In addition, labour mobility between different industries and types of enterprise 
ownership was hindered, as the change of employment meant employees lost all previously 
accumulated pension funds from their previous employer—the previous companies retained all 
pension funds (Li, 2013; Nielsen, Smyth, & Vicziany, 2007). With reform of SOEs in the late 1970s, 
more Chinese employees moved into the growing private sector. 
Alongside these labour market changes, significant demographic changes occurred. The 
strict implementation of the one-child policy in China from the late 1970s necessarily reduced 
family size and severely limited the ability for multiple children to provide future support to their 
elderly parents (Scharping, 2013). These immense societal changes caused by new economic and 
population policies led to the two pillars of old-age welfare crumbling and, in the late 1980s, 
amplified the demand for a new, more effective old-age pension system. In 1986, fund pooling was 
established at the municipal level in selected cities across SOEs,9 and employees began to make 
contributions to retirement pension funds (Dorfman et al., 2013). 
                                                             
8 Rice has been China’s staple food for thousands of years. Thus, the most important symbol of the Party’s economic 
policies has been an ‘unbreakable iron rice bowl’, which symbolised cradle-to-grave security offered to all citizens. 
9 Pooled funds from many individual pension participants are aggregated for the purposes of pension investment. 
Through pooled funds, investments benefit from economies of scale, which allow lower trading costs per dollar of 
investment, diversification and professional money management. 
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1.4.1 Transition from PAYG to Funded Approach 
In funded pension systems, each generation contributes to a fund for their own cohort’s 
retirement. Thus, funded pension schemes are designed so there would be no redistribution between 
different generations. However, in PAYG pension systems, the pension benefits of current retirees 
are funded by the current working generation, thus allowing intergenerational transfer of pension 
funds (Andersen & Bhattacharya, 2012). 
When the Communists first established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after the 
Second World War, PAYG pension systems provided China an inexpensive way to support retirees. 
The initial generation, which had not accumulated sufficient pension funds because of the war, 
could receive pensions without having contributed to the system. Fast-growing populations from the 
1960s to the late 1970s guaranteed a high rate of return, allowing DB PAYG systems to be fiscally 
sustainable. However, after the stringent one-child policy was implemented in 1979, the population 
growth rate dropped from 1.8% per annum in 1960 to 1.2% in 1980 (World Bank, 2012). The 
decline in fertility rates contributed to structural financial pressures on many SOE budgets for 
managing their pension schemes and thus caused the government to reassess its national pension 
system (Dorfman et al., 2013). 
In the 1980s, the international community realised the growing longevity of world 
populations combined with lower fertility rates would result in population ageing, meaning that 
contribution rates would have to rise in the future to maintain the existing pension benefit levels. 
Consequently, many countries actively considered shifting from PAYG to funded systems 
(Andersen & Bhattacharya, 2012; Cipriani, 2014; Fall, 2014). Some Western countries that 
depended predominantly on PAYG systems realised that national PAYG social security 
programmes were not financially sustainable and introduced funded elements into their pension 
systems, either on a compulsory basis (e.g. Germany and Italy) or on a voluntary basis (e.g. Sweden) 
(Bonoli, 2003). 
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Following in the footsteps of these countries, China also adopted a funded pension system as 
a component of its pension system. In 1991, the State Council’s Document No. 33 required pension 
contributions from individual employees and initiated a pension system combining social pooling 
with individual accounts (Y. Cai & Cheng, 2014; X. Y. Zhang, 2009). In 1995, the State Council 
took a crucial step to restructure its old-age pension system by combining the PAYG system with a 
funded system dependent on individuals’ contributions. In this new arrangement, each pension pool 
consisted of two accounts: a social pooling account and an individual-funded account. From 1991 to 
1997, the Chinese Government began to promulgate the hybrid pension scheme and experiment 
with it in some municipalities. In 1997, it established the urban basic old-age scheme, which was 
implemented by local governments. All workers who have legitimate jobs in urban regions of China 
are eligible for this scheme. Currently, the basic urban pension scheme has a multi-pillar framework 
with two pension accounts. Employers fund the social pooling account (20%) and employees fund 
the individual account (12%) (Y. Cai & Cheng, 2014). 
Despite the government’s efforts during the 1990s to improve its old-age welfare system, the 
pension scheme remained a policy rather than a law, and the coverage rate was not regarded as 
satisfactory—only around 55% (Oksanena, 2010). To increase the scheme’s coverage rate, the 
government translated its intent of improving the old-age pension insurance in China into legislative 
rules and established the Social Security Law in 201110. This was the first legal social security 
framework for employees across Mainland China and covered five types of social insurance 
schemes. In addition to the urban basic retirement pension insurance scheme, it included medical, 
unemployment, occupational injury, and maternity insurance. 
Besides the urban pension scheme, China also implemented the NRPP in 2009, which is 
funded by individual contributions and government subsidies. There are five levels of contributions 
by individuals: RMB100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 per year per person. When NRPP members reach 
                                                             
10 The Social Security Law was adopted at the 17th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eleventh National 
People’s Congress on 28 October 2010.  
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the age of 60, they start to receive monthly pension payments from the individual account for a 
maximum of 139 months, in addition to the basic pension benefit (currently A S11.5; J. Han & Liu, 
2010; C. Shen & Williamson, 2010). The NRPP benefit level might be able to meet the demands of 
people living in rural areas but cannot guarantee the basic living standard in cities (Lei, Zhang, & 
Zhao, 2011). 
1.4.2 Old-Age Pensions and Rural-Urban Migrant Workers 
As noted earlier, the coverage rate of the basic urban old-age pension among rural-urban 
migrant workers was less than 20% in the five years from 2009 to 2013. Realising the low scheme 
coverage for rural-urban migrant workers, the Chinese Government introduced many policies 
intended to improve this situation. Since 1 January 2010, urban pension scheme applicants were 
able to transfer their pensions when moving to other urban regions to work. This Measurement of 
Basic Pension Transfer (2009) enabled migrant workers to transfer their full personal pension 
accounts plus 12% of the social pooling funds if they moved. It was a breakthrough for China’s 
pension insurance reform (Ye & Duan, 2014). Previously, workers were able to transfer only their 
own pension contribution; the employer-paid part was left with the local government where they 
had previously worked. However, the effectiveness of this new policy in assisting migrant workers 
to transfer their age pension has been doubted. In Shaanxi Province, only 52 of 6.5 million migrant 
workers actually transferred their pension accounts in the first half year of operation (W. Yang, 
2010). 
Whereas the new Social Security Law (2011) aimed to reduce the pressures of social 
inequality in retirement by making social insurance mandatory for Chinese citizens, it was unclear 
whether participation in the urban pension scheme was mandatory or voluntary for the increasing 
population of internal migrant workers. Although domestic news in China reported an increased 
pension scheme coverage rate after enactment of this law (Bai & Hao, 2013), the claims of success 
may not be valid. With access to data in three cities in China (Changsha in Hunan; Harbin in 
Heilongjiang; and the Yinzhou district in Ningbo, Zhejiang), Davies and Ramia (2008) reported the 
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successful implementation of some public policies claimed by Chinese officials did not reflect 
reality. As accurate statistics could indicate sensitive issues—in the form of the state’s failure to 
enforce its own laws—the Chinese Government tends to conceal data that may lead to loss of public 
confidence (Koch-Weser, 2013). 
1.4.3 Legal Ambiguities 
A number of ambiguities in the law relate to participation in the urban pension scheme by 
migrant workers. They are identified as ambiguities in entitlement, contributions and legal liabilities.  
1.4.3.1 Entitlement 
Although the law provides all workers legal entitlement to join the urban basic old-age 
pension scheme, it does not mandate either employers or migrant workers to comply with the law. 
To illustrate, Article 1011 states: 
Employees shall participate in the basic pension insurance, the premiums of which shall be 
jointly paid by employers and employees. 
Individual industrial and commercial households without other employees, non-full-time 
employees not participating in their employers’ basic pension insurance, and other flexible 
employees may participate in the basic pension insurance, the premiums of which shall be 
paid by the participating individuals. (Article 10, ‘Social Insurance Law’, 2011) 
It is worth noting the word ‘may’ (rather than ‘shall’) is used in relation to employees who 
are not full-time workers or who are in other flexible working arrangements. Article 58 explicitly 
uses the word ‘voluntary’ in relation to non-full-time employees and workers on other flexible 
arrangements: 
Individual industrial and commercial households without other employees, non-full-time 
employees not participating in their employer’s basic pension insurance, and other flexible 
employees who would like to participate voluntarily [emphasis added] in the social 
                                                             
11 Translation from International Business Publications [IBP] (2015). 
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insurance shall apply for social insurance registration at the social insurance agency. (Article 
58, ‘Social Insurance Law’, 2011) 
The Social Security Law indicates that the urban pension scheme is employment based. In 
formal employment sectors such as governments and SOEs, employment relationships between 
workers and employers are normally established by labour contracts, and social insurance is 
provided based on the law. However, most migrant workers work in the informal labour market or 
are casually engaged in the formal sector. According to a 2004 survey of 40 cities conducted by the 
Labour and Social Security Ministry, only 12.5% of migrant workers from the countryside had 
signed a labour contract (State Council Research Office Team, 2006). Although a new labour 
contract law was enacted in 2007, legal enforcement and state supervision is generally weak to non-
existent—and a large number of workers were found to be employed without contracts after its 
enactment (Friedman & Lee, 2010). 
As the Social Security Law does not define employee or employment, The Labour Law of 
China, which came into force in 1995, explains the legal employment relationship. It stipulates that 
all employees in enterprises of any ownership type shall sign employment contracts with employers. 
However, compliance has been low, especially in the non-state sector where the majority of migrant 
workers are employed. In 2007, only 50% of employers had signed employment contracts with their 
employees; the rate in the non-state sector was only 20%. Among all employment contracts, 60% to 
70% were short-term contracts of less than one year (Friedman & Lee, 2010). This suggests that the 
labour law was not well enacted in China, and employment relationships are not effectively 
protected in practice. 
To ensure migrant workers can access the old-age pension scheme, the Ministry of Social 
Security promulgated the Measures of Migrant Workers Joining the Basic Urban Old-Age Pension 
as an interim scheme in 2009. This measurement applied to only migrant workers who had 
employment relationships with employers. It stipulated that employers should clarify issues of 
migrant workers joining the pension when they signed the labour contracts (Ministry of Human 
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Resources and Social Security, 2009). However, most migrant workers work without signing a 
labour contract; thus, this interim scheme may not enhance their chance of joining the basic urban 
old-age pension scheme. 
Based on the China Employment Law Guide (Baker & McKenzie International, 2013), the 
Labour Contract Law of China recognises the concept of de facto employment relationships and 
generally requires of employers in such relationships the same responsibilities as when written 
contracts are in place. However, it does not specify how de facto employment relationships should 
be established or proven. The word ‘generally’ in stipulating employer responsibilities offers a 
multitude of flexible interpretations of the law and cannot guarantee that employers will assume the 
responsibilities. A research report by the State Council Research Office Team (2006) provided an 
authoritative portrayal of marginalised migrant workers situation and indicated the Labour Contract 
Law of China was ineffective in protecting their rights. The State Council of the PRC’s (2014) 
suggestions for implementation also stated that the urban pension scheme should be provided for 
migrant workers with stable employment relationships. This clarified that participation and 
provision of the scheme were not mandatory for migrant workers who worked on a casual or 
flexible basis. The Social Insurance Law indicated that uptake of the urban pension was voluntary 
for flexible employees, based on Articles 10 and 58 with subsequent clarification from the Chinese 
Government. Given that the majority of migrant workers work on a flexible basis without legal 
recognition of employment relationships (Démurger, Gurgand, Li, & Yue, 2009), membership in 
the scheme would appear to be voluntary for most of them. 
1.4.3.2 ContributionsSecond, the Social Security Law mentioned neither the employers’ nor the 
employees’ contribution rates. China’s pension system is decentralised and fragmented, involving 
more than 2,000 jurisdictions, and local-level pension plans vary in entitlements, contribution rates 
and collection methods (B. Lu & Piggott, 2012). Despite specified rates in the policy, the lack of 
mandatory contribution rates in the Social Security Law provides both employers and employees 
the option to fully or not fully support the pension funds and offers a legitimate reason for both 
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parties to comply less with the legislation. Due to this ambiguity, some employers might revise the 
contribution rates to a level below the rates required by the urban pension scheme. 
1.4.3.3 Legal LiabilitiesThe legal liabilities of stakeholders in the Social Security Law are unclear. 
Chapter 11 (legal liabilities) of the law stipulates the consequences of violating the law. Specifically, 
Article 84 states: 
If an employing entity does not go through the formalities for social insurance registration, 
the social insurance administration department shall order it to make rectification within the 
stipulated period. (Social Insurance Law, 2011) 
The legislation mentions only the consequence for employers not registering for social 
insurance; it omits consequences for employers who complete registration but do not pay the 
pension contribution. Moreover, the chapter on legal sanctions does not mention consequences for 
employees who do not make pension contributions. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the law 
mandates employees to actively join the social insurance programme. 
These ambiguities make the Social Security Law unlikely to be of much consequence for 
most migrant workers. Given that the law does not clarify important issues related to migrant 
worker uptake of the urban pension scheme, there is little possibility this law can institute an 
effective mandatory pension scheme for migrant workers thereby increasing the coverage rate 
among them. The law, as it stands, seems more a statement of intent and political manifesto than a 
comprehensive legal framework establishing a credible, enforceable, mandatory urban pension 
scheme capable of covering most—let alone all—migrant workers. 
Thus, I take the view that uptake of the urban pension scheme remains effectively voluntary 
for China’s migrant workers. Some studies have analysed the law from different perspectives 
(World Bank & Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, 
2014), arguing that scheme participation is mandatory for migrant workers. However, in this 
doctoral study, I proceed on the basis that migrant worker participation in the urban old-age pension 
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scheme is effectively voluntary because this better reflects the realities of the scheme as it operates 
in most migrant workers’ lives. 
1.5 Thesis Organisation 
Chapter 1 of this thesis introduces the research project in the current political environment 
under the new leadership, the rural-urban migrant workers’ life on the margins of society, and 
challenges in providing an old-age pension confronted by the ageing of 263 million migrant 
workers. Understanding the implementation gap in the basic urban old-age pension scheme at the 
migrant worker level is the primary aim of the project. This chapter also conceptualises the study 
within the policy background of the basic urban old-age pension scheme and discusses the scheme’s 
historical development and reforms that cater to migrant workers. 
Chapter 2 surveys a range of literature on the constructs of work in implementation gaps, the 
pension system and migrant labour in China. It focuses on the literature gaps in empirical studies on 
the implementation of urban old-age pensions at the migrant worker level. 
Chapter 3 discusses the conceptual framework and methodology used in this study. The 
theories of policy implementation and bounded rationality underpin the rationale for adopting a 
mixed-method approach. These two theories place migrant workers in the roles of both policy 
recipients and individuals confronted with decision-making tasks. The processes and procedures of 
the study’s two sequential phases are then set out: a questionnaire survey followed by semi-
structured interviews to capture migrant workers’ perceptions of taking up the urban pension policy.  
Chapters 4 and 5 provide the empirical findings of the project. Chapter 4 addresses the 
quantitative study, the first phase of the project, analysing first-hand data gathered from March to 
April 2013 in Shenzhen, China, including 252 questionnaires from the fieldwork. Thus, Phase 1 
provides statistical information about migrant workers’ responses to a range of factors that might 
influence their intentions to join the basic urban old-age pension scheme and their understanding of 
the scheme. 
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Chapter 5 reports the Phase 2 results. Twelve participants were drawn from the survey 
respondents, split into two groups based on the survey findings. Primary data were collected 
through in-depth interviews, discussing migrant workers’ perceptions of taking up the basic urban 
old-age pension policy, their intentions and perceived feasibility to join and their understandings of 
it. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with suggestions for further research. It also compares and 
links the key findings identified in the qualitative and quantitative analyses to reveal the groups of 
migrant workers most interested in joining the urban old-age pension scheme and their perceptions 
of it, thus showing how and where the current implementation gap in the scheme at migrant worker 
level might be closed. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Demographic changes and the associated issue of reforming old-age pension systems taking 
place globally give rise to research on population ageing and reform of unsustainable pension 
systems. Like other social policies, pension policy is context specific, and most countries confront 
their unique challenges. Demographic pressures and unfunded pension schemes placed both low- 
and high-income economy countries in a pension crisis and urged them to adjust to a more robust 
pension system (Verbič & Spruk, 2014). In addition to the universal pension issues countries 
around the world face, China has distinctive pension system problems caused by its unique political 
structure and institutional background. 
First in this chapter, studies on the implementation gaps of China’s public policy are 
reviewed to shed light on the root cause of challenges to policy enforcement in China. Then, the 
establishment and structure of a specific public policy, China’s welfare system, are discussed. This 
further elicits the issue of rural migrant workers using the dual rural-urban welfare systems. Taking 
into account rural-urban migrant workers’ multiple roles and the complications of social welfare 
issues in China, literature on China’s social security system, particularly the urban old-age pension 
scheme and its implementation among migrant workers, is analysed to determine what is missing in 
the academic attempts to suggest policy options to best integrate the rural-urban migrant labour 
group into China’s pension system. 
Apart from setting the scene for understanding the context in which the Chinese rural 
migrant workers’ pension policy operates, the themes discussed in this literature review help point 
to some critical factors that potentially influence migrant workers’ decision whether to join the 
pension scheme. Perhaps more relevant to this study, the significance of the literature is its possible 
elimination of factors that limit migrant workers’ capacity to make the most rational calculation or 
evaluation in deciding the merits of taking up the existing pension scheme. Individual migrant 
workers’ decisions to join or not join the scheme cannot be free from realities caused by the 
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implementation challenges of Chinese Government policies in general and migrant workers’ 
pension policy in particular. 
2.1 Implementation Gaps and Inequality in China’s Social Policy 
Sound policies are the foundation of effective governance and economic development in 
every country. However, designing such policies is only half of the puzzle. The more challenging 
half is ensuring the policy is effectively implemented. Too often, the act of formulating a policy is 
regarded as an end in itself because it assumes that policies are well delivered to target recipients 
(Supovitz & Weinbaum, 2008). Overlooked in practice, there is more to administering than merely 
policy design (Wilson, 2013). This phenomenon, known as the policy implementation gap, is the 
difference between what measures policy makers consider and how different levels of government 
deliver them. Policy recipients are affected most by the implementation gap because it directly 
undermines their livelihoods. 
To lay a foundation to discuss the implementation gap in the basic urban pension policy for 
China’s urban-rural migrant workers, this section probes into the root cause of implementation gaps 
in China’s public policies. Previous research on the fundamental reason for China’s implementation 
gap have mainly examined China’s political and policy administration systems from institutional or 
hierarchical perspectives. To understand these studies thoroughly, this section first reviews research 
on China’s implementation gap from each of these perspectives. 
2.1.1 Institutional Gap 
Previous studies that examine the implementation gap of China’s public policies from an 
institutional perspective mainly focus on the ‘institutional gap’ caused by the imbalance found in 
the policy implementation process. There is a lack of balance in China between political policy-
designing institutions and bureaucratic policy-implementing structures (Gustafsson, Li, & Sicular, 
2008). The bureaucracy in China is fragmented, while the political system lags behind in 
supervising the bureaucracies. This ‘institutional imbalance’ results in a bureaucracy that acts 
without much political supervision.  
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Some scholars (Edin, 2003; Landry, 2008) have challenged the existence of the institutional 
gap, arguing that although bureaucracy in China is widely spread across different regions in the 
form of local governments, they are all under CCP control. The bureaucracy exists to maintain 
CCP’s dominance (Yeo, 2016). However, other scholars (Golley, 2007; Mertha, 2009) have argued 
that this group of research has ignored the fact that local bureaucracies in China are established 
based largely on the different regions’ local regulations. The scholars have pointed out that 
fragmentation of the institutional feature of China’s bureaucracy has shaped the incentive to pursue 
local economic growth when implementing public policies. In fact, decentralisation and 
fragmentation have been key features of China’s political structure as demonstrated in fiscal, 
governing and legal aspects (Lampton & Lieberthal, 1992). It has been acknowledged that local 
bureaucracies are also set hierarchically within each province, from township to county, municipal 
and provincial levels (Ahlers & Schubert, 2015). This section mainly discusses these institutional 
imbalances from a horizontal perspective focused on the fragmentation of governing, fiscal and 
legal systems across China’s local governments. One of the most fundamental challenges for rural-
urban migrant workers using the urban pension is the conflict between their mobility and China’s 
institutional fragmentation (Park & Wang, 2010). Thus, understanding China’s institutional gap is 
important to this research. The fragmentation of policy implementation and discord between various 
levels of administration is likely to result in an environment where information can be confusing 
and insufficient, thereby undermining policy recipients’ capacity to make the most advantageous 
decision or choice for their individual circumstances. 
2.1.1.1 Fragmentation of Governing System 
The fragmentation of local governments in China is often referred to as ‘stove-piping’, 
wherein different regional governments communicate only within their own management teams and 
not with others that might be related (Dumbaugh & Martin, 2011). Based on previous research (C. 
K. Chan, Ngok, & Phillips, 2008), China’s stovepipe bureaucracy constitutes a barrier to 
implementing public policy across the nation, especially for enforcing urban pension policy among 
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rural-urban migrant workers who frequently move from one governing unit to another (Dorfman 
et al., 2013). Even when local bureaucracies across China are commanded to implement a public 
policy, the individual ministries do not share information or collaborate with each other (Wu, 2013). 
In addition to the political institution, the lack of inter-government cooperation is also caused by 
fierce competition among overlapping authorities (Carsten & Feng, 2004; Chou, 2009). 
With the decentralised political structure in China, local bureaucracies play a greater role 
delivering public services that range from social security to education (L. Fan, 2011). Previous 
research (Quah, 2013) has shown that local officials’ decision-making could be influenced by their 
ambition for vested benefits based on business ties, family and friendship, which then gives rise to 
corruption. Local bureaus interact most regularly and directly with the public sector and policy 
recipients when, for example, they apply for minimum living allowances, register for temporary 
residences in the city or participate in social security programmes. Therefore, when corruption 
occurs at the local level, the impact on policy recipients’ lives can be the most damaging, with the 
poorest being hit the hardest (Taube, 2011). The mobile nature of rural-urban migrant workers 
requires them to interact with local officials in various regions, which might lead to exploitation of 
their welfare benefits with the corruption of different local governments. 
It might be argued that the central government could demand that local governments meet 
designated tax revenue, birth control or economic growth targets. However, without an independent 
supervisory mechanism, the central government cannot ensure that local authorities do not falsify 
data to meet the set targets or that they do not engage in corruption. It has long been recognised that 
the data manipulation conducted by China’s local governments is widespread, especially in 
economically backward areas where the government cannot meet its economic growth targets 
(Koch-Weser, 2013). Falsifying outstanding data could help local officials show their political 
achievement, win regional competitions and gain promotion (Kaiman, 2013). The feasibility of 
falsifying data might discourage local officials from exerting efforts to properly implement public 
policies, including the urban pension policy in real life. 
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This group of research has revealed that a major barrier to policy implementation lies in 
policy coordination and monitoring, due to China’s fragmented governing system. This barrier 
affects all public policies in China, including the urban pension policy (Frazier, 2010a). The lack of 
effective monitoring systems provides local officials with opportunities to hide their activities from 
scrutiny and ignore central directives that conflict with the benefit of local governments. The 
localised authority also results in fragmented fiscal and jurisdictions in China (C. Shen, Jin, & Zou, 
2006). These highly decentralised fiscal and judicial systems have compromised effective policy 
implementation and contributed to increasing disparities among regions. The following two sections 
review research on how these disparities hinder implementation of China’s public policies. 
2.1.1.2 Fragmentation of Fiscal System 
In transitioning from a planned to a market economy, China made considerable efforts to 
transform the country’s highly centralised fiscal system to a decentralised system that increases 
local governments’ autonomy in implementing fiscal functions, with an aim to increasing the 
development of regional economies (Shevchenko, 2004). However, the decentralised fiscal system 
complicates management of public funds (H. Cai & Treisman, 2006; Y. S. Zhang & Barnett, 2014). 
This is particularly a problem for rural-urban pension participants who expect to transfer their social 
security funds when they move. This issue is discussed further in relation to pension funds 
management and pension transfer in Sections 2.2, 2.4 and 2.5. 
In terms of carrying out public policies under the decentralised fiscal system, the Chinese 
central government has given the regional governments ‘unfunded mandates’ to finance new public 
policies based on parameters the central government establishes (Oi, Zhan, Babiarz, Rozelle, & Luo, 
2012). The urban pension policy researched in the present study is one of the unfunded mandates 
that China’s central government imposes on the local governments. A majority of regional 
governments often faces shortfalls of local revenue, forcing them to depend on other financing 
sources to achieve their ‘unfunded mandates’ (Y. Fan, 2008). Because local government spending 
obligations comprise approximately two-thirds of the total government expenditure, financing is a 
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huge pressure for local governments carrying out public policies (Lam & Wingender, 2015). Grants 
from the central government only partially cover the policy implementation funds. Consequently, 
many regional bureaus finance their budgets with land sales and construction projects through local 
government financing vehicles (J. Wang, 2014).  
Regional governments are comprised of provincial, city, county and township levels of 
administration (C. Shen et al., 2006). Each government level is obliged to maintain a balanced 
budget and provide transfers to its lower government level. Previous research (Lam & Wingender, 
2015) has shown that expenditures of county-level governments are the highest compared with 
other levels of local governments, causing county-level localities to rely heavily on transfers from 
upper levels. Due to the local financing system’s dependence on transfers from upper-level 
governments, local entities at the same administrative level compete for scarce funding resources, 
capital collection and recognition from officials in the higher level (L. He & Bao, 2015). The 
promotion of local officials also largely depends on local economic development and the increase of 
local revenues (Dunford & Liu, 2014). 
The rising spending on public policies weakens local finances. Thus, despite strong demands 
for better delivery of public services such as social security, local bureaus are only incentivised by 
rewards of local revenues. As a result, the local governments mainly compete for commercial 
business programmes that would drive growth in the local economy and demonstrate the local 
official’s political achievement (H. Cai & Treisman, 2006). Empirical research (J. Wang, 2014) on 
the competition among China’s local governments has proved their passion for commercial projects.  
For instance, the regional governments that govern highly profitable Chinese businesses such as 
tobacco companies take advantage of the profit-driven opportunity and actively involve themselves 
in the local tobacco business for more market shares (Mao, Jiang, Yurekli, Hu, & Tao, 2007). 
The real estate bubble in the last decade led to the local governments’ dependence on land 
sales for income (accounting for up to 50% of local revenue) (J. Wang, 2014). However, in 
providing social security programmes, the local governments appear passive in contrast with their 
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enthusiasm for commercial projects. The motivation of increasing local revenues leads local 
officials to embezzle funds of non-profitable policies such as social security programmes in order to 
implement commercial projects (C. K. Chan et  al., 2008). One scandal related to embezzlement of 
urban pension funds is discussed in Section 2.4. When delegating a public task to regional 
governments, the central government must ensure the task is funded sufficiently. ‘Unfunded 
mandates’ often lead to strategic design failures. Grants such as shares of centrally collected taxes 
from the central budget or revenues collected by the local government are the main funding sources 
for the implementation of public policies (Ngok & Chan, 2015). Because implementing social 
security programmes requires local authorities to spend their locally collected revenues, local 
governments are discouraged from implementing the programme (C. K. Chan et al., 2008). 
Previous studies (A. Chen & Groenewold, 2013) have also uncovered that under the 
decentralised fiscal system, the lack of public reporting for budget planning and expenditure control 
can challenge local budget management at the regional level. Without an accurate assessment of 
government resources, the local government usually ends up misallocating resources, which makes 
public service delivery less effective and efficient. The absence of complete and transparent reports 
on local governments’ financial positions also contributes to governance issues such as corruption. 
For instance, China’s decentralised statistical system maintains no consolidated account of data on 
social security funds at the national level. Even if consolidated records exist at the local government 
level, they do not publically report social security funds either (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2015a). 
Under this fragmented fiscal systems, the numerous ill-coordinated public policies 
implementers focus mainly on vesting local economic revenue (A. Chen & Groenewold, 2013). 
China’s top-down political system neither guarantees compliance from implementers nor provides 
adequate information for policy makers to monitor policy implementation and exercise sanctions 
effectively. More importantly, the incentive systems at local government level go against the aim of 
implementing public policies. For example, the performance appraisal systems of local officials 
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drive them to emphasise short-term growth of local revenue but ignore the welfare of local citizens. 
Thus, despite strong demands for greater provision of public services, local officials are 
incentivised by reward and patronage to focus on GDP rather than public policy outcomes. One can 
draw from the above discussion, based on the literature on implementation challenges in Chinese 
public policy, that recipients engage with policies relevant to them in contexts not conducive to 
making the most informed decisions. Making a decision in such a policy implementation minefield 
is likely to pose stern cognitive and informational challenges. 
One might argue that despite the lack of motivation for local governments to implement 
non-commercial policies, judicial systems can regulate implementation of social policies. However, 
China’s incomplete legal system and weak law enforcement, rather than narrowing the 
implementation gap, they in fact create more barriers to successful policy implementation. The next 
section explains how China’s legal systems hinder the process of implementing public policies. 
2.1.1.3 Fragmentation of Judicial System and Weak Law Enforcement 
In countries with independent judicial institutions, a range of bottom-up channels can help 
monitor governmental behaviour and accountability. Independent judicial systems evaluate whether 
local officials implement public policies in accordance with national law (Minzner, 2007). Although 
corrupt officials might be removed through free elections, these channels do not exist under China’s 
one-party system. Local Chinese party secretaries exercise sweeping control over the local media, 
legislatures and courts. At the local level, authorities are held accountable through unofficial rules 
and norms (L. Zhao, 2013). China’s fragmented judiciary and absence of a well-developed body of 
social security rules refined through judicial interpretation and supervision have left a system that 
fails to adequately protect rural-urban migrants’ interests and entitlements under the urban pension 
scheme. 
The absence of rules in a legal system is also regarded by scholars (Diamant, Lubman, & 
O’Brien, 2005) as one of the root causes behind the failure of many policy implementations in 
China. Without judicial independence, strict law enforcement and watchdog organisations, 
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corruption often disturbs the judicial system itself, so effectively prohibiting corruption during 
public policy implementation may not even be possible (Chow, 2004). China has long been 
criticised for a judiciary system that is a fertile ground for corruption (Minzner,2007; Quah,2013). 
The Chinese Government always claims judicial corruption is idiosyncratic behaviour limited to a 
few ‘black sheep’. However, corruption has gone beyond individual behaviours. It has become 
institutionalised, especially at the local government level (deLisle & Goldstein, 2014). China’s 
litigation mechanisms and law enforcement are not yet well developed, and its legal system is 
imperfect compared with that of Western developed economies (Chow, 2004).  
Localism intensifies China’s incomplete legal system and weak enforcement of central 
policies (Goodman & Segal, 2002). For instance, although the central government designed the 
Social Insurance Law which took effect in 2011, its implementation is mostly at the whim of local 
governments. The Ministry of Labour and Human Resources lacks authority to intervene in local 
enforcement actions and thus depends on social security bureaus to enforce the law (Moser & Yu, 
2014; Reintgen, 2014). Since local governments fund and manage the local bureaus, they can 
exercise authority over social policy implementation of social policies, and have been widely 
known to protect the local economy and sometimes even personal interests rather than stimulating 
law enforcement (Clarke, 2008). Policies and regulations designed by the central government can 
be modified considerably by local bureaus during their implementation of the central government’s 
directives. The localisation of implementing public policies also means that the mechanisms to 
collect and transfer resources and to support the policy needs of local people have been left to local 
governments. 
In conclusion, the fragmented governing, fiscal and judicial systems have left policy 
recipients heavily dependent on the efforts of local bureaus to collect adequate resources within 
their jurisdictions for the implementation of public policies. When stepping out of their jurisdictions, 
issues caused by inconsistent policies among regions pose challenges for policy recipients. 
Retaining the same entitlements in different regions has always challenged Chinese public policy 
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recipients. One consequence of the absence of a coherent and refined legal environment for policy 
implementation is that policy recipients have less opportunity to know their entitlements and 
benefits under a public policy. In turn, this lack of knowledge further diminishes recipients’ 
capacity to make the best possible choice for their individual circumstances. The institutional 
barrier can be further demonstrated with examples of conflicts of interests being caused between 
local government interests and their implementation of the basic urban pension policy among rural-
urban migrant workers (see Section 2.5). 
2.1.2 Hierarchical Trust 
The previous sections regarding institutional barriers for policy implementation in China 
show that public policy in China is implemented mainly by local governments. However, some 
research (Braithwaite & Levi, 2003; H. Liu & Raine, 2016) has shown that Chinese citizens trust 
local governments less than the central government, demonstrating that ‘hierarchical government 
trust’ prevails in China. This section discusses the impacts of this hierarchical trust on the 
implementation of public policy, paving a way to understand migrant workers’ perceptions of local 
governments during their decision-making process of taking up the urban pension policy. 
In countries with electoral democracies such as the US and Japan, citizens tend to have more 
trust in the local bureaus than in the central government (Cole & Kincaid, 2000). The reason behind 
this paradox of distance is that democratic elections help build a stronger relationship between local 
bureaus and their voters, which reinforces the public trust (Panagopoulos & Weinschenk, 2015). 
However, without a democratic political institution that allows elections for authorities, would the 
hierarchical trust demonstrate a reverse pattern in China, an authoritarian one-party state?  
Previous research (Diamond & Myers, 2001) has observed a prevalence of hierarchical trust 
in China. Chinese citizens have stronger trust in the central government than in local authorities 
(Saich, 2012). In China, massive land expropriation, with fast-paced industrialisation and 
urbanisation triggered the hierarchical trust issue for local governments. Under China’s land system, 
citizens do not have the right to own property; instead, they have only usage rights (Oi & Walder, 
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1999). The ownership right belongs to the village collectives. When selling land, the local 
authorities exercise the ownership right on behalf of village collectives and decide the price with the 
property developer (World Bank, & Development Research Center of the State Council, the 
People’s Republic of China, 2014). The local government retains most of the profits and offer only 
a small amount to land-losing farmers as compensation. Because the compensation is far from 
adequate and normally 5% to 10% of the market rates, land-losing individuals feel the local 
government seriously exploited them (OECD, 2015a). It has been estimated that approximately two 
million rural residents lose land each year in China (OECD, 2010). Local governments often 
requisition the land for the ‘public interest’ without the consent of property holders (World Bank, & 
Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, 2014). 
It has been found that the incentives for local government to continue the practice of land 
requisition are the collection of local revenue rather than the so-called ‘public interest’ (C. Wang, 
2016; World Bank, & Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of 
China, 2014). Local officials sell expropriated land to real estate developers who offer profits in 
return. These profits constitute a major source of local government revenue and GDP growth, 
approximating 30% of the total annual local government budget in recent years. In many big cities, 
the figure has reached 50% (C. Nelson, 2012). It has been reported that almost half of the local 
government debt in 2010 was repaid by land sale profits (C. Nelson, 2012). 
Despite increasing group protests against land expropriation, local governments regard such 
incentives as a legitimate practice to attract investment projects and boost local revenue. The huge 
economic incentives have led to massive forced land expropriation across China, jeopardising the 
reputation of local governments (Teets & Hurst, 2014). The compulsory land requisitions conducted 
by local authorities cause grievances and violent conflicts today. The land expropriation process is 
normally not based on rules and regulations, and even involves violent confrontation with residents 
who refuse to give up the land (Mendes & Srighanthan, 2009; Yeh, O’Brien, & Ye, 2016). The 
dispute over land expropriation and house demolition has intensified tensions between local bureaus 
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and land-expropriated citizens. As the exploitation continues, land-expropriated peasants are forced 
to move to cities and become rural-urban migrant workers; therefore, the trust in local government 
is a particular issue for migrant workers who have dealt with local officials during land requisition. 
The experience of being exploited by local governments might influence some rural-urban migrants’ 
decisions to take up public policies implemented by local bureaucracies. Thus, rural migrant 
workers’ decisions on whether to take up the pension scheme can, at least in some cases, be 
influenced more by their lack of trust of local officials than by the real merits of the policy. Such an 
evaluation of a choice thus becomes more emotional rather than rational. 
Since trust is important for increasing public confidence, to a large extent it decides the 
outcome of implementing policies that rely heavily on behavioural responses from the public 
(OECD, 2015b). Lack of trust compromises the citizens’ willingness to respond to a wide range of 
public policies. As a result, many government policies, programmes and regulations that depend on 
public cooperation and compliance have failed (Brown, 1994). For instance, social security 
programmes in China that include basic pension insurance, basic medical insurance, work-related 
injury insurance, unemployment insurance and maternity insurance have a low uptake rate, 
especially among rural-urban migrant workers (Pan & Wei, 2015). Based on the review of the 
literature in this section on public trust, one of the reasons for such low take-up might be the rural-
urban migrants’ lack of trust in local governments that once exploited them during land 
expropriation. However, how this lack of trust in local officials affects migrant workers’ decisions 
regarding the social security programme needs to be studied. 
In summary, previous research has studied China’s policy gap from the perspective of 
institutional shaping and hierarchical trust. Institutionally, public policy in China is implemented 
across different fiscal, juridical and governing units driven by their own political and economic 
interests. Local officials strive to obtain more economic benefits through quick and profitable 
projects while coping with unfunded mandates designated by the central government as part of their 
duty to implement public policies. Local officials are incentivised to show their political 
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achievement with increasing local revenue. Therefore, they put more effort into implementing 
commercial projects than public policies, whose unfunded mandates would add to their financial 
burden instead of bringing economic returns. The fragmented juridical and governing systems at 
local and regional levels give rise to different local regulations even for the same public policy, 
which hinders the implementation of any national policy (Goodman & Segal, 2002). 
Moreover, China’s multi-level government generates hierarchical public trust in government 
agencies at national and local levels. Individuals who trust the national government that designs the 
policy may not trust the local bureaucracies that implement the policy. Likewise, those who trust 
the local government may not believe that policies designed by the central government benefit them. 
Public policies are implemented through hierarchical relation chains, wherein local implementers 
and policy makers are separate but dependent for successful policy enforcement. As such, the 
fragmented implementation structure and public trust for different levels of government have 
complicated policy enforcement in China. The complication is demonstrated through the 
implementation gap and inequality of social policies mainly caused by the institutional structures of 
China’s political systems, uncooperative local implementers and issues of public trust triggered by 
the hierarchical structure of government.  
This section’s discussions have also noted these implementation barriers for public policy 
become more problematic when the target policy recipients involve rural-urban migrant workers. 
The conflict between China’s fragmented political model and the mobile nature of rural-urban 
migrant workers, and these workers’ distrust in policy implementers caused by their land-
expropriated experience, could widen the policy implementation gap. Having borne in mind barriers 
for the implementation of public policies in China, particularly among rural-urban migrant workers, 
the following sections discuss how welfare and pension systems are established and implemented in 
China’s political context, as well as their delivery to rural-urban migrant workers. 
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2.2 Welfare and Pension Systems in China 
China is currently in the midst of significant demographic changes, including a rapidly 
expanding elderly population, shrinking family size and rural-urban labour migration (Powell & 
Chen, 2012). The increasing elderly population and changing family structure have resulted, in part, 
from China’s one-child policy implemented in 1979, combined with significant increases in 
longevity (Dong & Wang, 2014).12 Research (China Center for Economic Research, 2011) has 
projected that the proportion of people aged 60 or above will climb to 34% in 2050—from 12% in 
2013. The quickly ageing population and the 1–2–4 family structure (one child, two parents and 
four grandparents) challenge family resources to support the elderly (Hesketh, Lu, & Xing, 2005). 
In addition to domestic determinants of elderly population growth in the city such as the low 
mortality and fertility, migrant workers in China make up a significant share of the urban 
population—almost 40% (Geoff, 2008). Facing multiple demographic challenges resulting from 
social and policy changes—such as the change in family structure and rural-urban migration—
China’s welfare and pension systems have been widely researched for their capacity to cope with 
China’s increasing welfare needs. 
2.2.1 The Establishment of China’s Welfare and Pension Systems 
The existing literature has explained the establishment of China’s current social welfare 
policy from various angles. One prevalent view is that changes in social and economic structures 
caused incompatibility between the old social welfare policy and the market economy; thus, welfare 
reforms were required to eliminate these incompatibilities step by step (Guan, 2005; Saunders & 
Shang, 2001). According to these bodies of research, the rise of the market economy since the 
1980s has gradually shifted China’s social policy towards a neo-liberal pattern (A. d. Haan, 2013). 
Because of this shift, the government ceased its traditional price-subsidy policy for basic needs in 
urban regions of China. The market economy calls for a more integrated social welfare system to 
                                                             
12 Longevity in China has increased from 62.91 years in 1970 to 75.20 years in 2010, according to World Bank (2014) 
data. 
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compensate for the loss of the ‘direct-planned welfare provision’ in cities. The new urban welfare 
system redistributes social wealth by pooling funds gained through taxation and then redistributing 
them based on welfare principles. This redistributive process makes the welfare system more 
sophisticated than it was under a planned economy. Scholars have viewed the incompatibility as the 
primary ground for welfare reform and as the most important point supporting their claim: 
Marketisation does not confine its effects to economy; it also penetrates into a wide range of social 
areas, which, to some extent, affect welfare provision (Malesky & London, 2014). 
Another body of literature (Carrillo & Duckett, 2011; Saich, 2012) has paid attention to 
trends of social welfare provision in the transition from socialist to welfare pluralism.13 The focus 
on local diversity recognises that local governments often implement regional welfare schemes in 
accordance with the specifics of their economic and social circumstances. In addition, the literature 
has discussed non-state welfare (e.g., family, commercial organisations and third sector) created by 
the economic and social circumstances. This diversity in the local public policy implementation 
resulting from the decentralised political structure was discussed as one feature of the inequality of 
social policy and part of the institutional gap in China in Section 2.1.1. 
Recent studies (L. Zhang, 2013; Kettunen, Kuhnle & Ren, 2014) have tended to view 
China’s increasing welfare expenditures, especially on pension systems, as attempts to defend the 
legitimacy of the CCP. They have taken a perspective of historical institutionalism to account for 
why pension reforms after the privatisation of local SOEs took the path they did, despite other 
alternatives. Specifically, local bureaucracies suffering the loss of SOE revenues could benefit from 
the fragmented pension system. Fiscal decentralisation at the local government level allows them to 
institute a taxation mechanism, retain pension funding and avoid local unrest caused by the collapse 
of local SOEs (see discussion in Section 2.1.1.2). Based on this opinion, China reformed its welfare 
                                                             
13 Welfare pluralism, sometimes referred to as the ‘mixed economy of welfare’, has played an increasingly prominent 
role in social policy discourse since the late 1970s, providing pluralistic arrangements for the provision of social 
welfare—although not necessarily at the expense of state-sponsored provisions. 
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systems to retain its political constituency and stabilise the Communist ruling power—rather than to 
benefit Chinese citizens. These studies have also pointed out how institutions shaped rural and 
urban citizens’ pensions preferences and highlighted dangers in the way the system has developed. 
However, this view conflicts with that of another group of scholars (e.g., L. Zhao & Lim, 
2010) who have emphasised that welfare reforms were for urban-rural harmonisation, propelled by 
government attempts to achieve a ‘harmonious society’. This second group has claimed that China 
is gradually dismantling the institutional basis for the urban-rural divide and is en route to becoming 
a modern welfare state that provides welfare to both rural and urban citizens. These scholars have 
also claimed that the fragmentation of pension systems will move to integration, as with other 
welfare states in history. 
Previous literature has also discussed the urgent issue of empty14 accounts caused by the 
transition of pension systems and demographic changes in China (X. Chen, 2012; Cozzarin & Farid, 
2009; Q. Sun & Maxwell, 2002). Specifically, many people who worked under the ‘planning’ 
economy retired after the establishment of the new system and did not accumulate a pension under 
the current system. Consequently, their pension benefits were ‘borrowed’ from the current funding 
of their individual pension accounts (H. Peng, Chen, & Zhan, 2008). China’s one-child policy and 
improved longevity has led to the country’s shrinking workforce and increasing number of retirees 
(Chesnais & Wang, 1989; England, 2005; Powell & Chen, 2012). Thus, current contributions are 
not enough to pay current benefits. This deficiency has buried individual accounts in debt. By 2010, 
only 203.90 billion yuan (US $32.37 billion) remained in the individual accounts instead of the 
needed 1.96 trillion yuan (US $0.31  trillion). The total deficit was 1.76 trillion yuan (US $0.28 
trillion) (Hu, 2012). 
                                                             
14 The word ‘empty’ here refers to individual accounts that are currently in debt and facing increasing deficits. Since the 
beginning of China’s pension model, which is a mix of DB PAYG and defined contribution (DC) systems, the 
premiums paid by employees and employers into personal pension fund accounts have paid the pensions of those who 
have already retired. However, due to transitional costs and decreasing numbers of working-aged people in the society, 
the individual accounts of this pension system have accumulated mounting deficits (Q. Sun & Maxwell, 2002). 
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2.2.2 Rural-Urban Dual Welfare Model 
Besides fragmentation, another important factor is the sharp urban-rural divide resulting 
from the recent hukou system established at the outset of the Communist regime as a unique feature 
of the Chinese welfare state (Ngok & Chan, 2015). Whereas welfare systems have been generous 
and comprehensive in urban regions, they are marginal and overly simplified in rural areas (Alm & 
Liu, 2013; Imai & You, 2014). Based on empirical evidence from the China Household Income 
Project data (1988-2007) (NBS, 2007), research has analysed the functioning ability of the Chinese 
welfare state (Gao, Yang, & Li, 2013; Luo, 2012). The findings have shown that the Chinese 
welfare state is strikingly different along rural-urban lines. Specifically, the urban welfare state is 
relatively advanced and similar to systems in developed Western countries, but the rural welfare 
state is regressive and similar to those in the least industrialised countries. The large gaps between 
urban and rural welfare provision and progressivity indicate a contrast in the rural-urban divide. 
Despite the large differences between the two systems, a multitude of literature (Dorfman et al., 
2013; Huang, 2013; Li,2014) has discussed prospects for eventual integration of rural pensions and 
urban old-age pension schemes. 
The literature discussed above has viewed both urban and rural welfare systems as 
components of the Chinese welfare state and researched the national welfare system as a whole. 
However, they have also researched the systems separately. In terms of the rural old-age pension, 
ample research has recorded how family-dependent old-age care in Chinese rural regions evolved to 
social pension systems (F. Cai & World Bank, 2012). The new rural pension insurance, 
implemented in October 2009, is funded simply by individual contributions and government 
subsidies. This rural pension insurance has been widely criticised for being too low as a basic 
pension component at a rate of (around US $8) per month (C. Shen & Williamson, 2010; Wang & 
Béland, 2014). As the average monthly expenditure in rural China is around 200 yuan (about US 
$30), the benefits of the new rural pension are not sufficient to cover the average living costs in 
rural China (Y. Yang, Williamson & Shen, 2010). Research conducted on the net effect of China’s 
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new rural pension scheme on household income inequality (B. Lu, 2012) has shown that the rural 
public pension could significantly diminish the rural income inequality in poor regions but has only 
a small impact in affluent provinces. 
Compared with the rural pension system, the urban pension system—with its more 
comprehensive structure of combining the PAYG system with a funded system and more urgent 
challenges—has drawn more attention from scholars. A large body of literature (Y. Cai & Cheng, 
2014; Dong & Wang, 2014; Y. Zhao & Xu, 2002) has concentrated on the major and urgent 
challenges the urban system faces. The authors have realised that some problems are the 
consequence of demographic trends, such as decreased family size and rural-urban migration, but 
other problems lie in the pension scheme’s fundamental structure. This group of research has taken 
mainly a macro view, focused on challenges deriving from the urban pension system design—
particularly its fragmentation and sustainability. Previous research has identified the high degree of 
fragmentation of the urban pension scheme as a primary impediment to pension transferability 
(Pozen, 2013), and found the administration of China’s urban pension scheme extremely 
decentralised, with pension records administered at more than 2,000 low-level jurisdictions. 
Further, the urban old-age pension account is financed and managed by local governments 
under different regulations, adding complexities for migrant workers who seek to transfer their 
pension records from one local government to another. In theory, pension members can transfer 
their full individual account balances plus 12% of their social pooling funds to the new work 
jurisdiction; however, in practice, most migrant workers prefer to remain non-pension members to 
avoid the complex procedures and to retain flexibility (B. Lu & Piggott, 2012). The fragmentation 
and decentralisation of urban pension implementation is caused by China’s institutional structures 
(see Section 2.1.1). Due to the decentralisation of implementation of the welfare policy, public trust 
in local governments, which are the implementer of the welfare policy, also poses a challenge for 
increasing the uptake rate of these policies (Diamond & Myers, 2001). (See discussion of the issues 
regarding hierarchical trusts in Section 2.1.2.) 
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Scholars have identified another major issue in the unsustainability of the pension funds and 
empty individual accounts. According to World Bank (2012) research, although the working-age 
population has continued to decline, people over 60 years old account for 13% of the Chinese 
population; this number will rise to around 17% by 2015. In 2013, one Chinese pensioner was 
supported by an average of five working-age people, but this ratio may drop to one supported by 
fewer than two working-age people by 2050 (Pozen, 2013). China’s increasing difficulty to make 
pension payouts has undermined its citizens’ trust in the pension system (Q. Sun & Maxwell, 2002). 
Research regarding the weakness of China’s urban pension scheme has led to additional 
studies on reform strategies to possibly rectify flaws in the urban pension system. Scholars (Barr & 
Diamond, 2008; Feldstein & Jeffrey, 2006; J. B. Williamson & Deitelbaum, 2005; J. B. Williamson, 
Price, & Shen, 2012) have most widely recommended adoption of a notional or ‘non-financial’ 
defined contribution (NDC)15 pension system as a solution for China to better cope with its pension 
payout obligations and to reduce pension system fragmentation. Unsustainability of pension funds 
caused by DB PAYG systems has posed challenges in many countries (Boeri & Galasso, 2010). 
Having realised this challenge, countries such as Switzerland, Italy and Poland are transitioning to a 
fully funded system with the adoption of an NDC structure (Belloni & MacCheroni, 2013; 
Holzmann, 2006; Holzmann, Palmer, Robalino, & World Bank, 2012). 
Nevertheless, some studies have been sceptical about applying NDC in China. Under NDC, 
the state is the monopoly provider of services and benefits (Blake, 2011). To ensure a sustainable 
pension supply, the country must provide these benefits stably and cannot change the agreement in 
the long term. Switzerland, where NDC is a successful pension model, has seven major political 
parties and a modern democratic constitution dating to 1848. Switzerland’s multiparty system and 
well-established, stable democracy made the country advantageous for NDC. However, as a 
                                                             
15. The NDC treats the DB PAYG system, which could result in pension-funding deficits, as DC PAYG. That is, the 
linkage between contributions and benefits is individualised, with a ‘fictitious’ balance allocated in the individual’s 
account. It is considered ‘fictitious’ because the PAYG system does not accumulate capital (Robalino, Holzmann, & 
Palmer, 2013). 
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dominant-party state with political repression, China lacks checks and balances on the legislature, 
judiciary and executive branches of the CCP to keep its actions always accountable (J. Chen, 2004; 
D. Roberts, 2014; Yu, Li & Lieberthal, 2014). The high level of political repression in single-party 
states could threaten stability, such as it did in the Soviet Union under Stalin during the Great 
Purge,16 China under Mao during the Cultural Revolution17 and North Korea’s repressive system of 
Communist control throughout its rule. This potential instability in single-party dominance with 
repressive policies may render China unable to maintain the macro stability needed to make long-
term pension promises trustworthy. Further, the massive corruption caused by the single-party state 
has made China’s economic capacity questionable for stable pension payments in the long run 
(Wedeman, 2012). Despite constant anti-corruption campaigns in China such as Xi’s sweeping anti-
corruption campaign, since 201318 Western critics have argued these campaigns are doomed to fail 
without free press and judicial independence (Shay, 2014).19 Without legally recognised opposition 
parties keeping check and a strong public voice applying pressure on a highly centralised form of 
government, systemic corruption in the one-party regime is unavoidable. Thus, transparency and 
accountability in the funding process might be difficult to accomplish if China adopts the NDC as 
its urban old-age pension system. 
                                                             
16 The Great Purge was a political repression launched by Joseph Stalin from 1934 to 1940. It featured widespread 
imprisonment, arbitrary executions, suspicion of saboteurs and repression of farmers. British historian Robert Conquest 
(1968) referred to this purge as ‘The Great Terror’. 
17 The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was a sociopolitical movement in China that punished people who showed any 
trace of disagreement with the CCP.  
18 Since Xi’s presidency in early 2013, he has executed a crackdown on corruption at all levels of government and state-
owned industry. 
19. The Chinese Government has long kept tight censorship on the media to avoid potential sabotage of Communist 
control. Any word that the government sees as a potential threat to authority can be blocked in the media. Further, 
China’s judicial system continues to depend on a variety of governmental controls that interfere with its decision-
making. Internally, the adjudication committee decides cases without hearing them, and has been criticised for 
‘handling a case in camera’ (暗箱操作). Externally, decisions on legal cases are influenced by the Party, the People’s 
Congress and local governments. 
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Besides the adoption of NDC, other strategies have been identified to combat the looming 
crisis China’s urban old-age pension faces include raising the retirement age, reducing the pension 
replacement rate and increasing contribution rates (Dorfman et al., 2013). However, some research 
(Murphy, 2009) has argued that these strategies, which cut retirees’ benefits, would lead to loss of 
political credibility because many people view pension benefits as a social entitlement that must be 
defended. 
In summary, China’s welfare and pension systems are confronted with challenges caused by 
a set of issues ingrained in the country’s institutional system and structure of the welfare 
programmes. The fragmented governing, fiscal and judicial systems, the urban-rural divide and the 
unsustainability of the social insurance system all complicate the implementation of China’s welfare 
policies. This complication is intensified by rural-urban migration. Enabling rural-urban migrant 
workers, who live and work in cities but hold rural hukou, to use the divided social security system 
is one of the most urgent issues faced by public policy implementation in China. The next section 
outlines the literature on implementation and reform of social security schemes in relation to rural-
urban migrant workers. 
2.3 Social Security for China’s Rural-Urban Migrant Workers 
With the dual identity of being rural citizens and urban workers, migrant workers have 
become a sensitive group since the reform and opening up of China. Although they are not 
registered as urban citizens, they live in cities and are supposed to enjoy social security services as 
other urban citizens. However, China’s divided social security systems, established under the urban-
rural dual citizenship system, complicate migrant workers’ use of social security programmes 
(Watson, 2010). Discussions on migrant workers’ entitlements of social protection and their 
participation in social security systems have drawn extensive attention from scholars. This section 
reviews studies that examined how rural-urban migrant workers as rural citizens use social security 
programmes in cities. 
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Because rural-urban migrant workers are products of China’s hukou system, which 
segregates Chinese into rural and urban citizens, some scholars (R. Tao & Xu, 2007; Murphy, 2008; 
Watson, 2010; H. Wang, Guo, & Cheng, 2013; L. Zhang & Wang, 2010) have taken a citizenship 
perspective and focused on hukou when discussing the issue of rural-urban migrant workers joining 
the social security system. They have argued that the institutional discrimination and systematic 
exclusion caused by the hukou system make people with rural hukou inferior to their urban 
counterparts in many aspects of life, including participation in urban social security programmes (P. 
C. Lan, 2014). In their view, rural-urban migrant workers with rural hukou cannot join the basic 
urban pension scheme because the entitlement to join is confined to urban hukou holders. However, 
this view has been challenged by recent research (Z. Cheng, Nielsen, & Smyth, 2014; Cheung, 2013; 
Nielsen & Smyth, 2008; Oxoby, 2009), which asserts that with policies aiming for rural-urban 
integration20 in the recent decade, rural-urban migrant workers are entitled to join the urban social 
security programmes even without urban hukou. These policies are in response to the demand for 
social inclusion and protection in the context of globalisation, where the development of economy 
is fuelled by informal labours in developing countries. Thus, technically, hukou is no longer a 
barrier for rural-urban migrant workers to joining the urban social security programmes including 
the urban pension scheme. 
Nevertheless, some researchers (Solinger, 1999; L. Zhang & Wang, 2010) have argued that 
although the national policies in relation to the welfare of migrant workers and hukou system have 
been implemented to facilitate rural-urban integration and alleviate the social inequality, these 
policies are far from effective to provide migrant workers with full citizen right in cities. In China’s 
                                                             
20 From 2004 to 2009, the Chinese Government issued a series of documents, such as ‘New State Funding for Culture, 
Education and Health for Rural Citizens’, ‘The Construction of a New Socialist Countryside’ and provisions allowing 
‘Industry to Support the Development of Agriculture and Cities to Support the Development of Rural Regions’, with an 
aim to facilitate urban-rural integration. In particular, the ‘Decision by the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party on Some Important Issues Regarding the Development of Rural Reform’, passed in 2008, outlined 
recent strategies and policies on the development of integrated rural and urban regions and announced new measures 
and policies. 
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reform era, urban hukou is used by city governments not only to exclude some members of society 
from accessing urban welfare but also to make the urban economy more competitive. Specifically, 
the cities grab the capital and human resources rural-urban migrants possess, at the cost of the 
migrants’ wellbeing and equal rights with urban citizens (L. Zhang & Wang, 2010). Previous 
research (Zhu, 2014) has shown that although they live in the city, migrant workers normally live 
with other rural people and urban poor in ‘village in the city’ (chengzhongcun), referring to rural 
communities located in city areas mainly composed of disorderly, run-down and low-rent 
apartments. This indicates that despite policies aimed to equalise the rights of rural and urban 
citizens technically, in reality, it remains difficult for rural-urban migrants to assimilate into urban 
life and enjoy social welfare in all aspects of their lives. Because the unequal status of rural-urban 
citizens is caused by the hukou system, the citizenship approach attributes the root cause of rural 
migrants with insufficient social security rights to their lack of urban hukou. It should be noted that 
China will continue to reform its hukou system with its long-term urbanisation plan which aims to 
be complete by 2020 (Tiezzi, 2016). The literature discussed above relates to different periods, and 
therefore findings of future research on the issue of access to social security system and migrant 
workers’ hukou predicaments might change due to China’s changing policies. 
 From an institutional perspective, scholars (Frazier, 2010b; Park & Wang, 2010) have 
examined this issue from the angle of China’s decentralised governing, fiscal and legal system21 in 
relation to local governments’ implementation of social security programmes. In China, public 
policies are handed down to the local governments in the form of unfunded mandates (Y. Fan, 
2008). Because the central government does not fund mandates regarding social security 
programmes, the local government must fund social security programmes such as the old-age 
pension, workplace injury compensation, medical insurance and unemployment payments (Saich, 
2010). Local officials bear direct responsibility for implementing these unfunded mandates. This 
                                                             
21 China’s governing, fiscal and legal system and how it affects the urban pension has also been discussed in Section 
2.1.1. 
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system leads to huge bribes and corruptions. The Shanghai pension scandal22 has attracted the most 
attention and arguably is the biggest corruption case in the history of the PRC, with billions of 
RMB and the highest-ranking city officials involved (Barr & Diamond, 2008). Increasing local 
revenues is the main evaluation criterion for government officials’ political achievement in China. 
Thus, local officials focus more on commercial projects that could boost local revenues efficiently 
than on implementing social security programmes (Frazier, 2010b). For instance, the pension funds 
corrupted by Shanghai’s local government were used for real estate projects that could increase its 
local revenues rapidly and highlight the local official’s political achievement (Barr & Diamond, 
2008). 
The decentralised fiscal and governing systems that lead to local officials’ lack of 
motivation to implement social security programmes affects all Chinese citizens. More particularly, 
the decentralised and fragmented judicial system hinders migrant workers’ use of the social security 
system (Mendes & Srighanthan, 2009). Owing to the highly localised nature of the judicial system 
in China, sharing information on social security rules among different jurisdictions is fraught with 
bureaucratic and technical difficulties (Dumbaugh & Martin, 2011). For migrant workers who move 
frequently between jurisdictions, their use of social security programmes is subject to the decisions 
of local officials who implement local rules to satisfy their interests (Ngok & Chan, 2015). 
Although the Social Insurance Law aims to unify legislations on social security programmes across 
China, it cannot change the judicial systems’ decentralisation and fragmentation that impede 
migrant workers from assimilating social security rules created at the whim of local officials.  
As discussed above, most previous research on the provision of social security scheme for 
rural-urban migrant workers is conducted with a focus on China’s broad policy and citizenship 
context. These top-down approaches have viewed China’s political system as a hindrance to 
                                                             
22 The Shanghai pension scandal began in 2006 when the central authorities sacked Chen Liangyu, the Shanghai Party 
Chief, and Zhu Junyi, Director of the Shanghai Municipal Labour and Social Security Bureau, which administers the 
city’s pension funds. They were charged with embezzling RMB 3.2 billion ($US 490 million) from pension funds to 
support a private real-estate business to bid for road construction and real-estate projects. 
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migrant workers’ use of social security system. However, some scholars (Nielsen & Smyth, 2008; 
Solinger, 1999) have attempted to examine this issue from the perspective of the rural-urban 
migrant workers to whom the social security policy is communicated. They aim to investigate how 
the decision to join the social security system is influenced by migrant workers’ perceived class 
identity. Guided by class theory, most of these researchers explained migrant workers’ difficulties 
in utilising the social security system by highlighting their underclass status. These scholars have 
claimed that despite the prevalent Maoist celebration of peasants’ virtue, China places rural workers 
in the difficult and undesirable status of an exploited underclass forced to support the development 
of its urban economy. Researching migrant workers from social justice and equality perspectives, 
these studies have attributed migrant workers’ lack of social security to the society’s routine 
exploitation of the underclass. Using empirical evidence, they have indicated that rural-urban 
migrant workers are seriously underpaid and employed mainly in demeaning, dangerous and dirty 
jobs with employers ignoring labour rights (L. Wong, 2011). Facing social discrimination in cities, 
rural-urban migrant workers often engage in physically demanding jobs and experience 
psychological poverty due to social exclusion and feelings of helplessness and isolation (Nielsen & 
Smyth, 2008). The abusive labour relations, unjust rewards and exploitative working conditions 
cause rural-urban migrant workers to form part of China’s underclass, struggling to meet basic 
needs in cities, let alone enjoy social security programmes (J. Schwartz & Shieh, 2009). 
However, recent research (Frenkel & Yu, 2015) has challenged this commonly recognised 
view, comparing the criteria of underclass and working class through class theory and empirical 
studies. The research findings indicate that most migrant workers are transitioning to working class 
in terms of economic and labour conditions, political status and social conditions, but many 
remaining issues impede this transition. For instance, although the proportion of migrant workers 
who signed employment contracts rose in the last few years, the contracts have been contentious. 
Based on Sun Yat-sen University’s (2009) survey findings, the migrants’ employment contracts 
were mostly for less than a year. Among the surveyed migrant workers who signed contracts, 
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around 37% regarded the contracts as unfair and about 20% were unsure about the fairness of the 
contracts (SYS, 2009). More than half of the participants with a labour contract stated their 
contracts were not implemented strictly according to the law. Based on the Social Insurance Law 
(2011), entitlement to social insurance is legally protected only for workers in an employment 
relationship formalised by labour contracts. Thus, although migrant workers may be transitioning 
from the underclass to the working class in many aspects of their lives, the lack of fully 
implemented labour contracts due to the informal nature of their work still impairs their labour 
entitlements and social security rights (Nee & Opper, 2012). Sun and Tao (2014) has confirmed this 
in their research on informal institutions migrant workers use to obtain legal insurance 
compensation. In their study, they described employees’ compensation insurance law as a ‘symbolic 
ornament’. 
Overall, research conducted from different perspectives has been aware that migrant 
workers are exploited and hindered from joining the social security programmes in the city where 
they live and work. The findings of these studies show that the rural-urban dual hukou system, the 
decentralisation of fiscal, governing and judicial systems and abusive employment relationships 
with employers contribute to denial of migrant workers’ social security entitlements. However, 
most of these studies examined the issue from the perspective of the institutional structure or 
political and legal systems, thereby falling short of an appropriate account of how rural and urban 
citizens perceive implementation of this urban-rural divided pension policy. Some scholars have 
noticed these shortcomings and employed the perspective of the rural-urban migrants’ identity and 
inclusive citizenship to better account for the barriers to using urban welfare systems the workers 
experience (Beckman & Erman, 2012; Kapai, 2012; Nielsen & Smyth, 2008; Solinger, 1999). This 
group of literature has examined how rural-urban migrant workers confront institutional barriers 
caused by the identity of underclass citizens in order to avail themselves of urban welfare benefits. 
However, endeavours in this respect have mainly focused on the migrant workers’ marginalised 
identity as rural citizens using urban welfare programmes. Approaches that integrate their multiple 
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identities as internal migrants, rural citizens, urban workers and policy recipients in the 
implementation of the urban pension scheme are still scarce.  
In the following section, the literature on social security and pension policy for China’s 
migrant workers is reviewed. As opposed to focusing only on migrant workers’ disadvantages in 
being rural citizens working in cities, these studies have broadened the perspectives of China’s 
migrant workers and considered the interaction of their multiple identities—rural-urban migrants, 
urban workers without urban hukou and stakeholders in the implementation of the urban pension 
policy. 
2.4 Pension Policy for Rural-Urban Migrant Workers in China 
The ballooning population of the young rural-urban workforce over the years has allowed 
China to enjoy enormous economic benefits as the world’s factory. However, as the share of young 
workers falls and the share of elderly workers rises, China’s labour market will age rapidly. 
According to data from NBS (2014a), the average age of rural-urban migrant workers increased 
from 36 in 2010 to 38 in 2014. Around 44% of migrant workers in 2014 were above 40 years old, 
compared with 34% in 2010. As a result, the importance of the pension scheme for Chinese migrant 
workers has grown. This section reviews research concerned with migrant workers’ use of the urban 
pension policy conducted from different angles. 
Much research has studied the pension systems for rural-urban migrant workers from a top-
down perspective. These studies have examined the big picture of the dual rural-urban pension 
system and its implementation for rural-urban migrant workers (T. Chen & Turner, 2014; Dorfman 
et al., 2013; World Bank, 2014). At the central level, the design of the pension system for citizens 
with rural hukou is based on the policy idea that rural citizens can still rely on their agricultural land 
and family, supplemented by commercial insurance schemes in their old age (S.J. Shi, 2006). Thus, 
although the new rural pension insurance in China shows progress towards a comprehensive system, 
the benefit level remains low (around RMB 55 per month, approximately equivalent to AU $11) (C. 
Shen & Williamson, 2010). This low benefit level reflects the Chinese Government’s belief in self-
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reliance on the part of rural residents. When citizens with rural hukou become rural-urban migrants 
and live in cities, the benefits are insufficient to maintain basic living standards in cities. The design 
of the urban pension scheme, which provides a basic living allowance for aged people in cities, does 
not fully consider rural migrants’ situation of having a barely formal employment relationship 
formalised by labour contracts with their employers (W. Lin, 2012). Scholars have argued that 
social justice and social equity require the development of a pension system that treats all citizens 
equally and that the development of an integrated labour market will ultimately require a unified 
national pension system.  
Some of this research has focused on policy design, including whether there should be a 
separate pension system for migrant workers. A rich body of literature (Cao, 2005; X. Guo & Du, 
2005; Song, 2007; Y. Zhang, 2011) has compared different pension mechanisms for migrant 
workers in terms of premium rates and pension benefits, and concluded that establishing a new 
pension system to benefit migrant workers is necessary and urgent. Specifically, the existing 
pension system that combines social pooling with individual accounts requires a high contribution 
rate and thus leads to the low coverage rate among rural-urban migrant workers, who are often 
exploited and financially disadvantaged. 
However, some researchers (Z. Li, 2004; Mu & Liu, 2006; G. Zheng, 2008) have argued 
that a separate pension system developed for migrant workers would lead to a fragmented insurance 
market, a complexity that might impede its operation as well as labour mobility. International 
experience has also shown that, in developing countries that have adopted fragmented social 
insurance systems, migrant workers have been victims of the ‘Latin American phenomenon’,23 
whereby poverty grows faster in urban than in rural areas. Thus, Chinese scholars have argued that, 
                                                             
23 Many Chinese scholars (Fay, 2006; Xu & Zhang, 2006) use the ‘Latin American phenomenon’ concept to describe 
imbalances between economic growth and social development, between urban and rural development, between market 
forces and state intervention, and between opening the door to international trade and protecting the domestic market. 
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in order to avoid the potential growth of urban poverty, China should avoid a fragmented pension 
system. 
There are also ample studies that take a bottom-up position and investigate the issue from 
the perspective of Chinese employers and local governments, both key agencies enabling migrant 
workers to join the urban pension. A survey conducted by Song (2007) showed that 80% of 
employers were reluctant to offer pensions for migrant workers because the employer contribution 
rate of 20% heavily burdens their enterprises. In particular, enterprises with more young workers 
were reluctant to join the scheme because they felt they would lose competitive advantages due to 
the long-term pension contribution to their young employees (Ebbers, Hagendijk, & Smorenberg, 
2009). The reason enterprises prefer migrant workers over local workers is that the labour cost of 
migrant workers is much lower. However, contributions to pensions significantly increases migrant 
workers’ labour costs and reduces employers’ profit margins; therefore, many employers choose to 
avoid their pension obligations (D. Yang & Guo, 2006). Currently, the Social Security Law requires 
employers in the city to provide all migrant workers with the urban pension. In order to deal with 
government inspections, most enterprises underreport the number of migrant workers in their 
companies (Banister, 2005). Some studies (D. Yang & Guo, 2006) have found regional 
protectionism as another factor that could explain some employers’ refusal to pay for the pension. 
In most regions of China, local governments and firms ‘swim in the same deep waters together’, 
sharing vested interests (Y. Huang, 1990). In these regions, local governments negotiate with firms 
over implementing the pension scheme for migrant workers. Some governments fully respect 
employers’ opinions and shield local enterprises that do not contribute to their migrant employees’ 
pensions. 
According to the bottom-up approach, localisation of policy implementation and regional 
protectionism resulting from decentralisation and fragmentation complicate implementing the urban 
pension policy among rural-urban migrant workers (Moser & Yu, 2014; Reintgen, 2014). As 
discussed in Section 2.1.1, the implementation of public policy especially urban pension policy in 
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China faces challenges posed by decentralised governance and fragmented management. 
Specifically, because the labour force has become increasingly mobile, employees may pay pension 
contributions in one province, and then move to another for new work opportunities or retirement. 
However, the urban pension funds are managed at the provincial or municipal level (Y. S. Zhang & 
Barnett, 2014). This inconsistency between localism and worker mobility especially affects rural-
urban migrant workers who are highly mobile (Garnaut, Golley, & Song, 2010). Before 2010, 
migrant workers could transfer only their own pension contribution in the individual account when 
they changed jobs between administrative units. The part paid by their employers was left with the 
local government where they had previously worked. Local governments’ detention of migrant 
workers’ pension funds led to ‘systematic government theft of migrant workers’ pensions’ (J. 
Becker & Elfstrom, 2010). The theft is systematic because the detention is caused by the 
institutional design in which the management of pension funds is decentralised to local 
governments. 
Since implementation of the Interim Measures for the Transfer and Continuation of the 
Basic Old-age Insurance of the Urban Enterprise Workers24 on1 January 2010, applicants of the 
pension scheme can have their pension transferred when moving to other regions to work. This 
measure enables migrant workers to transfer their full personal pension accounts and 12% of the 
social pooling funds if they move. The Social Insurance Law that took effect on 1 July 2011 further 
states that the urban pension accounts can be transferred to either the new rural pension insurance or 
the urban pension insurance in another province or municipality. This breakthrough for China’s 
pension insurance reform appears to address the issue of pension transfer. However, the 
effectiveness of the implementation of pension transfer has been doubted greatly. Although the law 
ostensibly enables workers to transfer their pensions, it does not resolve the root cause of the non-
                                                             
24.This measure was stipulated in Document 66 by the General Office of the State Council of the PRC on 28 December 
2009. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
51 
transferability of the urban pension—the decentralisation of pension fund management and the 
fragmented implementation across regions (L. Zhao, 2013). 
Some researchers (Ebbers et al., 2009; OECD, 2015a) have shown concern regarding the 
negative consequences pension transfer may bring to local governments. Because urban pension 
funds are administrated at the local level, there will be considerable surplus in the pension system of 
provincial or municipal regions with greater labour force inflows, whereas regions lacking in 
pension contributions from the labour force will face deficits. Further, the central government 
cannot manoeuvre the pension funds from local governments with surplus funds to those face 
deficits. Thus, although the new policy allows the transferability of urban pension, it could lead to 
the imbalance of pension funds across local governments in China (World Bank, 2014). 
Owing to the negative impacts the pension transfer might have on local pension funds, 
scholars (Pan & Wei, 2015; Pozen, 2013) have cast doubt on local governments’ support for the 
pension transfer in reality. Fragmentation of China’s fiscal and governing systems gives rise to 
regional protectionism. In order to protect local pooling funds, local governments might be more 
willing to see workers abandon their pension funds rather than transfer them to another local 
government when they move (Deng, 2011; D. Zhang, Wang, & Ma, 2011). As discussed in Section 
2.1.1, local governments in China priories profitable projects that contribute to the local revenues, 
which can show local officials’ achievements to the central government. The pension transfer, as 
opposed to those profitable projects, is an unfunded mandate that could lead to deficits in local 
funds. Thus, local governments may be unwilling to promote policies regarding pension transfer 
among employees.  
Another issue relevant to local governments’ role in public policy is the public’s lack of 
trust in local bureaucracies. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the massive land expropriation enforced 
by local governments, which forces many peasants to be rural-urban migrants, has undermined 
these migrants’ trust in local authorities. This mistrust of local authorities may also affect their 
uptake of other public policies including the pension schemes. 
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The question arises as to how to make employers and local governments fulfil their pension 
obligations. According to an empirical study by Moo (2009), most employers and local 
governments see the lack of tax incentives as a main obstacle to offering the pension. Therefore, 
some researchers (X. Wang, 2006; Q. Zhang & Qiu, 2003) have suggested that financial incentives 
are necessary to encourage firms and local governments to perform their pension obligations. 
However, other scholars (Ebbers et al., 2009) have argued that offering incentives would be costly 
and complex. Firstly, a qualified accountant would need to audit each scheme. Secondly, the 
numerous players involved in each scheme (e.g., custodian, trustee, fund manager, administrator) 
add to the difficulty of providing incentives.  
Researchers (Feldstein, 2004; James, 2002; Leung, 2003) have reached a consensus that the 
best way to improve pension policy implementation at the frontline is to raise funds through various 
channels. Thus, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) was established as a national long-term 
funding strategy to help share the employers’ pension obligations. The NSSF aims to raise funds 
through investment activities and serve as a stable financial source for the urban pension system. As 
of this writing, the NSSF is in the accumulation phase, and payment has not yet started. 
Although implementation of the urban pension scheme has been well researched at the 
policy-making and frontline levels, studies conducted from the perspective of migrant workers 
remain scarce. Previous studies have shown that not all migrant workers are interested in joining the 
urban pension scheme because some migrant labourers are seasonal workers who came to work in 
cities during slack periods in farming seasons and will eventually return to their rural hometowns (C. 
Cai, 2006; D. Shen, 2009; L. Shi, 2008). However, little attention has been given to migrant 
workers’ intentions to join the urban pension scheme. Thus, the following questions arise: What 
types of migrant workers intend to join the urban pension scheme? How do they perceive the urban 
pension policy? Furthermore, among the existing studies regarding migrant workers’ use of the 
urban pension scheme (B. Li, 2008; Wang & Sheng, 2008; Xiao & Shi, 2005; Yao, 2008), few have 
taken into account factors caused by China’s recent land reform. Does this mean that land 
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expropriation is less likely to influence migrant workers’ engagement in the urban pension scheme? 
As little research has captured stakeholders’ voices at the bottom level of the urban old-age pension 
implementation, answers to these questions are unclear. To fill the research gap, this PhD project 
examined rural-urban migrant workers’ perspectives on the urban pension policy. 
The literature review above has provided an overview of the institutional, political and 
cultural contexts in which public policy in general, and social security policy in particular, are 
implemented in China. The review shows that ample studies have examined challenges to the 
implementation of policies. These studies provided insight into the multifaceted challenges that 
policy implementation in China faces and the unique conditions under which public policy operates. 
The present study has benefited immensely from the findings and discussions of the large body of 
literature on Chinese public policy in general and social security policy in particular. The present 
study, by way of an original contribution to the growing understanding of Chinese social security 
policy, seeks to examine the rural-urban migrant workers’ pension scheme by focusing on 
implementation challenges from the perspective of rural-urban migrant workers. To this end, this 
research delves into the rural-urban migrant workers’ thought and reasoning processes as they 
applied their minds to the existing pension scheme. The theoretical and conceptual approaches 
adopted as best suited to the aims of this research are discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter describes the research methodology of this PhD study. The purposes of this 
chapter are to (1) detail the theoretical and conceptual foundations for this PhD study and how they 
necessitate an application of mixed methods in this study, (2) account for the sample selection in 
fieldwork, (3) describe the procedure applied in designing the instrument and data collection and (4) 
explain the procedure used for data analysis. 
3.1 Conceptual Approach to the Study 
This thesis examines the dynamics of the implementation of urban pension policy from the 
perspective of China’s migrant employees. The thesis is foregrounded on the observation that recent 
pension policy changes intended to enable migrant workers to use the urban pension scheme have 
not led to significant increases in migrant worker membership. Specifically, and despite recent 
reforms, the migrant worker coverage rate has remained less than 20% over the past five years 
(State Council of the PRC, 2014a; S. Zhang, 2012). Given the nature of the scheme as outlined in 
Chapters 1 and 2, a range of actors are required to enable the urban pension scheme to be taken up 
by migrant workers:(1) the central government must have a clear and well-communicated policy, (2) 
employers must offer their migrant employees access to urban pension schemes, (3) rural local 
governments must transfer migrant workers’ pension entitlements from rural to urban when 
requested and (4) migrant workers must apply for membership of the urban pension scheme. 
Although past research has demonstrated the extent to which employers and governments 
are taking a role in policy implementation, very little is known about the operation of the policy 
from the migrant workers’ perspective. There may be several reasons why migrant workers are not 
participating in the urban pension scheme in greater numbers, including that they do not want to 
participate. However, another approach is to regard the low take-up as evidence of an 
implementation gap. This project uses implementation theory to conceptualise migrant worker 
behaviour in the implementation process in terms of choice-making; namely, the choice to join or 
not join the scheme. This study uses bounded rationality theory to conceptualise this choice-making 
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process because of the thorough and comprehensive ways it analyses choice-making activities in 
both objective and subjective environments. Based on the conceptual and theoretical frameworks, 
the two overarching research questions in this research are: 
RQ1. What are the main factors that influence rural-urban migrant workers’ intentions to 
take up the basic urban pension scheme in China (among the following factors: A. land; B. 
enterprise; C. settlement; or D. individual)? 
RQ2. How do rural-urban migrant workers make decisions whether to join the basic urban 
old-age pension scheme in China’s broad social, cultural and political context? 
The sub-questions of RQ2 are: 
 How do migrant workers inform themselves of the scheme? 
 How do migrant workers form intention to join the scheme? 
 How do migrant workers perceive the feasibility of joining the scheme? 
 How do migrant workers’ evaluation of the intention to and feasibility of joining the 
scheme influence their decision whether to join the scheme or not? 
 How do migrant workers evaluate uncertainties of gains and losses of joining the 
pension scheme? 
These two research questions are derived from the theory of bounded rationality outlined in 
Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.2. As the theories are explained and detailed, sub-questions to enrich 
these two research questions are developed. As outlined in Chapter 2, the implementation of the 
urban pension policy is a multi-level process that involves the top level of central directives, the 
street level of local governments and employers, and migrant workers. It has been widely observed 
that successful policy implementation needs a clear policy designed by policy makers, effective 
frontline delivery by government employees and cooperation of target groups (Gunn, 1978; 
Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Schofield, 2001; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1974). In the Chinese 
context, Chapter 2 showed that although ample studies regarding the policy design and delivery of 
the pension policy for Chinese migrant employees have been conducted at the central and street 
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levels (i.e., governments and employers). What is lacking is a study which has applied conceptual 
and theoretical framework that enables to investigate more deeply into the choice-making of 
migrant workers. Previous research on the choice-making of Chinese migrant workers have mainly 
used migration theory and rational choice theory. For instance, migration theory was used by 
Connelly, Roberts and Zheng (2011) to study the choice-making of settlement by China’s migrant 
workers, and by Zhang (2010) to examine the migration decision-making of rural women migrants. 
This PhD study could also apply the theory of migration to examine Chinese migrant workers’ 
demand for pension membership. However, with the main focus on people’s motivation to migrate, 
the theory of migration could not capture the complex cognitive process of choice-making. To 
analyse the perceptive process of Chinese migrant workers’ decision-making, some researchers 
have adopted the theory of rational choice (Wang, Chen, & Lu, 2013) to examine the decision-
making process of job mobility to rural-urban migrant workers. However, this theory could not 
reflect individuals’ cognitive limitations and the influence of context in making choices (Simon, 
2010). Thus, the theory of bounded rationality is used in this study to capture both Chinese migrant 
workers’ perceptive process of choice-making and their cognitive limitations. This research 
examines the pension policy implementation at the level of rural-to-urban migrant workers, 
pertinent to the point where administrative actions intersect with private choices. By using the 
theory of bounded rationality, the private choices of migrant workers whether to join the urban 
pension scheme are conceptualised. 
3.1.1 The Theory of Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality theory, a type of choice-making theory (Simon, 1956; 1972; 1990, 
2010), enriches classic rational choice theory by considering individuals’ emotional actions and the 
subjective environment in which such actions are procedurally generated. Bounded rationality 
theory has been used in migration research to conceptualise relocation decisions and model 
migration patterns because it can capture psychological changes among migrant employees in 
complex situations during migration (Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Cross, Gelderblom, Roux, & 
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Mafukidze, 2006). This theory is also widely used in policy implementation studies that analyse 
actions taken by interest groups involved in the policy process (Feiock, 2007; Mealem, 2011; 
O’Toole, 1995). Accordingly, its use in this thesis to conceptualise migrant workers’ use of the 
urban pension scheme has merit. 
Classical rational choice theory, from which bounded rationality theory evolved, is based on 
the idea that agents choose to take the action that maximises their self-interest based on their 
calculation of the costs and benefits of alternative choices (G. S. Becker, 1976; Brandis, 1988; 
Frank, 1991). In considering this perspective, perfect rational choices can be made only under three 
conditions (Day, 1971; Posner, 1998; Zizzo, 2005): (1) existence of a consistent system of preferred 
consequences, (2) possession of the ability to expect the consequences of choices and (3) possession 
of a rational function that determines the system of preferred consequences. Agents in this theory 
need to have perfect rationality, which means they always act in a way that maximises their benefits. 
Perfect rationality further presupposes that agents have the reasoning ability which allows them to 
evaluate all possible outcomes in order to select the action that leads to the best possible result. 
Under this theory, no boundary exists between the ‘objective information’ and the ‘cognitive 
knowledge’ upon which individuals act (G. S. Becker, 1976). Agents are assumed to have all the 
information they need to make optimal choices.  
Many criticisms have been raised against the idea of a perfect rational choice. The critique 
of Sen’s (1977, 1987, 1988) theory is based on the idea that agents rank their preferences and take 
the action that results in the best choice. However, in the real world, people are unable to rank all 
the possibilities. Thus, although an individual can be ‘rational’ in a limited sense of having stable 
preferences, they cannot order all the different possibilities carefully. Some scholars also argued 
that the term ‘rational’ is misleading because it assumes individuals have the ability to act 
reasonably and purposively, unaffected by capricious emotionality (Frank, 1991; Gustavo, 2010). 
Furthermore, the rational actor model, in which agents act purposively to maximise their preference 
function, is subject to material and informational limitations (Elster, 1979; Moran, 1996). 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
58 
Among these critiques, the bounded rationality theory developed by Simon (1956) has 
played a dominant role. Simon (1956) related psychological factors to economic behaviour and 
regarded people as partly rational individuals who act emotionally on occasion. He contrasted the 
theory of bounded rationality against the perfect rational choice model and claimed the classical 
model was insufficient to explain the choice-making process because it did not consider the crucial 
issues of conflict and the dynamics of decision-making. Constraints of rationality, such as 
uncertainties reflecting cognitive limitations and incomplete information regarding options, always 
exist. To gain a better understanding of how individuals make decisions with constrained rationality, 
the key elements of bounded rationality are discussed below. 
3.1.1.1 Intention and Perceived Feasibility 
A thinking and reasoning process involves myriads of cognitive activities that are hard to 
compartmentalise (Simon, 1956, 1976, 1990). What individuals do when they perceive gains and 
losses of given alternatives and make a choice or a decision has many elements. Singling out certain 
elements with the view to analysing decision-making assists in examining a thinking and reasoning 
process. Intention and perceived feasibility here are adopted as two elements that can be 
conveniently used to study the thinking and reasoning process of individual migrant workers as they 
perceive the gains and losses of joining the pension scheme.  Such an approach draws upon 
previous scholars (Fitzsimmons & Douglas, 2011; McSwain & Glandon, 2008) who adopted these 
two factors in their research of individuals’ decision-making process. 
The aim of decision-making is to meet the individual’s goals, framed in terms of gains and 
losses (Viale, 2012). Changing the intention to and perceived feasibility of taking up alternatives is 
one major strategy to demonstrate that individuals calculate gains and losses to meet their 
expectations (Fiske & Macrae, 2012). Thus, feasibility and desirability-intention are considered the 
two essential elements of the cognitive process (Lescanne, 2009; Munro, 2009; Rubinstein, 1998). 
Feasibility pertains to individuals’ perceptions of their capacity to implement the required behaviour 
and depends on agents’ perceptions of the world and themselves, whereas desirability-intention 
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pertains to whether or not agents intend to take an option (Munro, 2009; Rubinstein, 1998). The 
desirability of any decision is an outcome of a balance assessment between the perceived costs and 
benefits of that decision. People who desire an option but perceive it as unfeasible will not choose 
the option (Rubinstein, 1998). Thus, the individual’s reasoning in making a choice is a process of 
weighing the option’s feasibility and desirability. Further, feasibility and desirability interact when 
individuals make a choice. This interaction is affected by uncertainties about an action and 
incomplete information about an option, which limit the individual’s rationality (Elster, 2000). 
Applying these two elements— feasibility and desirability—to the thesis, this study can 
conceptualise migrant workers’ decision-making regarding the costs and benefits of joining the 
urban pension scheme. 
3.1.1.2 Information 
When developing the intention and perceived feasibilities of taking up one of the choices, 
individuals have to roughly assess the probability of gains and losses and quantify the information 
gap between what is known and what needs to be known for an optimal choice (Mallard, 2015). 
Difficulty in evaluating risk and assessing the probability of gains and losses arises when 
information is incomplete, ambiguous or inconsistent. Some researchers compare human brains to 
computers and assert that individuals tend to access only recently opened memory files, even 
though choice-making procedures require substantial information that might require some deep 
searching. People tend to remember the first, last and peak moments of their experiences (Ariely, 
2010). In the experience of visiting an amusement park, for example, people tend to forget the 
waiting and queuing time at parks but remember the thrill of the roller coaster (Thompson, 2013). 
Thus, when individuals make choices, they always overlook or forget some important information. 
3.1.1.3 Uncertainties 
In addition to information, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found that sensitivity to 
uncertainties also prevalently impacts the rationality of assessing gains and losses. Their research in 
experimental psychology showed that choice-makers tend to prefer certain to uncertain choices in 
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general, called ‘the certainty effect’. According to the certainty effect in the domain of gains, 
because individuals overweigh certainty and because gains are favourable outcomes, overweighing 
a certain gain leads individuals to choose it over an uncertain gain. In contrast, losses are 
undesirable outcomes, and overweighing a certain loss leads individuals not to choose it over an 
uncertain loss (Altman, 2015). Thus, the certainty effect assumes risk aversion in gains and risk 
seeking in losses when the choices given involve both certain and risky options. However, when 
evaluating the degree of certainty, individuals tend to save cognitive costs with heuristics rather 
than learning, experimenting and processing information regarding certainties and risks of 
alternatives (Henrich, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1982). 
3.1.1.4 Interaction of Intention, Perceived Feasibility, Information and Uncertainties in a 
Subjective, Broad, Social and Cultural Environment 
As people’s cognitive process should also be considered in this model, Simon (1957, 1959, 
1972, 1976, 1979, 1999) has argued that the rationality of individuals is shaped by their subjective 
environment. Recognising the importance of subjective environments, Simon (1990) adopted the 
psychological concept of procedural rationality that stresses the process through which rationality is 
developed. Given that the extent to which the perfect rational decision is constrained by the agents’ 
rationality, individuals must roughly assess the probability of gains and losses and quantify the 
information gap between what is known and what needs to be known for an optimal choice. They 
base their intention and perceived feasibility regarding each option on this rough assessment rather 
than on meticulous calculation. With incomplete information and uncertainties surrounding the 
options, individuals can only make bounded rational choices, and are forced to choose based on 
‘rules of thumb’ rather than the rigid rule of maximisation (Tversky et al., 1982). 
Besides the subjective environment, the objective environment—such as social, cultural and 
political environments—also influences the interaction between information, uncertainties, intention 
and perceived feasibility (Munro, 2009). The theory of bounded rationality challenges the 
assumptions of omniscience with perfect information, unlimited information-processing capabilities 
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and time. Instead, it assumes that choice-makers prefer fast and frugal algorithms, which enable 
choice-makers to cope with a variety of options under realistic circumstances without incurring 
considerable information-gathering and process costs. Henrich and Albers (2001) explored three 
ways in which the development of social and cultural environment give rise to adaptive algorithms 
or bounded rationality. First, heuristics derived from error-learning in society enables choice-
makers to save the costs of individual learning, experimentation and processing information from a 
variety of sources. Second, over the evolution of social cultures, complex sets of rules, choice-
making procedures and motivations are produced by these algorithms in a particular society. Third, 
the interaction between social norms and cultures and individuals gives rise to adaptive group 
processes that distribute cognitive patterns and further develop these patterns into an institution. 
Social norms and cultures are information that is spontaneously transmitted among 
individuals in societies (Boyd, 2002). This information entails commonly accepted values and 
beliefs, behavioural strategies and perceptual models deeply rooted in individuals which other 
individuals can assimilate through social learning, observation and communication. Culture is not 
institutions or social structure, but is closely bound up with the evolution and functioning of each 
(Hayakawa, 2000). 
The above discussion of the theory of bounded rationality and its key components can assist 
in analysing migrant workers’ decision-making process. However, understanding this theory alone 
cannot explain decision-making in the context of policy implementation. To apply this theory to this 
PhD project, the next section steers the theory of bounded rationality to the setting of the 
implementation of urban pension policy among migrant workers in China. Factors in China’s 
particular social and cultural environment that would shape migrant workers’ perceptions of taking 
up the urban pension scheme are discussed. 
3.2 Applying the Theory of Bounded Rationality to Policy Implementation 
This thesis studies the implementation gap in China’s urban pension scheme at the level of 
migrant workers. The theory of bounded rationality was adopted to analyse migrant workers’ 
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behaviour of taking up the urban pension scheme. However, this theory alone cannot explain how 
the implementation of the urban pension scheme could be improved at the level of migrant workers. 
To inform policy development, this research takes into account the policy circumstances in which 
migrant workers’ perceptions might act as serious constraints or facilitators to the implementation 
of the urban pension scheme. This section incorporates key elements of the theory of bounded 
rationality, including intention, feasibility, uncertainties and information into the context of policy 
implementation for a better understanding of how the implementation process of urban pension 
policy is affected by the perceptions of migrant workers. 
Policy implementation of the urban pension policy is a multi-level process that involves the 
top level of central directives, the street level of local governments and employers and the target 
group level, which is the migrant worker. Successful implementation needs a clear policy designed 
by policy makers, frontline delivery by local governments and employers and cooperation of clearly 
identified target groups to experience the policy outcome (Gunn, 1978; Pressman & Wildavsky, 
1973; Schofield, 2001; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1974). A literature review of this topic (Chapter 2) 
showed that although ample studies regarding the policy design and delivery have been conducted 
at the top and street levels of pension policy implementation for Chinese migrant employees, 
research at the target group level is lacking. Thus, this research examines the pension policy 
implementation at the target group level, rural-to-urban migrant workers, pertinent to the point 
where administrative actions intersect with private choices. 
Policy might be largely framed by governments, but it is made on behalf of and for the 
public. Virtually all government entities claim they serve the public interest, even if they do not 
have direct relationships with specific end users (Freyens, Butcher, & Wanna, 2010; Grin & Graaf, 
1997; Sabatier, 1986, 1991). Thus, knowing a policy’s target group is of crucial importance. 
Understanding the target group’s perspective is likely to be important to central authorities. Such 
understanding enables authorities to anticipate policy feedback and to be aware of the behavioural 
assumptions upon which the programme is based (Elmore, 1979; Fischer, 1995). An appreciation of 
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the target group’s perspective becomes crucial when the programme is based on assumptions about 
the target group’s motivation (Stone, 1988). 
It is widely accepted that using a top-down or bottom-up approach alone is not adequate to 
analyse implementation issues for practical purposes (Elmore, 1979; J. Hudson & Lowe, 2009; 
Michael, 2006) because implementation involves a combination of both approaches. Mazmanian 
and Sabatier’s (1981, p.146) synthesis model of implementation essentially combines the two 
approaches. As opposed to conventional models that consider implementation as a political and 
administrative process, the synthesis model assumes implementation to be technical and potentially 
programmable. Recognising that perfect implementation cannot happen in the real world, the 
synthesis model examines conditions necessary for effective implementation, with reflections on the 
work of top-down and bottom-up models. This model is the most notable attempt to overcome the 
incompatibilities of the top-down and bottom-up schools (J. Hudson & Lowe, 2009; Michael, 2006). 
It lays the foundation for synthesising top-level and street-level perspectives, individual recipients’ 
concerns for the ‘bigger picture’ perspective and top-level goals. 
According to this approach, the condition for successful implementation at the target group 
level is that the programme of action is based on a sound theory of action: ‘Given a stipulated 
objective and the assignment of certain rights, the target groups will behave in the prescribed 
fashion and the objective will be attained’ (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981,p.188). Mazmanian and 
Sabatier (1983, p.147) explained that this condition consists of technical and cooperation 
components. The technical component refers to the unambiguous relationship between the target 
group and achieving statutory objectives. In other words, the policy should be delivered technically 
to the target group. The cooperation component refers to the target group’s expected behavioural 
changes in response to the policy. To achieve the policy objective, both components must be valid 
(Sabatier, 1986, 1991). This indicates that a policy with a technical design that does not receive the 
target group’s essential cooperation is rendered ineffective. Similarly, a well-designed programme 
that achieves the cooperation of the target group but is technically ambiguous can also be rendered 
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ineffective to a certain degree (Kendal, 2010; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981; Sabatier, 1986). Thus, 
accounting for these two components is essential in examining implementation at the target group 
level. 
3.2.1 Identifying Target Groups: Factors that Influence Migrant Workers’ Intentions to Join 
the Urban Pension Scheme 
In this PhD study, the technical component is the sound relationship between the migrant 
workers, who are supposed to be the target group and the objectives of the urban pension scheme. 
Although the theory of bounded rationality criticises the assumption of perfect rationality in the 
classic theory of rational choice, it does not deny the assumption that decision-makers need to adopt 
an intention to choose a certain alternative. In the context of public policy, the theory of bounded 
rationality discusses intention as ‘merit wants’. Merit wants are goods that differ between individual 
preference and individual welfare (Munro, 2009). As the imperfect rationality affects individuals’ 
ability to always accord welfare ranking with preference ranking, what individuals want may fail to 
reflect their welfare. Thus, although the urban pension scheme was designed to benefit migrant 
workers, the migrant workers may not have an intention to take up the policy. This inconsistency 
between individual preference and individual welfare poses challenges for the Chinese Government 
to promote the urban pension scheme among migrant workers because it is unclear which groups of 
migrant workers the government should target for the scheme. 
The technical component of successful policy implementation requires identifying the target 
group to examine whether or not the relationship between this group of people and the policy 
objective is sound. In this doctoral study, migrant employees who have an intention to join the 
urban pension scheme comprise the target group of this voluntary scheme. This group is defined 
because the energising force behind the implementation process of the voluntary policy is the 
individual’s rational pursuit of his or her intention to take up such a policy (Stone, 1988). Moreover, 
whether people can choose the insurance products properly based on individual preference is one 
factor that should be considered in designing social insurance (Auerbach & Feldstein, 1985). 
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Although the urban pension policy is open to all migrant workers (in theory), the target group 
consists of only those likely to benefit from the urban pension. Not all migrant employees are 
interested in joining the urban pension scheme. For various reasons, some are keener on the rural 
pension programme (F. Cai, 2006; D. Shen, 2009; L. Shi, 2008). However, while seeking to achieve 
the policy objective of the urban pension scheme among the group, the government does not know 
which migrant employees intend to join the urban pension scheme. Thus, the factors that influence 
the migrant employees’ interest in this policy must be determined to identify the target group and to 
begin establishing well-defined relationship between this group and the policy objective. 
This study applied the theory of bounded rationality to examine migrant workers’ intentions 
to take up the urban pension policy in China. In applying this theory, migrant workers are 
considered policy recipients, and procedural aspects of their decisions to take up the pension policy 
are spelled out explicitly. This means that migrant workers’ judgement heuristics are analysed with 
the theory of bounded rationality in the context of policy implementation of the urban pension 
scheme. In addition, discussions in Section 3.1.1 indicated the uniqueness of the broad environment 
in which individuals live, with perspectives on the social conventions and policy histories of their 
circumstances, shape the individuals’ intuitive judgements about the choices they face. Having 
realised that policy agents’ perceptions of choices, including their intentions to take up the policy, 
are formed in the broad environment, four factors that might influence the migrant workers’ 
intentions to join the urban pension scheme are explored in China’s social, cultural and political 
environment: the land factor associated with China’s massive land expropriation in the process 
urbanisation, the enterprise factor related to SOEs and non-SOEs, the settlement factor complicated 
by China’s urban-rural segregation system, and individual factors that reflect the social and 
economic situation. Below are theoretical and empirical discussions on these four factors from 
which the hypotheses are drawn. 
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3.2.1.1 Land Factor 
The economic theory on migration usually highlights ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. Whereas pull 
factors are those in the destination that attract individuals to migrate, push factors are those that 
force voluntary migration (Vandererf & Heering, 1996). Pull factors normally include factors such 
as better opportunities and a better quality of life. Based on the theory of labour migration (Lewis, 
1954; Todaro, 1976), social insurance is also a migration incentive. Therefore, the urban pension as 
an insurance scheme, which provides income in cities where the quality of life is much better than 
in rural regions, is a pull factor for rural-urban migrant workers. Because massive land 
expropriation has forced a large population of migrant workers to migrate to cities for new income 
sources, land expropriation is a push factor for rural-urban migration in China. The push factor of 
land and the pull factor of the urban pension interact in the process of rural-urban migration. 
However, the theory of bounded rationality argues that an individual’s judgement is not 
always rational (Simon, 1956, 1972). Thus, sometimes individuals’ perceptions about the push and 
pull factors are not necessarily correct. When migrant workers assess push and pull factors for 
decision-making, they may not rationally calculate the consequences caused by these factors, but 
instead make intuitive judgements. Intuitive decision-making is a process by which individuals 
unconsciously access information acquired through experience and stored in their long-term 
memories (Kahneman, 2003). Although bounded rationality casts doubt on whether migrant 
workers could rationally understand land expropriation and pension as push and pull factors, 
respectively, it indicates that the workers’ land expropriation experience would be stored in their 
perceptual system and shape their intuitive decision-making process for joining the urban pension 
scheme. Thus, it is reasonable to establish a hypothesis that land expropriation interacts with the 
intention to join the urban pension during rural-urban migration. 
Many empirical studies have shown that a main function of agriculture land in rural China is 
to maintain livelihood standard security (Y. X. Guo, 2008; S. Wang, Weaver, & You, 2012; Y. 
Zhang & Ran, 2011). In China, land is under rural collective ownership. Farmers are granted the 
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right to use the land but are prohibited from selling it. The contract with the rural collective for 
using the land is based on the family unit, and the government may take the land for urban 
construction. Through investigation of many cities in China’s eastern, western and central regions, 
K. Q. Wang (2005) empirically demonstrated that under the contractual relationship based on 
collective ownership, land serves six functions for farmers: securing living standard security, 
guaranteeing employment opportunity, providing direct economic income, enabling offspring to 
inherit the land, acquiring compensation after land expropriation, and avoiding huge payments for 
land reacquisition. At present, the primary function of land for farmers is living standard security. 
During urbanisation, the conversion of agricultural land that allows building factories, urban 
residential buildings and infrastructure forces peasants to find off-farm jobs in cities for new 
financial resources (L. Sun & Liu, 2014; R. Tao & Xu, 2007). Therefore, migrant farmers who lose 
the living standard security provided by their rural land might be more willing to consider other 
social security schemes. 
3.2.1.2 Enterprise Factor 
According to the theory of bounded rationality, the process of thinking about contingencies, 
designing covenants and seeing through implications in a contract is often constrained by cognitive 
limitations (Grandori, 2013). Incomplete contracts reflect parties’ cognitive constraints (Anderlini 
& Felli, 2000). In this study, the lack of stable labour contracts is considered a possible sign of 
migrant workers’ cognitive limitations in labour protection, including the protection of pension 
entitlements. Labour unions, which target employers and workers for surveillance and protection of 
labour rights, could help migrant workers foresee risks and benefits in a labour relationship. In this 
sense, the labour union assists migrant workers to gain more information in the decision-making 
process. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that migrant workers with stable labour contracts and 
labour union membership are more likely to join the urban pension scheme than are those without 
such contracts and memberships. 
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The theory of bounded rationality also shows that sometimes individuals’ decision-making 
is driven by information cascades, which is a process of individuals imitating the choice of others 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). These cascades can lead individuals to follow the behaviour of the 
majority of group members, even if it goes against what might appear rational (Easley & Kleinberg, 
2010). The individual might be thinking rationally that if many others have made the same choice, 
then it must be right. In SOEs where the overall awareness of labour protection is strong, the 
majority of employees have membership in social security programmes. Thus, according to the 
theory of bounded rationality, rural-urban migrant workers in SOEs might follow the behaviour of 
the majority and intend to join the urban pension. 
In an empirical study conducted by the Research Centre of Labour Security and Public 
Policies at Zhejiang University, which was based on results from six counties and cities of Zhejiang 
Province, the problem of protecting labour rights in private enterprises appeared much worse than 
those in SOEs (J. Li, 2002; X. Li & L. Shi, 2006). Thus, even though most of them are informal 
employees,25 migrant workers in SOEs, collective-owned enterprises and governmental 
organisations may be more likely to intend to join the urban pension programme than would be 
workers in private enterprises. Furthermore, whether or not a migrant worker signs a labour contract 
is closely bound up with the labour rights protection status in an enterprise (H. Liu & Zhou, 2007; 
X. Peng, 2008). The signing of labour contracts is mostly firm dependent and therefore irrelevant to 
income or employment stability. Thus, if the signing of labour contracts relates to joining the urban 
pension programme, we can infer that joining it mainly relies on the enterprises. At the same time, 
some studies found labour rights protection within enterprises to be positively correlated with 
membership in a labour union (Yao & Han, 2007; J. Yue, 2008). Thus, if migrant workers can 
participate in an enterprise’s labour union, then labour rights protection in the enterprise is 
satisfactory, and migrant workers might have intentions to join the urban pension scheme. 
                                                             
25  The term ‘informal employee’ refers to workers who receive unfairly low benefits and are not provided with 
employment security and legal protection (P. C. C. Huang, 2009). For example, vendors, self-employed business people 
and temporary enterprise workers fall into this category. 
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3.2.1.3 Settlement Factor 
Although the theory of bounded rationality focuses on the intuitive decision-making process, 
it still supports the idea that intuition and rationality are better viewed as being complementary 
rather than separate (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Individuals are considered to have two 
information-processing systems (S. Epstein, 2012). The first, the intuitive-experiential system, 
drives individuals to think unconsciously and automatically, enabling them to reach conclusions 
without conscious awareness. The second, the analytical-rational system, mainly operates at the 
intentional, conscious and analytical level, allowing individuals to undertake analysis during 
decision-making process. When making decisions, individuals analytically process information at 
the second stage of the decision-making procedure. In this study, migrant workers’ decision-making 
regarding the urban pension also takes into consideration the realities and future plans. China’s 
rural-urban citizenship system and variations in regional administration have made rural migrants 
confront complex settlement challenges as they live in cities without urban hukou (L. Tao, Wong, & 
Hui, 2014). According to the theory of bounded rationality, when migrant workers decide whether 
to join the urban pension, they consider the realities and alternatives in both intuitive-experiential 
and analytical-rational systems. The analytical-rational system could guarantee the logical 
consistency of their intentions to join the urban pension and the reality of their settlement situation. 
Given that the urban pension schemes are designed for urban residents; it is reasonable to assume 
that migrant workers who plan to settle in the city are more likely to join the urban pension for their 
retired lives in cities. 
Some empirical research (L. Fan, 2011; Yao, 2009; P. Ye, 2011; Zhang & Guo, 2005) has 
shown that migrant workers can be divided into two groups based on their settlement decision: 
potential settlers in cities and temporary ‘floaters’ who will eventually return to their rural 
hometowns. Their decisions on where to spend their old age greatly affect their selection of pension 
programmes. Migrant workers with long-term plans to stay in cities basically have abandoned their 
agricultural work in their rural homes and rely highly on the urban pension system after they retire 
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in cities (Zhou, 2011). Therefore, they might be more likely intend to join the urban pension. 
Moreover, to receive the pension benefits, migrant workers must pay into their pension account for 
10 consecutive years in the place of pension participation. Clearly, floaters who circulate between 
their urban migrant work and their rural homes cannot make consecutive premium payments in 
cities. Therefore, they might be less likely to intend to join the urban pension scheme. 
3.2.1.4 Individual Factors 
Based on the theory of bounded rationality, individuals conduct their choice-making in both 
objective and subjective environments (Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, & Schmeidler, 2010). Their 
subjective environment is shaped by their experience and demographics such as age, gender, 
income, education and lifestyle (OECD, 2013). As a result, migrant workers’ demographic features 
and experience, such as the length of their stay in cities, which form their subjective environment, 
would influence their decision-making regarding whether or not to join the urban pension. 
Previous research (Fagen, 2012) has shown that people with higher education levels are less 
likely to be influenced by others in choice-making. According to the theory of bounded rationality, 
individuals tend to save the cost of searching and processing complex information regarding 
possible choices. They prefer to assimilate information through external influence as a shortcut to 
making choices (Kahneman, 2003). This phenomenon is described as the ‘cascade effect’, which is 
defined as conformity that ignores the choice-makers’ own preferences and causes them to imitate 
the choice of agents who disseminate information (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). Education provides 
individuals with knowledge that allows them to act as innovators and disseminate their knowledge 
on social products, and thus influence others. Compared to highly educated people, those with less 
education are more likely to be imitators, saving the information-process effort. Hence, this study 
considers that migrant workers with higher education might be less likely to follow the ‘herd’, the 
majority of migrant workers who do not participate in the urban pension scheme. 
The theory of social and economic organisation shows that an individual who has worked 
for an organisation for a relatively long time will significantly influence those who have worked for 
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it for a shorter time, and will be less influenced by the latter (Pfeffer, 1983). Similarly, some studies 
on China’s migrant workers (Mao, 2012; L. Shi, Li, & Zhao, 2006; Q. Zhang, 2006) have found 
that a longer period of staying in cities will result in a stronger period effect, and migrant workers’ 
views and behaviours will gradually converge with those of urban residents. Thus, urban residents, 
most of whom have joined the urban pension scheme, will have a relatively greater influence on the 
views and behaviours of migrant workers who stay in cities for longer periods, in terms of insurance 
participation. As a result, the longer migrant workers stay in cities, the more likely they might be to 
intend to join the urban pension scheme. Previous research findings also indicated that gender and 
earnings are statistically significant predictors for migrant workers’ participation in the urban 
pension scheme (Nielsen, Nyland, Smyth, Zhang, & Zhu, 2005). 
According to a recent investigation report on China’s young migrant workers (Chinese 
Federation of Labor, 2011), the new generation of migrant workers is more aware of labour rights 
protection than is the older generation.26 Therefore, young generation migrant workers might be 
more likely to claim their insurance rights. Meanwhile, some research (Kang, 2007) has found that 
migrant workers with higher education levels have a higher awareness of labour protection. In this 
way, migrant workers with higher education levels might be more likely to intend to join the urban 
pension scheme. 
In summary, both theoretical and empirical research findings indicate that four factors—land, 
enterprise, settlement and individual—might influence China’s migrant workers’ intentions to take 
up the urban pension policy. Exploring the impact of the above factors on their intention to join the 
scheme could assist the Chinese Government to identify the policy’s target group and then establish 
a clear relationship between these groups of migrant workers and the objectives of the policy. 
                                                             
26 The new generation refers to migrant workers born after 1980. 
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3.2.2 Decisions to Take Up the Urban Pension Policy: The Interaction of Intention, Perceived 
Feasibility, Uncertainty and Information 
Knowing the features of the target group, governments can technically design the policy to 
suit the needs of the end users. However, whether a particular group will cooperate in taking up the 
policy remains uncertain. To analyse this choice-making process, the bounded rationality theory 
was applied to examine migrant workers’ perceptions of taking up the urban pension scheme. 
Desirability and perceived feasibility are key elements in the decision-making process (Gilboa, 
2010; Lescanne, 2009). Hence, although target migrant workers may have intentions to join the 
scheme, they may not be sure about the feasibility of their participation. Members of the group need 
to consider whether the option is feasible for them. Moreover, bounded rationality theory also 
shows that when people weigh feasibility and desirability, their rationality is constrained by 
uncertainties about the outcome and incomplete information (Simon, 1956, 1957, 1959, 1972). The 
uncertainties and information migrant workers have may affect their decisions to take up the policy. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the whole choice-making process is affected not only by the 
migrant workers’ objective environment, but also by their subjective environment (Gustavo, 2010; 
Simon, 1976, 1979, 1999, 2010; Simon & Mattioli, 1997). On a point particularly relevant to this 
study, most migrant employees suffered from social stigma and discrimination because they worked 
in the secondary labour market and were excluded from mainstream society (K. Wong et al., 2007). 
Such feelings of exclusion often decrease rationality, which can also influence the choice-making 
process (Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002; Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). 
Thus, in this current study, migrant workers’ perceptions of taking up the urban pension scheme—
including their perceived intention and feasibility to join the scheme, uncertainties about 
participation and information they have about the scheme—were explored by qualitative interviews 
conducted on migrant workers living in different objective and subjective environments. The 
objective environment pertains to the broad social and economic context, whereas the subjective 
environment is associated with the psychological environment. 
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3.2.2.1 Intention and Perceived Feasibility 
From intention to action, certain elements are required for an individual to decide to take up 
a public policy. Based on the planned behaviour model, one extension of the bounded rational 
model is the individual’s perceived feasibility of the action (Armitage & Christian, 2004). Whereas 
intention relates to the positiveness of an individual’s prior experience, feasibility connects to the 
availability of resources demanded by the alternatives. Both intention and perceived feasibility are 
significantly associated with costs and benefits invested in or gained from prior experiences of 
choosing similar options (Sorrentino & Yamaguchi, 2011). The experiences form individuals’ 
subjective norms that influence how they develop intention and perceived feasibility in the future 
decision-making process (Gilboa et al., 2010). 
Besides individuals’ perceptions of their own experiences, the influence of environmental 
factors such as availability of resources, social and cultural context and all related government 
policies should be taken into account in the study of an individual’s perceptions of a public policy 
because they determine perceived intention to and feasibility of taking up the policy (Ajzen, 2005). 
Thus, this study explores how migrant workers’ intentions to and perceived feasibility of taking up 
the urban pension policy are either facilitated or hindered by availability of resources and other 
factors taking into account the social, cultural and policy contexts. Based on the theory of bounded 
rationality, the decision-making process by which an intention evolves into an action is influenced 
by uncertainties and bounded by imperfect information (Simon, 1976, 1979, 1991). Hence, 
uncertainties and information China’s migrant workers have regarding the urban pension policy are 
examined in this study to picture the workers’ cognitive process of deciding whether or not to join 
the urban pension. 
3.2.2.2 Uncertainties 
The theory of bounded rationality challenges the assumption of the rational choice model 
that individuals always pursue utility maximisation. It implies that choice-makers may value losses 
more than gains, especially in the face of uncertainties (Simon, 1957, 1972, 1990, 1999, 2000). 
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However, many public policies are framed as either a loss or a gain. The Chinese Government tends 
to frame public policies as gains and highlight the benefits of taking up the policy. For instance, 
slogans promoting the one-child policy indicated strong gains for Chinese families such as ‘lower 
fertility, better quality’ and ‘stabilise family planning and create a brighter future’. When the 
Chinese Government promotes the urban pension policy among migrant workers, it highlights the 
pension transferability legislated by the Social Insurance Law in 2011, which indicates a gain for 
migrant workers who are highly mobile. Could these promotional campaigns, which emphasize 
‘gains’, increase migrant workers’ intentions to take up the policy? The answer is uncertain because 
migrant workers’ rationality is bounded by uncertainties that may result in losses. The theory of 
bounded rationality shows that perceived uncertainties are developed contextually through socio-
cultural impacts (Munro, 2009). Thus, this study explores uncertainties regarding taking up the 
urban pension policy, which migrant workers perceive in the context of their daily lives in China. 
Previous research (Dequech, 2001; Hanaki, Jacquemet, Luchini, & Zylbersztejn, 2015) has 
widely confirmed that sensitivity to uncertainties has a prevalent impact on the rationality of choice-
making. Individuals sometimes avoid risk and sometimes seek it. According to the bounded 
rationality model by Tversky and Kahnemann (1982), the risk model involves two stages: editing 
and evaluating. During editing, people use their heuristics to assess the loss and gain of given 
choices. In the subsequent evaluation stage, people use their reasoning to calculate the utility and 
probabilities of each choice-making outcome, and then opt for the choice with the highest utility. 
The sensitivity to uncertainties is discussed based on gains and losses. Risk-seekers are 
driven by small probabilities of gain (buy lotteries despite the low chance of winning a jackpot); 
people who avert risks try to avoid even small probabilities of loss (buy insurance). Moreover, in 
Tversky and Kahnemann’s (1982) risk model, the second stage of evaluation implies that people 
make choices based on a subjective evaluation of the utility of each decision outcome and its 
probabilities. However, this subjective assessment might differ from the objective probabilities, and 
thus choice-makers cannot always choose options with the highest utility (Munro, 2009). This study 
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considers that migrant workers consider uncertainties that could generate a loss or gain when 
perceiving the purchase of the urban pension scheme. At the initial stage, they apply heuristics 
gained from their experiences as migrant workers to evaluate loss and gain from buying the urban 
pension scheme. In the second phase, they use their reasoning to calculate the utility of buying or 
not buying the urban pension, and then choose the option with the highest utility. However, their 
perceived gains and losses are only their subjective assessment influenced by their experience of 
being migrant workers, and may not reflect the factual gains and losses. For instance, the social 
marginalisation and discrimination migrant workers experienced might cause bias when the workers 
assess the gains and losses of purchasing the urban pension. 
Another approach to understanding how uncertainties influence individuals’ choice-making 
process is to examine the ‘certainty effect’. Research in experimental psychology shows choice-
makers tend to prefer certain to uncertain choices in general, a tendency called the certainty effect. 
Choice-makers demonstrate the certainty effect when they overweigh outcomes they perceived as 
certain relative to outcomes that are uncertain (Altman, 2015). There are two natural reference 
points: 0% and 100%. The certainty effect leads individuals to prefer 100% as a reference point, 
although it might be impossible to guarantee 100% certainty in a real-life situation (Dickhaut et al., 
2003; M. Li & Chapman, 2009). 
This study inquires whether migrant workers have the intention to take up the pension 
policy, if they are certain about the benefits brought by participation in the urban pension scheme. 
Migrant workers’ cognitive processes of using heuristics and reasoning to assess uncertainties were 
examined in the fieldwork to understanding uncertainties about the outcomes of joining the urban 
pension that lead them to give up the scheme. Such an understanding could help close the 
implementation gap of the urban pension policy for migrant workers by developing a more targeted 
and tailored policy that takes into account the ‘losses’ migrant workers perceive. Policy strategies 
and legislation employed in the future could minimise factors that cause migrant workers’ perceived 
uncertainties about taking up the policy. 
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3.2.2.3 Information on the Urban Pension Scheme 
In the policy process, information can be viewed as a resource leading to a reduction in a 
policy agent’s uncertainty (Wolf, Just, & Zilberman, 2001). From this perspective, information 
plays an essential role in reducing uncertainties of the targeted policy receivers and their decision-
making on whether to take up the policy. Potential end users of a policy always have uncertainties 
regarding the outcomes of taking up the policy, since many outcomes are likely to be probabilistic 
rather than deterministic (Blandford, 2007). Information about the policy can either strengthen or 
weaken the uncertainty inherent in the decision-making process of target groups. Accurate and 
adequate information is a fundamental requirement for minimising potential end users’ uncertainties 
regarding the outcome of taking up the policy (Campbell, 2006). 
During the policy implementation process, governments regularly provide information to 
encourage cooperation by individuals using the underlying assumption of the rational choice theory; 
that is, if people know a policy has beneficial consequences they will have intentions to take it up 
(M. Lewis, 2007). Examples include welfare and education policies. It is clear, however, that in 
some cases information campaigns are not adequate by themselves to influence people’s decision-
making processes on a sustained basis. Although the theory of rational choice provides policy 
making and implementation with important theoretical grounds, it has limitations from a 
behavioural change perspective (Briggs, 2015). Individual behaviour is complicated for public 
policy issues. People continue to ignore welfare policies despite government information campaigns. 
The model of rational choice tends to overlook contextual impacts on individual behaviour, such as 
social pressure and other motivators other than self-interest (Halpern, 2004). It can also be 
challenging for people to accurately assess the costs and benefits inherent in their participation in a 
public scheme based merely on information from the government, particularly if they have 
relatively high levels of uncertainty about them. 
For its urban pension policy, the Chinese Government has been launching its information 
campaign mainly through government websites, news agencies, television and radio media (So & 
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Kao, 2014). Officials regularly state on public media the benefits of migrant workers joining the 
urban pension policy and publish news items with catchy headlines about migrant workers and the 
benefits of their taking up the policy, such as ‘Migrant Workers are the Main Beneficiaries of the 
Urban Pension Policy’ (2014). In the information campaign, the Chinese Government assumes 
migrant workers are rational and would take up the policy after reading from the media that 
participation will have beneficial results. 
However, according to the theory of bounded rationality, individuals in real life often make 
choices without knowing the costs and benefits of given alternatives (Simon, 1956, 1976, 1991, 
1999). As mentioned previously, individuals tend to save on the cost of searching and processing 
complex information regarding possible choices. They rely on whatever information they can 
acquire through casual word-of-mouth communication (Munro, 2009). This is a consequence of 
bounded rationality, which assumes that people’s information processing capacity is limited. As a 
result of this boundedness, they often prefer information that is easy to obtain and process (Simon, 
Egidi, Marris, & Viale, 1992). For instance, when choosing between two restaurants, one filled and 
one empty, most people would opt to go to the more popular restaurant in the absence of better 
information. 
Not only would lack of information lead individuals to make boundedly rational decisions, 
having too much information can also lead to poorer choice-making (Malhotra, 1982). If choice-
makers are provided with so much information that it exceeds the limits of the data they can 
comprehend and process during any given period, overload occurs and they become confused. This 
is why psychological researchers claim that individuals normally use heuristics as short cuts to 
making their choices (Kahneman, 2003). By paying attention only to heuristic information that is 
relevant to the choices given, individuals can ignore other information and save cognitive effort. 
Another reason choice-makers favour word-of-mouth information is the complexity of the 
modern environment, which has led to a decline in effectiveness of traditional media promotion of 
public policies (Gildin, 2003). Rosen (2002) suggested that factors contributing to the 
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ineffectiveness of social media include scepticism, noise and connectivity. Similarly, Kaikati (2004) 
claimed that information promotion techniques such as using television and internet often raise 
criticism of advertising and increase the difficulty of tracking down potential interest groups 
because the audiences are fragmented. 
This study starts from an assumption that the current information campaign launched by the 
Chinese Government may not be sufficient to change the behaviour of China’s migrant workers 
regarding implementing the urban pension policy. The current information campaign on the policy 
is based on the rational choice model, but the migrant workers may not be rational enough to assess 
information about the benefits and costs that the media provide. Furthermore, context also plays a 
key role in an individual’s information acquisition and processing, and may lead migrant workers to 
gain information through word-of-mouth from their own group. This study further explores these 
assumptions and sheds light on how the Chinese Government can improve its information campaign 
to influence migrant workers’ decisions to take up the policy. 
Having discussed the two key components for the effective implementation of the urban 
pension scheme at the target group level, this study now turns to the analysis, using mixed methods, 
of both the technical component related to identifying the target group of the urban pension policy 
and the cooperation component pertaining to migrant workers’ perception of taking up the scheme. 
Research on technical and cooperation components of the urban pension was conducted in two 
phases. The fieldwork and rationale for the chosen methodology for each phase are discussed in the 
following sections. 
3.3 Study Location 
The fieldwork of this PhD project took place in Shenzhen, a coastal city in South China, 
neighbouring Hong Kong. It was established as the first special economic zone for launching the 
reform and opening-up policy in 1980. The city was designed by Deng Xiaoping, who opened 
China up to the global economy. As a pioneer in driving China’s reform and opening up since the 
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early 1980s, Shenzhen has led the country in manufacturing, construction and commercial trade (Ng, 
2003).27  
3.3.1 The Economy and Migrant Workers 
In 2014, the total GDP of Shenzhen reached around $US 260 billion, representing an 8.8% 
growth compared with 2013 (S. Wang, 2015). The GDP per capita of Shenzhen in 2014 ranked first 
among all sub-provincial cities in China (Yuan, 2015). Among all other factors that contributed to 
the booming economy in this 35-year-old city, the rich supply of a young and cheap rural-urban 
migrant labour force is one of the most important (R. Murphy & Fong, 2013). 
Vigorous economic activities in Shenzhen drove rural migrants to pour into this special 
economic zone. The total population of Shenzhen was only around 0.3 million in 1979. However, 
the population increased dramatically to over 15 million in 2011, more than 50 times that of 1979 
(Pinner, 2015). Now Shenzhen has the highest population density in China (Sasin, 2014). With the 
largest population of rural-urban migrant workers in China, Shenzhen had 12.3 million rural-urban 
migrants out of 15 million people without an urban residency in 2011 (China Labour Bulletin, 
2011). Owing to the city’s large population of rural-urban migrant workers, Shenzhen was chosen 
for fieldwork in a multitude of studies on China’s rural-urban migrant workers (e.g., J. Chan & Ngai, 
2010; Du, Feldman, Li, & Yue, 2010; J. Li et al., 2014; L. Wang, 2014). Thus, this PhD study 
selected Shenzhen as the fieldwork location. 
3.3.2 Administrative Divisions 
Shenzhen governs six districts, four of which (Futian, Luohu, Nanshan and Yantian) are 
situated downtown. These four areas are the centres of finance and trading, municipal government 
and high-tech industries. The other two districts, Longgang and Baoan, are situated in suburban 
areas. 
                                                             
27 In 1979, the first export-processing zone of China was established in Shenzhen. Also, China’s first five-star hotel was 
completed in the same year in Shenzhen. 
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3.3.3 Longgang District 
Located in northeast Shenzhen, Longgang is the largest district by area in the city. 
Businesses such as Huawei28 are headquartered in Longgang. As Shenzhen’s industrial heartland 
and a suburban district, Longgang has a high concentration of rural-urban migrant workers and has 
long been known in the city as a migrant district (Human Rights in China, 2002). Thus, it was 
selected as the survey location for this study. 
3.3.4 Characteristics of Migrant Workers in Shenzhen 
According to surveys conducted by the NBS Survey Office in Shenzhen (2014) and NBS 
(2014a), migrant workers in Shenzhen share similar characteristics with those at the national level. 
Migrant workers in China typically work in low-paid, precarious and physically demanding jobs in 
low-skill and labour-intensive industries such as manufacturing, construction, hospitality and 
housekeeping (NBS, 2014a). In Shenzhen, the manufacturing industry employs around 64% of 
migrant workers, and approximately 15% and 5% of the migrant workers serve in the sales and 
catering industries respectively (NBS Survey Office in Shenzhen, 2014). Migrant workers in 
Shenzhen are also characterised by low education levels, with approximately 62% holding a junior 
high school degree and only around 6% having college education or above. Their education levels 
are similar to the national population in which around 61% and 7% of national migrant worker 
population hold a junior high school degree and a college degree or above respectively (NBS, 2014a; 
NBS Survey Office in Shenzhen, 2014). The gender ratio of female to male migrant workers in 
Shenzhen is about 4:6, also close to the national gender ratio of migrant workers of 3:7.  
3.3.5 Local Policies and Limitations Caused by the Selection of Study Location 
Whereas migrant workers are found across China, the survey captured only workers in 
Shenzhen. Although the new Social Insurance Law unified rules of the basic urban pension scheme 
across the country, other social policies are generally fragmented across China, as discussed in 
Section 2.1.1. Similar to other cities, Shenzhen has regional policies that may indirectly affect 
                                                             
28 Huawei, headquartered in Shenzhen, is the largest telecommunications manufacturing company in the world. 
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migrant workers’ attitudes towards the basic urban pension. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that if 
the survey were conducted in other cities, the results might be different. 
As arguably the most successful Special Economic Zone in China, the Shenzhen 
government has set a high threshold of hukou requirements to attract high-quality people, skilled 
workers and high taxpayers in order to optimise the city’s social capital (C. C. Fan, 2008). With 
more non-hukou workers in Shenzhen, it is more difficult to apply for hukou in Shenzhen than in 
small cities in China. In Shenzhen’s newly promulgated points system, quality is assessed according 
to education credentials or professional levels (L. Zhang, 2013). Facing the exclusionary strategy 
for non-hukou workers, migrant workers in Shenzhen may have a higher sense of social exclusion 
than would their counterparts in less-developed cities. Previous surveys (China Labour Bulletin, 
2015) have found that migrant workers in less-developed cities have a stronger sense of belonging 
than do those in developed cities. Although participation in the basic urban pension does not have a 
hukou requirement, feeling socially excluded may lead migrant workers in Shenzhen to have less 
intention to settle in cities and join the urban pension than would migrant workers in other cities. 
However, other factors may better position migrant workers in Shenzhen than migrant 
workers in other cities to join the urban pension. Shenzhen has been improving its regional rules for 
better labour protection and encouraging trade unions to bargain with employers on wage and 
workfare (P. N. Wong & Cheng, 2015). It introduced strict monitoring systems on the wages of 
employees. For example, ‘The Regulations of the Shenzhen Municipality on the Wage Payment to 
Employees’ can ensure the payment of overdue salaries for migrant workers (Shenzhen City 
People’s Congress, 2004). Compared to migrant workers in other cities who commonly experience 
wage arrears, migrant workers in Shenzhen have more guarantee of on-time payment. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the regional policy context, which is conducive for labour protection, 
escalates the intention of migrant workers in Shenzhen to join the urban pension scheme. If the 
study location were changed to another city where the labour protection rules are less developed, 
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the overall level of migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban pension scheme could be lower 
than it is in this research. 
As discussed above, regional policies in China vary across different cities, and Shenzhen is 
not an exception in terms of its unique social policies. Its policy context may shape migrant workers’ 
intentions to join the urban pension in Shenzhen, negatively or positively, and thus bias the samples 
in this research in its representation of the population of migrant workers in China. However, future 
studies need to verify these limitations by comparing migrant workers in Shenzhen with those in 
other cities in terms of their intentions to join the basic urban pension. 
3.4 Research Design 
3.4.1 Hypotheses for Phase 1: Understanding China’s Migrant Workers and Pension 
Intentions 
In seeking which groups of migrant workers to target in the urban pension policy, it is 
important to understand migrant workers’ realities that may shape their wish to join the scheme. 
Examination of the theory of bounded rationality in the context of policy implementation and 
extensive empirical studies of China’s migrant workers (Section 3.2) indicated that factors 
pertaining to land, enterprises, settlement and the individual affect the individual’s ideas and 
behaviour when moving from rural to urban areas. 
A deductive approach was employed in Phase 1. To test the hypotheses statistically, a 
quantitative study was conducted. Based on theoretical studies and empirical evidence (Section 3.2), 
hypotheses on factors that may influence migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban pension 
scheme were developed as follows: 
3.4.1.1 Land Expropriation Factors 
H1: The larger family share of expropriated land the migrant workers have, the more likely 
they are to have an intention to participate in the urban pension scheme. 
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3.4.1.2 Enterprise Factors 
H2: Migrant workers in state-owned and collective-owned enterprises and government 
organisations are more likely to have an intention to join the urban pension programme than are 
those working in private enterprises. 
H3: Migrant workers who signed labour contracts with their employers are more likely to 
have an intention to participate in the urban pension scheme. 
H4: Migrant workers who have participated in the labour union of an enterprise are more 
likely to have an intention to join the urban pension scheme. 
3.4.1.3 Settlement Factors 
H5: Migrant workers who have a long-term plan to stay in cities are more likely to have an 
intention to join the urban pension programme than are those who are temporary, floater residents. 
3.4.1.4 Individual Factors 
H6: The longer the migrant workers have stayed in cities, the more likely they are to have an 
intention to join the urban pension scheme. 
H7: Migrant workers born after 1980 are more likely than those of an older generation to 
join the urban pension programme. 
H8: Migrant workers with higher education levels are more likely to have an intention to 
join the urban pension programme. 
3.4.2 Use of Mixed Methodology 
This thesis conceptualises migrant workers’ non-use of the urban pension scheme in terms 
of a decision-making process within a bounded rationality. As the literature review demonstrated, 
the capacity for migrant workers to join the scheme is shaped by policy considerations and the 
actions of other policy actors involved in making membership feasible, namely, local governments 
and employers. However, this thesis seeks to extend knowledge of the operation of the 
implementation of the urban pension scheme by focusing solely on migrant workers and their 
decision, or non-decision, about the urban pension scheme. This decision-making process is viewed 
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as being variously shaped by information about the scheme, intentions to join the scheme (taking 
into account perceived costs and benefits) and the perceived feasibility of joining the scheme 
(taking into account perceived enablers and barriers). As discussed in Section 3.2, successful 
implementation at the level of migrant workers requires a clear relationship between the target 
group and the policy objective, and the cooperation of the target group. Thus, in this study, factors 
that influence migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban pension scheme were explored to 
identify the target group and assist in establishing a clear relationship between the objective of 
urban pension policy and the target group. Then perceptions of the target group in the decision-
making process were studied to explore the cooperation element in the implementation of the urban 
pension. Thus, this PhD study was conducted in two phases. Phase 1 explored the main factors that 
influence migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban pension, and Phase 2 investigated in depth 
the target migrant workers’ perceptions of joining the urban pension. In this section, the 
methodologies adopted by the two phases are discussed based on the aim of each phase and the 
strengths and weakness of qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
3.4.2.1 Phase 1: Quantitative Study of Factors that Influence Migrant Workers’ Intentions to 
Join the Urban Pension 
Although the theory of bounded rationality criticises the assumption of perfect rationality in 
the classic theory of rational choice, it does not deny the assumption that decision-makers evaluate 
costs and benefits of choosing alternatives and then develop intentions to choose a certain 
alternative that benefits them (Barros, 2010; Boella, Hulstijn, & Torre, 2011; Simon, 1972, 1991). 
This intention has commonly been researched using quantitative methods in previous research (e.g., 
Jansen, Coolen, & Goetgeluk, 2011; Kendrick & Torreira, 2015). In this study, the decision-makers 
are China’s rural-urban migrant workers, and the alternatives are whether or not to take up the 
urban pension scheme. Based on the theory of bounded rationality, these migrant workers need to 
adopt an intention to join the scheme. Factors that influence this intention, including enterprises, 
land, individual and settlement, reflect features of migrant workers. These factors could assist 
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policy makers to identify migrant workers who have intentions to join the urban pension scheme 
and then technically build a relationship between these workers and the policy objective. 
Hypotheses related to these factors were established using a deductive approach in Section 3.2.1. 
The quantitative method has strengths in testing and validating hypotheses constructed before the 
data are collected (Vogt, 2011). Furthermore, the predictive modelling of the quantitative method 
can statistically predict future outcomes (Bryman, 2012; Singh, 2007). In Phase 2, this strength of 
the quantitative method assisted in building predictive models with variables regarding the four 
factors (land, settlement, enterprise and individual), thereby producing predictive outcomes about 
factors that influence migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban pension. Then the predictive 
findings were utilised to identify migrant workers interested in the urban pension in the future. In 
doing so, the application of the quantitative approach in Phase 1 of the study was able to test the 
hypotheses derived from the theory of bounded rationality. And this allowed quantitative 
predictions to be made for a future policy design which considers characteristics of migrant workers 
who intend to join the urban pension scheme. 
3.4.2.2 Phase 2: Qualitative In-depth Exploration of Migrant Workers’ Perceptions of Taking Up 
the Urban Pension Policy 
According to the theory of bounded rationality, having intentions or preferences for an 
alternative is not alone sufficient for an individual to take the option. The individual needs to 
perceive the options as achievable with the available resources (Munro, 2009; Rubinstein, 1998). 
The decision-making process is limited by uncertainties and lack of information (Simon, 1956, 
1972, 1991). Phase 2 explored the cognitive process by which migrant workers make decisions to 
join or not to join the urban pension. As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the theory of bounded 
rationality suggests a matching between the decision-making process and the context to which it is 
applied. Based on this theory, individuals always face imperfect information and time when 
computing risks caused by uncertainties and potential benefits of an option. Experience and rules of 
thumb in the form of social norms and cultures establish a cost-effective choice-making mechanism 
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that can help individuals with the limitations of incomplete information, uncertainties and 
feasibilities in the process of decision-making (Hayakawa, 2000; Tversky et al., 1982). Therefore, 
the study of the decision-making process from the perspective of bounded rationality should 
emphasise how the process matches with individuals’ particular social and cultural contexts. The 
term ‘ecological rationality’29 has been adopted by previous researchers (Basel, 2012; V. L. Smith, 
2003) to indicate this decision-making and context matching. This term denotes an undersigned 
ecological system that brings forth a sociological and cultural revolutionary process. 
To researchers who adopt this strand of bounded rationality, rationality is a phenomenon 
that is found in specific cultures and societies. Ecological rationality examines the decision-making 
of individuals based on their experience and folk knowledge. These individuals are ‘naïve’ in their 
capacity for understanding the process of human cultural evolution, and their capacity for realising 
the reasoning behind the norms, rules and institutions of cultural heritage that are created from 
human experience rather than by intentional design (Basel, 2012; V. L. Smith, 2003). Individuals 
follow cultural rules in their particular context. Although not always able to articulate the rules, the 
individuals can apply them to their evaluation of information, uncertainties, intentions and 
perceived feasibilities, and make decisions (Henrich, Albers, & Boyd, 2002). As the theory of 
bounded rationality is based on the assumption of ecological rationality, it is of importance in 
applying a method conducive for researching perceptions from a context-based perspective. 
Furthermore, the research participants in this PhD study are rural-urban migrant workers whose 
mobility leads them to live in different environments of both traditional rural and modern urban 
areas. Their lives in villages and cities featured different social and cultural elements that could 
influence the way they acquire information, evaluate intentions, and perceive feasibilities and 
uncertainties in the decision-making process. Accordingly, the nature of the research participants in 
                                                             
29 The term ‘ecological rationality’ can contrast with the term ‘constructivist rationality’, which denotes all social 
environments were and should be created top-down by ‘conscious deductive processes of human reason’ (V. L. Smith, 
2003). 
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this study also necessitated a research method that could probe into respondents’ decision-making 
process while capturing the dichotomous rural-urban environments where they live. 
Qualitative research has strengths in addressing issues associated with developing an 
understanding of the perceptions and experience of individuals’ lives in particular social and 
cultural contexts (Liamputtong, 2012; Patton, 1990). The interpretive paradigm of qualitative 
methods helps understand social life and describe how people construct social meaning in their 
particular social and cultural contexts. Furthermore, compared with the quantitative approach, the 
qualitative method is more flexible. Open-ended questions allow participants greater spontaneity to 
describe in their own words how their complex perceptions of decision-making are influenced by 
different elements of their social contexts. These responses can hardly be obtained with quantitative 
survey questions that are worded in exactly the same way to each participant. Research by Scholz 
and Zimmer’s (1997) research focused on why contextualisation necessitates a qualitative approach 
to decision-making. In their research, a series of examples from the contextual perspectives 
revealed the constraints of quantitative modelling of uncertainties in the decision-making process. 
In communication between academic researchers and laypeople about uncertainties, it can be 
observed that the quantitative models of rationalities implicitly utilised by researchers and the 
subjective perception of uncertainties by laypeople are not consistent. It is argued that scientists can 
accountably communicate with the public on issues of rationality bounded by uncertainties only if 
they take into account the qualitative aspects of uncertainties as well as the quantitative aspects. 
Some scholars (Rosenfeld & Kraus, 2009) have applied a purely quantitative method to 
study heuristic reasoning of bounded rationality, using experiments, cognitive modelling and 
occasionally questionnaire-based studies. However, those statistics are weak in capturing the 
subjectivity of research target groups influenced by their specific social and cultural contexts, 
leading to a lack of external validity in the study. Establishing internal and external validity30 is 
                                                             
30 External validity refers to the extent to which the results of a study can be generalised to other settings. Internal 
validity refers to the confidence of drawing casual conclusions from a study. 
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important to any research (Wheeldon & Ahlberg, 2011). The application of the qualitative research 
method in this study helps to improve the external validity by matching results with settings. 
This research chose semi-structured interview as the collection method for the qualitative 
research. As noted previously in this section, the theory of bounded rationality indicates the 
importance of social, cultural and political contexts where decision-making heuristics are formed 
during the process of decision-making. Social realities that influence people’s intentions, perceived 
feasibilities of given alternatives, uncertainties, and information assimilation patterns are relativistic, 
which requires a naturalistic and interpretivist data collection method to examine (Williams & Vogt, 
2014).  As an interpretivist data collection method, the semi-structured interview allows key 
questions related to the research topic to be prepared, and free expression of views (Bryman, 2012). 
The so-called “environmental uncontrollables”, social and cultural norms in a context can be 
researched by the semi-structured interview because participants in such interviews are allowed the 
freedom to express their perceptions in their own terms. Data on migrant workers’ reasons for 
intending to join the urban pension, perceived feasibility and uncertainties of being an urban 
pension member were collected with interview questions, which were designed to access socially 
constructed perceptions of migrant workers through interactions between the researcher and the 
migrant workers. Interview participants were asked to elaborate on these questions. Although the 
interview was conducted based on the guide, topical trajectories that help contextualise migrant 
workers’ decision-making to join the urban pension were also allowed to be discussed. The 
interview questions were also adjusted and reframed depending on the migrant workers’ responses 
and feelings at the time. How migrant workers’ perceptions of joining the urban pension was 
influenced by China’s social, cultural and political context was reflected in their elaborations. As a 
result, the contextual elements which serve as sources of low-cost heuristics for decision-making 
were brought to light. With the interview data, migrant workers’ responses as indicators of their 
cognitive process of joining the urban pension in the context of China was analysed.  
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3.4.2.3 The Adoption of Mixed Methods 
The use of mixed methods allowed for the integration of the existing empirical evidence of 
different aspects of rationality, inclusive of both bounded and unbounded elements, in decision-
making. It enabled the study to capture a more complete, holistic and contextual portrayal of the 
decision-making process by which China’s migrant workers choose whether to take up the urban 
pension scheme. Given the complex nature of policy implementation and migrant labourer 
behaviour, it would have been difficult to conduct this research based on either a quantitative or a 
qualitative paradigm alone. Rather than choosing a single approach, this study combined elements 
of both to enhance the thoroughness and accuracy of the research. While a quantitative study was 
applied to test hypotheses on factors associated with migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban 
pension scheme, qualitative research was employed to help reveal migrant workers’ perceptions of 
the urban pension in China’s social, cultural and political environment. Thus, this PhD study 
applied a mixed methodology. The mixed methodology approach employed in this research is what 
Bryman (2012) referred to as ‘completeness’. 
‘Completeness’ occurs when two methods are applied to offer a more complete answer to a 
research question. The primary reason for using this complementary approach was to generate a 
more comprehensive picture of the urban pension policy implementation among migrant workers. 
In addition, the quantitative survey enabled interview participants to be purposively sampled. 
Therefore, the quantitative survey provided a sample and recruitment frame for the qualitative 
interview. 
With the aim of examining the implementation of the urban pension policy from the 
perspective of migrant workers, this research consisted of two parts. Study 1 focused on 
understanding the factors, and their relative importance, that influenced migrant workers’ uptake or 
intention to join the urban pension scheme. Phase 2 examined migrant workers’ understanding of 
the pension scheme and their reasoning behind their pension-use decisions. The two study elements 
were complementary. 
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Both intention in the quantitative study and perceptions of decision-making on whether to 
take up the urban pension policy in the qualitative study are elements of bounded rationality in 
individuals’ decision-making processes. The theory of bounded rationality links these elements 
conceptually in examining the policy approaches on which to base effective implementation at the 
level of the target group; that is, the policy approaches that maximise the chance of migrant workers, 
to whom the policy should be technically delivered, cooperating in taking up the policy and thereby 
helping achieve the stipulated policy objective. 
3.5 Quantitative Study Design 
The data collection method for Phase 1 was an anonymous self-completion paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire. For cost considerations and administrative concerns, the survey questionnaire was a 
fast and affordable solution for this study.  
According to a report by the Chinese Federation of Labor (2011), illiteracy has been almost 
eliminated among migrant workers, with an average education length of 9.8 years for the young 
generation of migrant workers and 8.8 years for the old generation. Thus, most migrant workers 
were competent to complete questionnaires themselves. 
3.5.1 Recruitment Criteria of the Survey 
Participants in the survey had to satisfy the following requirements: 
 no permanent residency in urban areas, 
 not currently a member of the urban pension scheme, 
 working in the Longgang District, 
 aged 18 years or over, and 
 able to speak Mandarin. 
3.5.2 Sampling and Recruitment Process of the Survey 
3.5.2.1 Sample Size As this quantitative study examined the impact of multiple factors on the 
dependent variable, multiple regression was employed after descriptive analysis and bivariate 
analysis. A sample size of 250 was desired. Based on Green’s (1991) discussion on sample size for 
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multiple regression models, the minimum sample size required was N ≥ 50 + 8n (where n is the 
number of predictors) for assessing multiple correlations, and N ≥ 104 + n for testing individual 
predictors. Other than testing the full regression model, the relative importance of each independent 
variable to the dependent variable was also measured in this study. I calculated the sample size both 
ways and chose the larger number of cases. There are eight independent variables in this research; 
thus, 50 + (8) (8) = 114 cases needed to test the multiple regression, and 104 + 8 = 112 cases to test 
individual predictors. In line with Green’s discussion for necessary cases, I chose 114 as the 
minimum sample size for this study. However, 250 questionnaires were collected to ensure the 
number of valid questionnaires (i.e., excluding missing data) was well above the minimum 
requirement (114). 
3.5.2.2 Sampling Stratification As discussed in the literature review, the behavioural patterns of the 
young generation of migrant workers are significantly different from those of the older generation. 
Therefore, questions that could help to distinguish these two groups of migrant workers were 
needed. As the young generation of migrant workers refers to migrant workers born after 1980 
(Xiong, 2013), and the survey was conducted in 2012, 32 years of age was used as the division 
between the young and old generations of migrant workers. In other words, migrant workers aged 
32 and under were considered young generation; migrant workers over 32 years were considered 
older generation. 
Two factors assumed to have influence on migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban 
pension system (age and the business ownership of their enterprises) were chosen to split migrant 
workers into four strata. Such stratification could lead to increased precision of variance estimates 
when the stratifying factors relate to the outcomes under investigation (Cohen, 2011). According to 
the Shenzhen Investigation Report on Young Migrant Labourers (Shenzhen Federation of Trade 
Unions & Shenzhen University, 2010), 73% of migrant workers in Shenzhen were aged between 16 
and 32, and 27% were aged over 32; therefore, a 7:3 ratio was required for the two age groups. 
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Similarly, the sampling fraction in relation to young migrant workers working in enterprises 
with different business ownership could be calculated this way, based on the data in the Shenzhen 
Report. Employment distribution of the older generation of migrant workers was unknown; thus, I 
based sampling for migrant workers of this age group on my judgement. Empirical studies have 
shown that only a minority of migrant workers work in stated-owned and collective enterprises 
(Knight, Song, & Huaibin, 1999; K. Wong et al., 2007); therefore, a smaller sample size was 
assigned to this stratum. Given that minorities should be properly represented in the sample, the 
survey included 10 older generation migrant workers working in SOEs or collective enterprises, and 
21 in other categories. Table 3.1 shows the relative size in each stratum. 
Table 3.1 
Relative Sample Size in the Survey 
Age 
Number selected 
(ratio = 7:1) 
Business ownership 
Number selected (ratio for the 
new generation = 1:9; ratio for 
the old generation is unknown) 
16-32 219 
State-owned, collective enterprises (including 
state or collective holding joint venture), 
government organs, and institutions 
22 
Other categories (self-employed workers also 
fall into this category) 
197 
32+ 31 
State-owned, collective enterprises (including 
state or collective holding joint venture), 
government organs, and institutions 
10 
Other categories (self-employed workers also 
fall into this category) 
21 
Note. N = 250 
3.5.2.3 Recruitment for Pilot Survey The pilot survey had selected 20 migrant workers as 
respondents. The recruitment strategy for the main survey was the same as used in the pilot survey. 
The pilot survey was administered on two occasions, the second one week following the initial 
administration. The survey instrument was then adjusted based on the outcome of the pilot survey. 
Besides techniques that might combat the nonresponse rate used in the main survey (e.g., 
financial compensation, requests for help and survey salience), ‘multiple contact’ was used in the 
pilot survey to maximise participant cooperation. The multiple contact strategy developed by 
Dillman (2000) is one of the most useful methods for combating survey refusal. Experiments 
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showed that it increases the response rate between 4% with pre-notification message (Brehm, 1994) 
and 16% (Goldstein & Jennings, 2002). Following Dillman (2000), before the second pilot survey, I 
sent pre-notifications (in the form of SMS text messages) informing participants that the second 
survey would be arriving. 
3.5.2.4 Recruitment for Main Survey The main survey was based on a random sampling of 
companies of different ownerships, which reflected their business makeup. Migrant workers in each 
enterprise were selected with purposive sampling. The rationale for this sampling strategy is 
presented in Appendix C. 
Enterprises with different ownership were first selected based on the stratification and 
sampling strategy in Table 3.1. A business directory that included businesses of all ownership types 
was utilised to randomly select enterprises. I waited at the factory dormitory building at the time 
when the workers finished work (normally 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.). The reason for choosing the 
dorm buildings rather than places near the factories was to avoid the employers who might have 
been present within the vicinity of the factories—migrant workers may not have been willing to join 
the survey within the presence of their employers. Prior to the survey, I researched the surrounding 
environment of the factories to find quiet areas for the completion of the questionnaires outdoors. 
During the survey, participants were led to these areas to complete the questionnaires. Pens were 
provided, and questionnaires were clipped onto hard paper boards for their convenience. Some 
factories had no dorm building, so I waited 200 metres from the factory gate, similarly to avoid the 
presence of the employers. In these cases, I first asked the workers whether they were employees of 
the surveyed factory, to make sure they were from enterprises sampled in the first stage. Previous 
research showed this strategy of recruiting migrant workers to be effective (A. Chan & Siu, 2007, 
2010; A. Chan & Wang, 2004). 
A person-to-person follow-up survey was conducted in administering the questionnaires. 
This type of survey is effective in increasing response rate (Dey, 1997; Kalton, 1983) because 
researchers can encourage people to participate by telling them, in person, about the value of the 
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study and the importance of their own contributions. Moreover, because I collected the 
questionnaire in person immediately after participants completed them, this method prevented 
questionnaires from being lost or misplaced. 
I used casual conversation with the migrant workers to establish rapport and determine their 
interest in the topic. I told the workers that I was a researcher independent of the government and 
that responses would be anonymous—as would be their employers or businesses. After explaining 
the purpose of this survey, I also solicited information related to the recruitment criteria and 
distributed questionnaires to workers who met the criteria and were interested in the topic. 
Participants who agreed to complete the questionnaires immediately responded to the questions by 
themselves, taking 15 to 20 minutes. Prior to the survey, I researched the surrounding environment 
of the factories to find quiet areas for the completion of the questionnaires outdoors. During the 
survey, participants were led to these areas to complete the questionnaires. Pens were provided, and 
questionnaires were clipped onto hard paper boards for their convenience. I stood within visual 
distance to minimise respondent bias. As time is crucial for migrant workers who work longer hours 
than local residents to earn the same amount of income, I compensated participants with an 
honorarium for the loss of one hour’s wage. According to the NBS (2011a) survey, the average 
wage for China’s migrant workers is approximately AU $1.50 per hour. Thus, each migrant worker 
received compensation of AU $1.50 after completion of the questionnaire. Those who participated 
in the semi-structured interview (qualitative part of this study) were paid an additional AU $2.00. 
As the survey took place after work, some workers refused to participate because of fatigue. 
In those cases, I still handed out the questionnaires but invited the workers to complete it at their 
convenience. However, I informed them that I would collect the questionnaires on my next visit to 
solicit new questionnaires, and that they would receive their honorarium only upon submission of 
their completed surveys. 
Ten workers were surveyed in a day, so the whole process took around 25 weekdays. To 
provide some assessment of the representativeness of the sample, I recorded the approximate 
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number of people who left the factory or appeared in the dorm building over the time the survey 
took place, noting the number of people who were asked to undertake the survey and the number of 
respondents who actually completed the questionnaire. 
Concerned that the survey would still suffer from high nonresponse rates, I adopted other 
techniques to maximise participation. According to the literature on survey responses, two types of 
methods can be used to deal with nonresponse. The first emphasises that the reasoned behaviours of 
participants are driven by their cost-benefit calculation. The second focuses on heuristic factors 
caused by psychological activities of participants when they make decisions about survey 
participation (S. R. Porter, 2004). 
Three factors are identified in the cost-benefit calculation: costs, benefits and trust (Dillman, 
2000; Hox, de Leeuw, & Vorst, 1995). The first two factors indicate that participants weigh the 
costs and benefits of their survey participation. They are less likely to participate when they think 
they will lose something because of their participation. Therefore, to minimise the perceived loss of 
the respondents, financial compensation was provided for participants. Trust means the expectation 
that the benefits of joining the survey will outweigh the costs in the long run. To enhance trust, I 
verbally explained the benefit of this survey in the long run. The consent form of the questionnaires 
also stated that the survey related to pension rights of migrant workers, and that, in the long run, 
their survey responses would contribute to the protection of labour rights. 
Psychological techniques combating nonresponse include requests for help, perceptions of 
scarcity and survey salience (Groves, Cialdini, & Couper, 1992). Experiments have shown that 
people might be more likely to join a survey if the survey contains requests for help. Mowen and 
Cialdini (1980) found that this kind of request could increase response rate by 18%. Thus, in 
communicating with workers, I emphasised, ‘Your participation would really help out us and your 
colleagues’. Furthermore, previous research has shown that people value scarce opportunities more 
than they value common ones (S. R. Porter & Whitcomb, 2003). Thus, I also emphasised that they 
would be part of the migrant workers selected for the survey when handing out questionnaires. The 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
96 
topic was an essential factor for increasing response rate as salience of the research topic for 
research participants is a crucial influence on response (Aldridge & Levine, 2001). Fortunately, this 
research topic was relevant to labour rights protection for the workers. Hence, I emphasised salience 
in verbal communication and in the consent form of the questionnaire through the statement, ‘This 
survey is really important for improving protection of your labour rights’. 
3.5.3 Questionnaire Design 
The survey sought to understand the factors associated with migrant workers’ intentions to 
join the urban pension scheme. The questionnaire design was based on the main variables deduced 
from the theory of bounded rationality and previous empirical research on China’s migrant workers 
(Table 3.2), which helped provide data for the exploration of factors that influence migrant workers’ 
intentions to join the urban pension scheme. Prior to the main survey, the questionnaire was piloted 
with a subsample of 20 migrant workers in Longgang. The recruitment method was tested and 
found to be effective and the length of questionnaire was appropriate. The pilot survey was 
administered twice, two weeks apart, for the assessment of the stability and reliability of the 
instrument over a period. Responses given to the test-retest pilot surveys were consistent, showing 
stability and reliabilities of instruments. The respondents were asked to provide feedback on the 
content of the pilot survey, and the questionnaire was revised based on results of the preliminary 
test. 
Table 3.2 
Main Independent and Dependent Variables 
Independent variable Dependent variable 
Individual factors Age  
Intention to join the urban pension 
scheme 
Education 
Length of stay in cities 
Settlement factors Settlement decision 
Enterprise factors Business ownership 
Membership of labour union 
Length of labour contract 
Land factors Experience of land expropriation 
Percentage of land expropriated 
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In relation to understanding behaviours of migrant workers, the questionnaire drew on the 
urban migrant survey constructed by the Rural-Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI, 
2010) project in 2007, which was established by the Australia National University in 2006 to 
investigate the behavioural patterns of migrant workers in China and Indonesia. The urban migrant 
survey questionnaire was one of the most comprehensive created for studying migration-related 
issues in China and is known for its measurement accuracy and high reliability (Meng, 2010). I used 
questions regarding demographic features, employment and settlement decisions from that survey in 
this study. Accordingly, my questionnaire was designed to measure constructs relating to the 
independent and dependent variables, as well as to include other basic demographic features of 
respondents. Additionally, questions related to the qualitative study, such as migrant workers’ 
perceived feasibility to take up the pension scheme, uncertainties they face regarding participation 
of the pension scheme and information they have regarding the pension scheme were included in 
the questionnaire and provided important insights for the follow-up semi-structured interviews. 
These questions were designed based on bounded rationality theory and previous studies on China’s 
migrant workers. 
The questionnaire consisted of four sections covering questions on settlement plans, 
employment and labour union membership, land expropriation in the rural hometown, participation 
and understanding of the urban pension, and individual information (see Appendix D for details of 
the questionnaire). 
3.5.4 Explanatory Notes for the Questionnaire 
3.5.4.1 Section A: Migration background 
This section includes questions about migration background, such as motivation to migrate, 
settlement plans, migration of family members, and the rural land in the rural hometown. Questions 
about this information were placed in the first section because they are the least threatening 
questionnaires in this survey. Considering workers with low education levels might be more 
sensitive to pictures than numbers, questions on the size of their rural land were designed to collect 
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numbers and drawings (A15-A18). They were asked to indicate with drawings how much land 
space in their families had been expropriated (A18). 
3.5.4.2 Section B: Employment and Labour Union Membership 
As enterprise ownership is a stratifying factor guiding the sampling for this survey, the 
researcher first selected enterprises with different ownership types and then chose migrant workers 
from them. Hence, the ownership status of workers’ companies was known prior to the 
questionnaire administration, and one question (B02) was enough to collect this information. It was 
expected that there would be very different employment rights and experiences between SOEs and 
private businesses, and that these would influence migrant workers’ perceptions of taking up the 
urban pension scheme. Three questions (B03–B05) were used to collect data on workers’ labour 
contracts, and questions B06–B08 are from standard questionnaires on workers’ employment 
contracts (RUMiCI, 2010; Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia, 2008). Questions B06-
B09 were drawn from standard questionnaires (Irish Congress of Trade Unions Questionnaire, 1998) 
to collect information on Chinese workers’ experiences of labour union participation and their 
attitudes towards it. 
3.5.4.3 Section C: Participation in and Understanding of the Urban Pension Scheme 
A standard questionnaire constructed based on the theory of planned behaviour (Francis, 
2004) showed that adequate internal consistency in relation to ‘intention’ can be demonstrated by 
using three items: ‘I expect to…’, ‘I want to…’ and ‘I intend to…’. As the words ‘want’ and ‘intend’ 
share the same phrase after being translated into Chinese, ‘I expect to…’ and ‘I intend to…’ were 
selected as two items measuring intention in this survey.  
The extent of the participants’ intentions/expectations was also measured. Three questions 
(C01–C03) were used as multiple-indicator measures for workers’ intentions to join the urban 
pension scheme (the survey’s dependent variable). 
As suggested by the theory of bounded rationality, information and uncertainties are 
important in decision-making. Consequently, uncertainties and information relating to the take-up 
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of the urban pension were assessed in questions C06 to C09. Questions C06 to C08 relate to 
workers’ perceptions of joining the urban pension scheme and the information they have about this 
scheme. In question C07, the table lists key components of the Social Insurance Law, ranging from 
the premium rate to the responsibility of local governments, and participants were asked to tick the 
relevant box to show whether they knew this information. Questions C09 to C11 were used to 
explore workers’ uncertainties regarding joining the urban pension scheme. 
Four uncertainties in questions C09 and C11 were main uncertainties that migrant workers 
face about their participation in the urban pension scheme. The reason for choosing these four 
uncertainties were: 
1. The survey conducted by Song (2007) showed that 80% of employers are reluctant to offer 
pensions for migrant workers, as the employer contribution rate of 20% is a heavy burden 
for enterprises. The reason enterprises prefer migrant rather than local workers is that the 
migrant worker labour cost is much lower than that of local labourers, but the pension 
contribution would significantly increase the migrant worker labour cost and reduce their 
marginal profits; therefore, most employers choose to avoid their pension obligations (W. 
Yang, 2006, p. 155). Hence, employers’ avoidance of pension obligations is an option about 
uncertainties. 
2. It has been found that most migrant workers do not trust the rural local governments and are 
concerned that the new policies will be misimplemented in their hometowns. In an 
investigation conducted by the Economic Information Daily (B. Li, 2010), migrant workers 
were interviewed about their attitudes towards the new pension transfer policy. Some 
respondents said they had enquired about the new pension transfer policies with the social 
security department in their hometowns; however, the reply they received was, ‘The local 
conditions are not ripe enough for the implementation of the new policies’. Some 
respondents also said that their hometowns were poverty-stricken and embezzlement of 
public funds happened very often. If their pension funds were transferred to the hometown, 
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the local government might retain the funds. Participants’ concerns about implementation of 
the new policy are understandable to some extent, because the lack of supervision makes the 
governance mechanism imperfect in some remote rural areas (B. Li, 2010, p. 288). As the 
local governments do not want to lose benefits, they might be more willing to see migrant 
workers abandon their pension benefits because of some loopholes in the social security 
system. Thus, local governments also render migrant workers uncertain about their 
participation in the urban pension scheme. 
3. Section 3.2.1 showed that workers’ intentions to join the urban pension scheme might be 
affected by their decisions to stay in cities or go back to the rural hometown in the future. 
Hence, the individual future plan is another uncertainty regarding migrant workers’ 
participation of the pension scheme. 
4. In cities, migrant workers experience a combination of different problems, such as low 
income, discrimination, lack of social rights and poor professional opportunities (K. W. 
Chan, 2010; K. D. Roberts, 2002). The interaction of different dimensions of social 
exclusion can result in lack of confidence and a sense of powerless (UN Development 
Programme, 2006). These feelings of disadvantage might also be an uncertainty for workers 
about their participation in the urban pension scheme. Thus, the term ‘doubts for life’ is used 
to capture their feelings of marginalisation. 
3.5.4.4 Section D: Individual Demographic Information, Including Social and Economic Status. 
Participants voluntarily provided contact information at the end of the survey if they wished 
to participate in a follow-up interview. Because information from the survey questionnaires was 
used to draw samples for the interview, some participants had to be identified. The protection of 
their identities was achieved by using pseudonyms, which has long been known as a main way to 
maintain anonymity (Morrow, 1995). Workers were informed in this section that their participation 
in the subsequent interview would be voluntary, and that those who would like to participate in the 
follow-up interview would obtain an AU $2 reimbursement. 
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The survey used a five-point scale to measure workers’ attitudes related to pension 
participation. Although an increase in the number of scale points could yield higher variances, an 
influential research by Miller (1956) argued that the human mind’s attention span can encompass 
only about six items at a time; hence, one question with more than six response options might not 
yield answers made with the respondents’ accurate judgement. Moreover, people with lower 
education have less ability to process and retain information than do those with higher education 
levels (Bernadette, 2003). Thus, to ensure that migrant workers with generally low education levels 
had no trouble processing information regarding response options and then making accurate 
judgements on them, the five-point scale item was applied in the questionnaire. Further, to avoid 
confusion and ensure everyone understood the points similarly, a label was provided for each point. 
Attached to the questions to collect data related to the migrant workers’ occupation and 
education levels were the ‘occupation code form’, ‘highest education level code form’ and 
‘education grade code form’. These three forms were designed in the RUMiCI (2010) project by the 
Australian National University. The occupation form covers all occupations of Chinese workers, 
while the two education forms consider different education systems and degrees granted in all 
provinces across China. These designed codes facilitate data input and analysis because the 
respondents avoid inputting different names of occupations or education levels for one category. 
3.5.5 Participants 
The survey recruited 252 migrant respondents paying particular attention to multiple 
variations in the wider migrant worker population of China. 
Gender bias was noted in the survey, with significantly more males (n = 210, 83.3%) than 
females (n = 41, 16.3%). This bias was more uneven than the data in the NBS (2011a) report on 
China’s young migrant workers; that is, their data showed 66.4% for males and 33.6% for females. 
Therefore, females were underrepresented in this study’s survey. The dominance of manufacturing 
and processing factories in the sample may have caused this underrepresentation, because female 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
102 
migrant workers are not highly represented in the manufacturing industry but in the hospitality and 
domestic work industry (Shen, 2016). 
The average years of schooling for the sample was 9.85 (SD = 2.49). As shown in Table 3.3, 
the highest education level attained by most participants was junior high school (59.9%), followed 
by primary school and lower (16.7%). Participants with polytechnic and bachelor degrees 
comprised 7.5% and 2.5% of the sample, respectively. 
Table 3.3 
Percentage of Migrant Workers in each Social-Demographic Category 
Education % 
Monthly Wage 
(RMB) 
% 
Regularity of 
payment 
% Age % Gender % 
Primary school 
and lower 
16.7 Below 1300  2.8 Late with 
payment more 
than one 
month 
14.8 <= 32 
years 
68.3 Male 83.7 
Junior high 
school 
59.9 1301-2300  14.6 
Senior high 
school 
11.8 2301-3300 32.9 Late with the 
payment less 
than one 
month 
31.6 
Polytechnic  7.5 3301-4300 32.9 > 32 
years 
old 
31.7 Female 16.3 
Bachelor 
degrees or above 
2.5 4301-5300 12.2 No late 
payment 
53.7 
More than 5300  4.5 
 
In the pilot survey, one open question was utilised to ask participants’ monthly income; 
however, the response rate for this question was very low. Therefore, in the main survey, 
respondents were asked to locate their personal income in bands. The monthly wages of participants 
mainly (32.9%) ranged from 2,301 to 3,300 RMB (about AU $384 to $550) with another 32.9% 
reporting 3,301 to 4,300 RMB (about AU $550 to $717). More than half of the participants earned 
income below the average monthly wage of 4,918 RMB (about AU $820) in Shenzhen (Guangdong 
Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, 2013).31 With regard to the regularity of their 
payments, 53.7% reported no late payments, 31.6% indicated delayed payments of less than one 
month, and 14.8% reported delayed payments of over one month. 
                                                             
31. This was the latest data reported by Guangdong Human Resources and the Social Security Bureau in June 2013. 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
103 
Based on the NBS (2011a) report on China’s young migrant workers, this project aimed to 
achieve the 7:3 ratio for the two age levels in this survey (i.e., workers aged 32 years or below, and 
workers aged over 32 years). In the survey, 68.3% of the participants were 32 years old or younger, 
and 31.7% were over 32 years old. Thus, the age ratio in the survey was approximately 7:3, which 
is consistent with the goal ratio. 
The top two outflow provinces in the survey were Henan and Sichuan,32 with participants 
from these provinces accounting for 18.7% and 17.5%, respectively. These are developing and 
populous areas in China, and considered the major regions for outflow of migrant workers. The 
third highest outflow province is Guangdong (9.9%), and the lowest outflow areas are Shandong 
(0.4%), Zhejiang (0.4%), Jiangsu (1.6%), and Inner Mongolia (0.4%). These low outflow areas are 
among the top 10 provincial regions with the highest GDP per capita (F. Huang, 2012). The 
outcome was generally in accordance with the findings in macro-migration theory, which states that 
workers are typically motivated by the wage gap and move from the low-income to high-income 
regions (Stark & Taylor, 1991). 
However, one point should be clarified. The third outflow area in the survey was 
Guangdong, whose GDP per capita was AU $10,284 in 2012 (NBS, 2013b). Thus, Guangdong had 
reached the level of the upper-middle income regions in the world. As an outflow area, it accounts 
for a substantial proportion of participants; it was also the location of the survey. The local rural-
urban workers’ geographic advantage to work in this province increased the probability that I would 
meet local workers in the survey. Similarly, provinces such as Qinghai and Xinjiang are two of the 
economically poorest provinces (NBS, 2013b) and were at the bottom of the list of outflow regions. 
However, this aspect may also be explained by geographic factors (i.e., they are fairly distant from 
the survey city). 
                                                             
32. Out-flowing provinces refer to provinces from which the migrant workers came. 
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3.6 Design for the Qualitative Study 
The qualitative phase of this study aimed at examining the ‘cooperation component’ at the 
target group level of implementation of the urban pension scheme, reflected in migrant workers’ 
perception of taking up the pension scheme. It directly contributed to providing a deeper 
understanding to answering RQ2 (How does migrant workers’ choice-making on whether to take up 
the urban pension reflect their state of cooperation with the policy?) than would have been possible 
in a quantitative survey. The bounded rationality theory provided the framework on which the data 
were analysed. As a key pillar in bounded rationality theory, migrant workers’ perceived feasibility 
of joining the pension scheme was examined. Further, how this feasibility relates to migrant 
workers’ intentions to join the pension scheme, with migrant workers’ rationality limited by 
uncertainties about their participation in the scheme and the information they have about the scheme, 
was analysed. Although data on feasibility, uncertainties and information came from the qualitative 
interview, information on their intention to join the scheme came from the quantitative survey. 
The qualitative part of this study regarding the cooperation component was conceptually 
linked with the quantitative part, which analysed the technical component of implementation, in 
order to examine the theory upon which effective implementation of the urban pension policy at the 
target group level should be based: that is, migrant workers—to whom the policy should be 
technically delivered—will render cooperation to achieve the stipulated policy objective of the 
urban pension scheme by taking up the policy. 
3.6.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
To generate a greater understanding of how the urban pension system was understood by 
migrant workers and barriers to their participation in the urban pension system, this research also 
required a qualitative methodology—specifically, semi-structured interviews. I chose individual 
interviews rather than a group interview because people may not talk openly about a topic involving 
government within a group of peers. Twelve interview participants were identified through their 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
105 
participation in the survey. The purpose of the interview was to explore migrant workers’ 
understanding of the urban pension scheme. The interview was structured in four stages: 
1. I explained the purpose of this research, how the data would be used, and research ethics, 
particularly stressing confidentiality. 
2. I asked migrant workers a set of general questions regarding their plan for old age, to elicit 
conversation. I based this on an interview technique called funnelling, which means the 
questions should move from general enquiries to more focused questions. This technique 
allows interview to flow like a conversation, and could help respondents make logical 
responses (Manion & Cohen, 1994). 
3. I asked questions that were more focused in relation to respondents’ experience with the 
urban pension, as enquiries regarding experience or behaviours are helpful in building a 
context for respondents to express their understanding and perceptions (Patton, 1987). 
Questioning in the next stage then moved to the specific issues on their understanding of the 
urban pension scheme, including their knowledge about the urban pension system, 
perceptions of the urban pension scheme, rationalisation behind their intention towards the 
urban pension scheme, and the main barriers they face to joining the urban pension scheme. 
4. I asked a set of specific reflective questions to help participants think back over the 
discussion, and then requested their final thoughts related to their perspectives of pension 
schemes. This technique could help interviewers confirm or disconfirm their interpretations 
of respondents’ opinions, and therefore increase research validity (Kvale, 1996). All 
interviews were tape-recorded. 
The setting for each interview was a quiet, private place chosen by the interviewee, as this 
helped to avoid noise (which might have led to low-quality audio recording) and helped participants 
trust the confidentiality of the interview (Bryman, 2012; Jolley & Mitchell, 2010). 
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3.6.2 Interview Recruitment 
The aim of this interview was to extract data on how migrant employees perceived taking up 
the pension scheme, with their rationality limited by uncertainties and incomplete information. Data 
on their perceived feasibility about taking up the scheme, the relationship between workers’ 
perceived feasibility and intention to join the scheme, uncertainties regarding their participation in 
the scheme, and the information they had about the policy were collected in the interview. 
According to bounded rationality theory, individuals’ different objectives and subjective 
environments shape their reasoning and their process of choice-making. Thus, the interview sought 
to explore migrant workers’ perceptions of taking up the pension scheme based on the different 
objective and subjective environments of the migrant workers. (See Appendix E for interview 
questions asked in the fieldwork.) 
The sample for the interview was drawn from the quantitative survey based on the survey 
questionnaires. Purposive sampling was used to select participants. The criteria for purposive 
sampling was based on the outcome of Study 1. The urban old-age pension scheme is effectively 
voluntary for migrant workers. Thus, migrant workers who expressed interest in joining the urban 
pension were selected to form the sampling frame of the follow-up interview exploring barriers that 
stop them from joining the urban pension despite their interest, their information about the urban 
pension scheme, and their perceived intention and feasibility to join the urban pension. This study 
excluded migrant workers who were not interested in joining the urban pension because the overall 
aim of this study concerns the implementation gap with emphasis on the urban pension policy 
cannot effectively cover rural-urban migrant workers despite their interest in taking up the policy. 
Factors shown in Study 1 to significantly influence participants’ intention to join the pension were 
also utilised as stratifying factors to group interview participants. Only two factors from Phase 1 
were selected, guaranteeing a sufficient sample in each interview group. 
There is little agreement in the literature on the minimum sample size for the interview. The 
sample size in this study was based on attainment of saturation. Because this approach requires 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
107 
interview data to be connected with theoretical insights in the process of data collection, it enabled 
all steps in the qualitative study to be theoretically combined, avoiding a linear process of 
qualitative study (Mason, 2010). Hence, six workers in each group were initially sampled, and data 
collection stopped if the information turned repetitive. Otherwise, more data were collected until the 
new data could not shed further light on migrant workers’ perceptions of taking up the pension 
scheme. Table 3.4 shows the time of the research participants’ recruitment. 
Table 3.4 
Timeline of the Research Participants’ Recruitment 
 January 
2013 
February 
2013 
March 
2013 
April 
2013 
May 
2013 
 
Pilot       
Phase 1        
Phase 2          
 
3.7 Research Rigour 
The criteria adopted to evaluate the rigour of the quantitative part of the study were 
reliability and validity. When assessing reliability, both internal and external reliability were 
evaluated. 
External reliability is mainly concerned with evaluating whether an instrument is stable over 
time. The test-retest method was employed to ensure external reliability. The pilot survey was 
administered on two occasions, one week apart, to examine whether there was a high correlation 
between measures in the initial test and the retest. Substantial agreement over repeated tests would 
imply reliable measures; low correlation would indicate unstable measures. If the results of the pilot 
showed low test-retest reliability, then revisions on the instrument would need to be made to 
improve the stability of measures. 
Internal reliability assesses whether multiple indicators measuring the same construct are 
related to each other. Cronbach’s alpha was used to test whether the variables measuring a single 
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influencing factor (e.g., enterprise factor) were associated with each other. The indicators would be 
adjusted until an acceptable level of internal reliability was achieved. 
Validity was also ensured in this part of study. For example, this study’s survey instrument 
utilised a previously validated questionnaire. Therefore, the face and construct validity were 
warranted. As the process of theoretical deduction was examined by supervisors, the 
operationalisation of the hypothesis was controlled. In addition, variables measured in this study 
were all information related to family, land expropriation, employment, demographic features and 
urban pension, which can be measured without any complex constructs. To warrant content validity, 
migrant workers who participated in the pilot survey were asked about their understanding of the 
questions to ensure that questions reflected the objective of the research. The preliminary test, 
which helped build a more credible multiple regression model, also guaranteed the study validity. 
Trustworthiness was chosen as a criterion for evaluating the qualitative study. The four 
issues of trustworthiness considered in this research were dependability, conformability, credibility 
and transferability. 
 Both dependability and conformability were guaranteed by using an ‘auditing’ strategy. My 
supervisors acted as auditors to thoroughly examine all materials regarding my research 
process. The recorded research process was also discussed at the school’s work-in-progress 
seminar for academic scrutiny. This ensured completeness of the auditable documents and 
also effectively avoided bias or distortion caused by personal value and theoretical 
inclination (Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Patton, 1990). 
 To warrant data credibility, the technique of respondent validation was used. Interview 
transcripts were emailed back to participants because some researchers (McNiff & 
Whitehead, 2002) suggested that returning interview transcripts to participants could 
enhance the validity of findings, that is, this correspondence allows interviewees to confirm 
the opinions they had or had not given and gives them an opportunity to withdraw 
statements that did not reflect their real perspectives. This strategy embraces the spirit of 
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openness and collaboration and, therefore, appeared to be a sound research practice 
(Christine, 2005). 
 Research transferability was achieved by adopting the strategy of ‘thick description’ (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1985). This means that migrant workers in the interview were encouraged to 
give rich accounts of their understanding of the urban pension scheme, as well as the reasons 
and stories behind their accounts. This richly described data provided sufficient information 
to judge themes and the appropriateness of generalising findings to a broader context 
(Geertz, 1973). 
3.8 Ethical Considerations 
This research was conducted in accordance with University of Queensland research 
protocols. The ethical clearance for this research was approved by the School Research Ethics 
Committee, clearance number SWAHS2012/5. Participants were asked to sign a consent form after 
being informed of the nature, aim and benefits of the research. They were also informed that they 
could withdraw from the research at any time without penalty or loss of benefits. As the participants 
in my research were all migrant workers aged 18 or over, with the average education length being 
8.8 to 9.8 years, it was reasonable to believe that they fully understood the procedures and purposes 
involved in this research and could decide whether to participate in this study. 
Confidentiality was maintained throughout the research process. Since information from the 
survey questionnaires was used to draw samples for the interview, some participants had to be 
identified. Protection of their identities was achieved by using pseudonyms, which has long been 
known as a chief way to maintain anonymity (Morrow & Smith, 1995). In data analysis, all 
recordings and transcripts were coded so they could not be associated with any participant. All 
hard-copy files containing confidential information were kept in locked cabinets, and electronic-
form data were stored in a password-protected computer. 
Migrant workers’ hourly wages are much lower than those of urban residents. To make 
enough money to sustain their lives in cities, migrants work much longer hours than urban workers 
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(Appleton, Knight, Song, & Xia, 2001; L. Shi, 2008). Thus, time is of vital importance for migrant 
workers. According to an NBS (2013a) survey, the average wage of migrant workers is about AU 
$1.50 per hour. Thus, each migrant received compensation of AU $0.75 for each participating in the 
survey and completing the questionnaire. Those who also participated in the interview were paid an 
additional AU $2.00. 
The interview on understanding the policy inevitably involved migrant workers’ perceptions 
regarding the role of government in the implementation process, which may be considered a 
sensitive issue. To let migrant workers talk freely in front of me, I began with a conversation prior 
to each interview, to help build rapport with participants. I clarified that I was not a member of any 
political party and did not hold any political position. Further, I told participants that Chinese 
citizens’ freedom to express political ideas is protected by the Constitution of the PRC, and that 
they would remain anonymous throughout the research process—thus, there was no risk of being 
identified. 
3.9 Translation 
The strategy adopted in the translation of instruments on the questionnaire was ‘back 
translation’, which refers to the process of retranslating a document that has already been translated 
into the source language (Baker, 2011; Brislin & Kazdin, 2000). This means that I translated the 
English survey instrument into Chinese, then a third person translated it back into English, and then 
we compared the original questionnaire and the back translation to assess the quality of the survey 
instrument translation. Revisions were made on translations until the translation covered all aspects 
of the source questionnaire. The translation was examined by a third person to ensure that it had no 
mistakes and was not biased. A Chinese version of NVivo was used for the qualitative data analysis. 
Only information relevant to reporting the final themes was translated into English. Throughout the 
translation process, a balance between language and culture was maintained, to ensure true 
translation equivalence. 
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Chapter 4: Factors Influencing Intention to Join the Urban Old-Age 
Pension Scheme 
The theoretical framework in Section 3.2 analysed the theory of bounded rationality in the 
context of policy implementation with an aim to explore the implementation gap of the urban old-
age pension scheme at the migrant worker level. The theoretical analysis revealed two significant 
conditions for successful implementation of the pension scheme at the migrant worker level. The 
first condition is the identification of factors that influence migrant workers’ intentions to join the 
pension scheme. An exploration of these factors could assist the government in identifying target 
groups for the in-effect voluntary policy and in establishing a sound relationship between the policy 
objectives and features of the target group. The second condition is the understanding of migrant 
workers’ decision-making processes in joining the pension scheme. These two conditions are 
examined in this thesis with two studies using quantitative and qualitative methods, respectively. 
This chapter presents the first study, which applies a quantitative method to answer the first 
research question: 
RQ1. What are the main factors that influence rural-urban migrant workers’ intentions to 
take up the basic urban old-age pension scheme in China (among the following factors: A. 
land; B. enterprise; C. settlement and D. individual)? 
The theory of bounded rationality guided the theoretical exploration of these factors and 
establishment of hypotheses. This theory challenges the assumption of a classic rational choice 
model that choice-makers could accurately calculate the cost and benefit generated by each 
alternative and then develop an intention for the choice that maximises their personal advantages. 
Instead, bounded rationality takes into account individuals’ limited computational capacity, 
uncertainties of natural decision issues and imperfect information, and instead analyses decision-
making as an intractable process (Simon, 1956; 2010). This process occurs in the particular social 
and cultural settings where people live. Intentions and choices have meanings because society and 
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culture give them meanings (Henrich, Albers, & Boyd, 2002). All individuals are constructed by 
their society and play a role as social beings; alternatives and intentons are also constructed.  
The impact of cultural and social environments on the development of individuals’ decision-
making perceptions, including their intentions, was acknowledged in Section 3.1. Having realised 
the importance of context in analysing individuals’ decision-making process, the four factors of 
land, settlement, employment and individual were selected for their possible impact on the 
intentions of China’s migrant workers to join the urban old-age pension scheme. Hypotheses (see 
Section 3.4.1) were built in relation to how these factors may influence migrant workers’ intentions 
to take up the scheme. Based on the hypotheses, surveys were designed and administrated to 
252 migrant workers in Shenzhen (see Section 3.5). Original data on the four factors were collected, 
and the quantitative results are presented in this chapter. 
This chapter is set out as follows: background, measures of variables, independent and 
dependent, and results. The findings of this chapter are briefly discussed and summarised in the 
conclusion. 
4.1 Background 
This study is based on the implementation gap of the urban old-age pension scheme when 
examined at the bottom tier, where migrant workers constitute the beneficiaries. Based on the 
theoretical framework of this research, the theory of implementation applies a synthesis model of 
top-down and bottom-up approaches. The technical component refers to a clear relationship 
between the policy objective and target recipients; the cooperation component pertains to how 
people react to the policy. This chapter focuses on the technical component and examines whether a 
clear relationship exists between migrant workers—the target group of the pension scheme—and 
the objectives of the pension scheme. 
The Chinese Government intends to include all urban workers in the pension scheme and, 
under the Social Insurance Law, obliges all urban workers with stable labour contracts to join it 
(Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 2012; Social Insurance Law, 2011). However, 
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the implementation of the Labour Contract Law did not guarantee migrant workers’ signing labour 
contract. In fact, the percentage of migrant workers with labour contracts even declined. In 2015, 
only 36 percent of Chinese migrant workers had signed labour contracts with their employers, 
compared to the percentage in 2014 (NBS, 2015). Moreover, migrant workers are normally not 
considered as formal employees by their employers and thus are not officially reported to the 
statistical system (Cai, 2016, p.42). The lack of formal employment contract and employers’ 
underreporting of migrant workers make it difficult for migrant workers to be protected by the 
Social Insurance Law.  
When people make pension contributions, they trade current benefits for a claim on future 
gains (Hill, 2007; Walker, 2005). China’s urban old-age pension scheme is a combination of PAYG 
and funded schemes. Both PAYG and funded schemes are claims on future returns and require 
individuals to contribute to their future (Hinz, Holzmann, Gersdorff, & World Bank, 2005). 
However, people in need often pursue the adequacy of their current income rather than long-term 
output (Blank, 1993). The pension scheme deducts a certain proportion of workers’ current wages 
for future use. Therefore, as a marginalised group, not all migrant workers are interested in joining. 
Moreover, some migrant employees are interested in the rural old-age pension scheme, which 
requires an annual contribution of only 100 RMB (approximately AU $17). Although the 
government is seeking to increase urban old-age pension scheme membership among migrant 
workers, it does not know which groups of migrant workers intend to join. When a target 
population is poorly specified and target efficiency is not attained, such as in this case, a scheme 
might not be able to benefit intended recipients (Kendal, 2010; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981; 
Sabatier, 1986; Surender & Walker, 2013; Walker, 1996, 2005). 
The first research question addressed in this thesis is: ‘What are the main factors that 
influence the intentions of migrant workers to join the urban old-age pension scheme?’ Based on 
previous research (as outlined in Chapter 2), hypotheses related to each factor—settlement, land 
expropriation, employment, and demographics—were developed. Focal hypotheses include: 
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 Migrant workers who plan to settle in cities in the future are more likely to have intentions 
to join the urban old-age pension scheme than are those who plan to go back to their rural 
hometowns (settlement). 
 Migrant workers who have experienced land expropriation are more likely to have intentions 
to join the urban old-age pension scheme than are those without land expropriation 
experience (land expropriation). 
 Migrant workers who work in SOEs are more likely to have intentions to join the urban old-
age pension scheme than are those who work in private enterprises (employment). 
 Migrant workers born after 1980 are more likely to have intentions to join the urban old-age 
pension scheme than are those born before 1980 (demographics/individual). 
In this chapter, survey data were used to examine the influence of the four factors on 
migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme. The following sections reveal 
how quantitative analysis was used to explore these factors. 
4.2 Measures 
4.2.1 Independent Variables 
Table 4.1 presents the independent variables used to provide measures in this study: 
participants’ settlement plans, experience of land expropriation, business ownership status, labour 
contract status, labour union membership, age, years of stay in cities, and marital status. Several 
variables were based on the 2006 RUMiCI project, whereas others were based on the literature on 
migrant workers. The method of constructing these measures is described in the following section. 
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Table 4.1 
Factors Used as Independent Variables in the Quantitative Study 
Settlement Land Employment Individual 
V1 Settlement statements 
I am likely to settle in the 
city in the future. 
I am likely to go back to the 
rural hometown. 
 
V2 Settlement plans 
Will stay permanently in 
the city 
Will eventually go back to 
rural areas 
unsure 
V3 Experience of land 
expropriation 
 
V4 Percentage of land that 
had been expropriated 
V5 Enterprise ownership 
1. State-owned, collective 
enterprises 
2. Other categories (private 
enterprises) 
3. Unsure 
 
V6 Labour contracts 
No labour contract 
Short-term labour contract 
(less than one year) 
Long-term labour contract 
(one year or above) 
 
V7 Membership of labour 
union 
Not a member yet 
A member 
V8 Age 
<=32 years old 
>32 years old 
 
V9 Education 
Primary school and lower 
Junior high school 
Senior high school 
Polytechnic 
Bachelor degrees or above 
 
V10 Length of stay in cities 
(Migration duration) 
 
V11 Marital status 
 
Two settlement statements were developed, as listed in Table 4.1. Participants rated each 
statement on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely likely). The accuracy of 
responses was affirmed by a repeated question concerning their settlement plans. The initial 
settlement plan responses were ‘plan to settle in the city permanently’ and ‘will eventually go back 
to the rural hometown’. However, the pilot study identified a significant amount of missing data in 
responses to this question. According to the feedback of the pilot participants, another response 
option—’not sure’—was added. Later descriptive statistics revealed the largest proportion (49%) of 
participants chose this new option. 
Two items were used to determine the participants’ experience of land expropriation 
(requisition). The first enquired about any experience they may have had regarding land requisition; 
the second enquired about the amount of land that had been requisitioned. However, these two 
items did not reflect the percentage of land that had been expropriated. I considered that participants 
may lack knowledge about the meaning of ‘percentage’ because of their low education levels, so 
‘percentage’ was not asked in the survey. However, a new variable, ‘percentage of land that had 
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been expropriated’, was created prior to the data analysis. I calculated the relevant data myself 
based on the responses concerning the total amount of land and the amount of expropriated land. 
One item was used to examine participants’ knowledge about enterprise ownership. 
Participants indicated the type of business ownership of their enterprise, namely, ‘state-owned’, 
‘private-owned’, or ‘I don’t know’. The participants were purposively sampled in one state-owned 
and 19 private-owned enterprises. 
One item constructed from the RUMiCI project was used to measure the nature of 
participants’ labour contracts, which consisted of three levels: ‘no labour contract’, ‘short-term 
labour contract’ (less than one year), and ‘long-term labour contract’ (one year or more). The 
responses were verified by two additional repeated questions on having a labour contract and the 
length of the contract. 
Three items were used to determine participants’ labour union membership. In one item, 
participants indicated their membership status by answering either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. To affirm the 
accuracy of participants’ responses, the other two items enquired whether the enterprise had a 
labour union and whether workers were allowed to join it. 
Participant age was asked using two items. One was based on the solar calendar, the other 
on the lunar calendar. Because the research aimed to investigate the intentions of workers in two 
age groups (<= 32 years old and > 32 years old), a new categorical variable named ‘age group’ was 
created to classify participants. 
As survey participants came from different regions of China where education systems might 
differ, the survey used three open-ended questions drawn from the RUMiCI project (grade level 
upon leaving school, total years of schooling, and highest education level completed) to obtain 
information on survey participants’ highest education level. Then, education level responses were 
classified into five categories based on all answers: primary school and lower, junior high school, 
senior high school, polytechnic, and bachelor degree or above. Therefore, a new categorical 
variable measuring education level was created. 
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Four items were used to determine participants’ length of stay in cities. To ensure reliable 
responses to the direct question of ‘How long have you stayed in the city?’, participants were also 
asked to provide the year they first arrived in the city, the number of times they had returned home 
since their first arrival, and the latest year of returning home. 
4.2.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in the research was measured by two statements on intentions 
to join the urban old-age pension scheme: (1) I expect to join the urban old-age pension scheme in 
the near future, and (2) I would like to join the urban old-age pension scheme in the near future. 
Participants rated each statement on a 5-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
A dependent variable was then created by calculating a composite score (mean) from these two 
Likert scale items. 
4.3 Quantitative Results 
This section details the data analysis process—from data cleaning, descriptive analysis, and 
bivariate testing to multiple regression. Descriptive statistics aim to provide a general picture of the 
overall data. The data were compared to previous research data collected at the local level in 
Shenzhen and at the national level. Correlation analysis examined if each predictor in the study had 
a significant relationship with the dependent variable—the intention to participate in the urban old-
age pension system. Using bivariate analysis, I explored the relationships between the dependent 
variable and each independent variable with regard to settlement, land expropriation, employment, 
and individual. After the influence of each predictor on the dependent variable was examined, 
predictors with significant effects on the dependent variable were placed in a multiple regression 
model to test if that set of variables had a significant influence on the dependent variable. 
4.3.1 Data Cleaning 
Data cleaning was achieved first through possible code cleaning and contingency cleaning, 
which are two effective methods for data entry checking and error detecting. Possible code cleaning 
was completed through descriptive statistics (frequency tables for categorical variables and 
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descriptive tables for continuous variables) to ensure that response choices in the data file matched 
the code, and maximum and minimum values of all variables fell into the questions’ expected 
ranges. This process identified 172 missing data points detected for ‘labour contract’, but few 
missing data for all other variables. The entering of variables was checked by examining the value 
labels. Contingency cleaning was conducted by examining the logical structure of the data. Illogical 
data were removed from the file. For instance, some participants who indicated having no 
experience of land expropriations gave responses to the size of expropriated land; these responses 
were deleted. 
Outliers were found for ‘length of time in city’, ‘education’, and ‘wage’; however, the 
values were considered legitimate and retained in the analysis. 
4.3.2 Statistical Assumptions 
Normality and homogeneity of variance are crucial for deciding whether parametric or 
nonparametric statistics should be used to ensure valid and reliable findings. Parametric analyses 
require normal data distribution and homogeneity of variance. 
Normality was first visually assessed by histogram and box plot, and then a normality test 
was applied. In a normal distribution, frequency distribution should follow a symmetric bell shaped 
curve, with the left and right sides being approximately mirror images of each other (Farrell & 
Rogers-Stewart, 2006). Data on all variables were examined based on histogram and box plots, and 
only ‘wage’, ‘ownership status’, and ‘proportion of expropriated land’ were considered to meet this 
requirement. 
Then, a Shapiro–Wilk test was applied for the normality test. The test showed that all results 
were significant; the null hypothesis of these data being normally distributed was rejected, and the 
data were judged to be non-normally distributed. 
Levene’s test was used to test the homogeneity of variance of all categorical variables with 
the dependent variable ‘intention to join the urban old-age pension scheme’. The tests for 
‘ownership status’, ‘age group’, ‘marriage’, and ‘wage’ were not significant; therefore, variances of 
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these data were not significantly different. However, the test showed that the groups within labour 
union participation and highest education level had significantly heterogeneous variances. 
Levene’s tests for ‘settlement plan’, ‘marital status’, and ‘membership of labour union’ were 
significant; therefore, variances of these data were seen to be heterogeneous. However, the 
Levene’s tests for the remaining variables were not significant, indicating that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was not violated. 
Overall, although data on ‘wage’, ‘ownership status’, and ‘proportion of expropriated land’ 
were visually inspected to be close to normal, the Shapiro–Wilk test showed that data on all 
variables violated normality. Therefore, all data were treated as non-normal in further analyses. 
Regarding the homogeneity of variance, the Leven’s test showed that data on no variables violated 
this assumption, except data on ‘settlement plan’, ‘marital status’, and ‘membership of labour 
union’. Because the data did not meet the first requirement for using parametric analysis, 
nonparametric analysis was applied as a conservative option in further analyses. 
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Multiple Regression 
4.3.3.1 Key Independent Variables Analysis of the means and frequencies indicated that workers 
had spent an average of 8.27 years in cities (SD = 7.03); the maximum number of years was 35 and 
the minimum was 0.25 years. The respondents expressed their intentions to settle in the city in the 
future, with 43.2% stating they were likely or extremely likely to settle in the city. The survey 
participants also indicated a low likelihood of returning to their rural hometowns in the future, with 
only 25.6% stating that they were very likely or extremely likely to return to their rural hometowns 
in the future. Another question concerning settlement plans revealed that 40.3% of the participants 
planned to permanently settle in the city, whereas 10.7% planned to return to their rural hometowns. 
However, most participants (48.9%) were unsure about their future settlement plans. This finding 
suggested that the rural old-age pension scheme in which most participants currently participated 
would not likely benefit them, because only a few planned to spend their advanced years in their 
rural hometowns. In the survey, 64.6% of the participants had experienced land expropriation. For 
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participants who had this experience, the average percentage of land that had been expropriated was 
55.1% (SD = 0.28). 
The results in Table 4.2 indicated that 13.1% of respondents worked in SOEs and 80.1% in 
the private sector. Participants with long-term labour contracts comprised the largest proportion 
(37.3%) of respondents, followed by those who had no labour contracts (34.9%), and those with 
short-term contracts (27.7%). At the time of the survey, 91.7% of participants had not joined the 
labour union. 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Analysis 
Independent Variable N Valid Percentage (%) 
Migration duration 252 247  
Likelihood of settling in cities 252 248 43.2 (% likely) 
Settlement plan 252   
Plan to settle permanently in cities  94 40.3 
Will eventually go back to the rural hometown  25 10.7 
Not sure  114 48.9 
Percentage of expropriated land  67  
Land expropriation experience 252   
Have experience of land expropriation  157 64.6 
Not have  86 35.4 
Business ownership 252   
State-owned  32 13.1 
Private  197 80.7 
Not sure  15 6.1 
Labour contract 252   
No labour contract  87 34.9 
Long-term labour contract (one year and above)  93 37.3 
Labour union membership 252   
Currently a member of labour union  220 91.7 
Currently not a member of labour union  20 8.3 
Age group 252   
<=32 years old  168 68.3 
>32 years old  78 31.7 
Marital status 252   
Single  65 27.0 
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Independent Variable N Valid Percentage (%) 
Married  171 71.0 
Cohabiting  4 1.7 
Divorced  1 0.4 
Wage 252   
Below 1300 RMB/month  7 2.8 
1301–2300 RMB/month  36 14.6 
2301–3300 RMB/month  81 32.9 
3301–4300 RMB/month  81 32.9 
4301–5300 RMB/month  30 12.2 
More than 5300 RMB/month  11 4.5 
Highest education degree 252   
Primary school or lower  42 17.7 
Junior high school  142 59.9 
Senior high school  28 11.8 
Polytechnic  19 8.0 
Bachelor or above  6 2.5 
Note: ‘% likely’ in the table shows percentage of respondents answering 4 or 5 on a 5-point Likert scale 
(1 = not at all likely to 5 = extremely likely). 
The results showed that 68.3% of participants were aged 32 or younger, and 31.7% were 
over 32 years old. The majority of participants were married (71.0%), while 27% were single and 
participants choosing ‘cohabiting’ and ‘divorce’ options accounted for only 1.7% and 0.4%, 
respectively. The highest education level attained by most participants was junior high school 
(59.9%), followed by primary school and lower (16.7%). Those who had polytechnic and bachelor 
degrees comprised 7.5% and 2.5% of the sample, respectively. The monthly wages of participants 
mainly ranged from 2,301 to 3,300 RMB (32.9%) to 3,301 to 4,300 RMB (32.9%). Only 4.5% of 
respondents had a monthly wage higher than the average monthly income of Shenzhen, which is 
4,950 RMB per month. 
4.3.3.2 Dependent Variables 
As can be seen in Table 4.3, overall inspection of means and frequencies showed that most 
participants had intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme, with 57.6% agreeing with the 
statement, ‘I expect to join the urban old-age pension scheme in the near future’, and 61.2% 
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agreeing with the statement, ‘I would like to join the urban old-age pension scheme in the near 
future’. This indicated that most participants were keen to have an insured advanced life in cities. 
Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Intention Statements 
Intention statements (n) Valid 
Mean 
(SD) 
% 
Agree 
% 
Disagree 
I expect to join the urban old-age pension scheme in the near 
future 
252 250 3.51 (1.19) 57.6 17.6 
I would like to join the urban old-age pension scheme in the near 
future 
252 250 3.57 (1.21) 61.2 17.2 
Note: ‘% Agree’ and ‘% Disagree’ in the table show percentage of respondents answering 4 or 5, and 1 or 2, respectively, 
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree), unless otherwise stated. 
4.3.3.3 Reliability 
Reliability was evaluated with the internal consistency of multi-item measures used in the 
research. This internal consistency was measured by Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. A Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of .70 or higher is considered an acceptable level in social science research 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). As can be seen in Table 4.6, items measuring ‘intention’ and 
‘likelihood of settling in cities’ yielded high Cronbach’s alpha coefficients: 0.97 and 0.87, 
respectively. This indicated that items measuring each of these two constructs were closely related 
as a group and could be considered as tapping the same construct. 
One point that should be noted in the internal consistency analysis is that one item regarding 
‘the likelihood of settling in cities’ (see Table 4.4) was reverse scored for consistency of direction 
of expression, creating an ascending scale. As such, higher scores indicated higher agreement. 
Given the high reliability of the multi-item measures, they were merged in the bivariate and 
regression analysis. 
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Table 4.4 
Reliability Test for Multi-Item Measures (N=252) 
Intention statements Valid 
Mean 
(SD) 
Cronbach’s alpha 
I expect to join the urban old-age pension scheme in the near future 
250 
3.51 
(1.19) 
0.97 
I would like to join the urban old-age pension scheme in the near future 
250 
3.57 
(1.21) 
Likelihood of settling in cities    
I will settle in cities in future 
248 
3.18 
(1.18) 
0.87 
I will go back to the rural hometown in future(reversed) 
235 
3.33 
(1.07) 
Note: Respondents rated both intention statements and the likelihood of settling in cities on a 5-point Likert scale 
(Intention statements: 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree; Likelihood of settling in cities: 1 = not at all likely to 
5 = extremely likely). 
4.3.3.4 Relationships Related to Intention to Join the Urban Old-Age Pension Scheme 
Given the non-normal distributions of the variables, nonparametric tests for bivariate tests 
were used. Questions using Likert scales, such as likelihood of settling in cities (merged) and 
intention to join the urban old-age pension scheme (dependent variable), were measured at interval 
levels. When the independent variables had two levels, Mann–Whitney U tests were conducted. 
Kruksal–Wallis tests were used when the independent variables had three or more levels. For 
independent variables measured at interval or ratio levels, Spearman’s rho tests were appropriate. 
Spearman’s rho was performed to test the correlation between ‘intention to join the urban 
old-age pension scheme’ (dependent variable) and continuous independent variables, such as 
‘migration duration’, ‘percentage of expropriated land’, ‘highest education degree’, ‘wage’, and the 
‘likelihood of settling in cities’ (merged). The result showed that intention to join the pension 
scheme was significantly correlated with the likelihood of settling in cities, rs = .48, p < .001. The 
more likely migrant workers were to settle in cities, the stronger intention to join the pension 
scheme they reported. No significant correlations were found between intention to join the scheme 
and the remaining continuous independent variables. 
Mann–Whitney U tests were applied for dichotomous independent variables, such as 
‘experience of land expropriation’, ‘membership in labour union’, and ‘age group’, to examine if 
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there were effects of these variables on the intention to join the urban old-age pension scheme. The 
results indicated that participants with land expropriation experience and those who did not have 
this experience significantly differed in their intentions to join the pension scheme, Mann–Whitney 
U = 9923.5, n1 = 156, n2 = 86, p < .001. Specifically, participants with land expropriation tended to 
have significantly higher ratings than those who did not have land expropriated. As hypothesised, 
migrant workers who had experienced land expropriation had stronger intentions to join the pension 
scheme than did those without this experience. The analyses also showed that other dichotomous 
independent variables did not have an effect on the intention to join the pension scheme, as the 
distribution in two categories of these variables did not differ significantly, p ≥ 0.1. 
For independent variables with more than two categories, such as ‘settlement plan’, 
‘business ownership’, ‘labour contract’, and ‘marital status’, Kruksal–Wallis tests were performed 
to examine if there were effects of these variables on intention to join the urban old-age pension 
scheme. Results showed that there were significant differences between groups with different 
settlement plans on intention to join the scheme, χ2 (2, N = 233) = 33.3, p < .001. 
Participants who planned to settle permanently in the city had the strongest intentions to join 
the urban old-age pension scheme, and those who were not sure about their settlement plans had 
stronger intentions to join than did those who stated they would eventually go back to their rural 
hometowns. Groups of other independent variables did not significantly differ with respect to 
intention to join the pension scheme, p ≥ 0.1. 
4.3.3.5 Predicting Intention to Join the Urban Old-age Pension Scheme with Multiple Regression 
The bivariate analysis confirmed that three independent variables had an association with 
migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme. These were (1) ‘likelihood of 
settling in cities’, (2) ‘settlement plan’, and (3) ‘experience of land expropriation’. Because people’s 
thoughts, behaviours, and emotions tend to be influenced by a combination of several factors rather 
an individual factor, having a set of predictor variables is useful when predicting human behaviour. 
Multiple regression models can precisely test whether a series of variables can influence certain 
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behaviours. Thus, in this section, the three independent variables that were found to have significant 
relationships with the dependent variable were analysed together in a multiple regression model to 
explore the simultaneous contributions of these predictors to the dependent variable. 
A multiple regression model requires that all variables analysed be continuous or 
dichotomous variables. Thus, the dependent variable of ‘settlement plan’, which has three levels, 
needed to be recoded. There are two common recoding methods: dummy and effect coding. With 
dummy coding, I assigned a ‘1’ to indicate membership in a particular group and a ‘0’ to denote 
non-membership. This coding method is preferred when comparing groups with a reference group, 
which receives ‘0’ on all dummy variables (Myers & Well, 2003). 
Effect coding uses ‘-1’, ‘0’, and ‘1’ weights for the coding. This coding method is similar to 
dummy coding, except the reference group is coded ‘-1’. Effect coding is appropriate when each 
group is compared with an entire set of groups, rather than with a single reference group (Cohen, 
2003). 
In this study, there are three groups in the ‘settlement plan’ variable: (a) ‘Plan to settle 
permanently in the city’, (b) ‘Will eventually go back to the rural hometown’, and (c) ‘Not sure’. 
Because I was more interested in the extreme settlement plans (i.e., a and b) and their effects on 
intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme, I compared settlement plan (a) and (b) to a 
reference group (c). Therefore, dummy coding was the more appropriate coding method. 
For dummy variable 1, every observation in group (a) was coded as 1 and all other groups 
coded as 0. Then, dummy variable 2 was created with 1 if the observation was in group (b), and 0 
otherwise. Dummy variable 3 was not needed because the two dummy variables had all the 
information required to determine which observation was in which group. Observations in group (c) 
had 0 on all dummy variables 1 and 2. 
Because one assumption for using multiple regression is normality of data, the non-normal 
data for ‘likelihood of settling in cities’ and ‘intention to join the urban old-age pension scheme’ 
needed to be transformed. Square root and logarithm transformations are widely used variable 
Chapter 4 Factors Influencing Intention to Join the Urban Old-Age Pension 
126 
transformation methods, and I attempted both. However, the data remained non-normal after 
applying both methods. Then, I removed the outliers on these variables. Although the results of the 
normality test remained significant, the skewness of data on both variables became smaller. One 
way of determining if the data are ‘significantly skewed’ is to compare the z-value for ‘skewness’ 
with ‘±3’.33 That is, if the z-value is less than 3, the skewness is not considered seriously violated, 
and the distribution can be considered approximately normal (Fidell & Tabachnick, 2013). In this 
analysis, after the removal of outliers, the z-value of both variables became less than 3 
(z-skewnessintention = 2.44, z-skewnesssettlement < 1). Therefore, the distribution could be accepted as 
normal. 
Then, I performed the multiple regression analysis. The full model was found to be 
significant: R2 = .25, F (4, 179) = 14.81, p < .001. That is, 25% of the variance in migrant workers’ 
intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme could be explained by ‘likelihood of settling in 
cities in the future’, ‘decision to go back to the rural hometown’, and ‘experience of land 
expropriation’. 
With respect to the effect of each predictor on the intention to join the urban old-age pension 
scheme and how strongly each predictor influenced the intention, the standardised regression 
coefficients (β weights) were inspected. Table 4.5 shows that all predictors, except the dummy 
variable ‘plan to settle permanently in the city’, had a significant effect on the intention to join the 
pension scheme. The beta values indicated that intention was mostly influenced by likelihood of 
settling in cities and experience of land expropriation, with settlement plan of eventually going back 
to the rural hometown also significantly contributing. Results also implied that (1) the more likely 
migrant workers thought they would settle in the city, the stronger intentions they reported to join 
the urban old-age pension scheme, (2) migrant workers with decisions to go back to rural 
hometowns reported weaker intentions to join the pension scheme than did those with other 
                                                             
33. A z-test was applied for normality testing using skewness. A z-score for skewness could be obtained by dividing the 
skew values by their standard errors. 
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decisions, and (3) migrant workers with land expropriation experience reported stronger intentions 
to join the pension scheme than did those without the experience. 
Table 4.5 
Effect of Each Predictor on Intention to Join the Urban Old-Age Pension Scheme 
Predictors Beta p 
Likelihood of settling in the city in the future 0.28 .020* 
Plan to settle permanently in the city  -0.14 .908 
Will eventually go back to the rural hometown -0.10 .049* 
Experience of land expropriation 0.28 <.001** 
Note. * and ** denote significance levels at 5% and 0.1%, respectively. 
4.4 Discussion 
The quantitative analysis showed that settlement plans (the likelihood to settle in cities and 
the decision to go back to rural hometowns) and land expropriation experience significantly 
influenced the intention to participate in the urban old-age pension scheme. However, other 
predictors did not have such statistical influence. This outcome is discussed below, with possible 
explanations derived from previous research on the functions of land, social security, and settlement. 
The discussion indicates that results of this study can be explained by previous research. 
4.4.1 Land Expropriation 
Findings confirmed the hypothesis that workers with experience in land expropriation are 
more likely to join the urban old-age pension scheme than are those without the experience. To 
discuss this result, the root cause of land expropriation and urbanisation is explained in this section. 
Urbanisation is the growth of cities that facilitate urban industrialisation and creation of 
residential communities (Berry, 1973; Lasuen, 1973). Urbanisation is associated with land 
expropriation and rural-urban migration because it requires agricultural land conversion, which 
facilitates development of urban infrastructure and industries for city expansion (Cervero, 2001). 
This growth forces peasants to leave their rural lands and move to cities (Xu & Kam, 1985). As a 
result, these landless peasants shift from rural to urban regions, and their employment accordingly 
shifts from agricultural work to work in urban sectors (Kundu, 2000). 
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Rapidly growing urbanisation has led China to expropriate much land and, thus, has caused 
a large-scale rural-urban migration of land-requisitioned peasants (Xu & Tao, 2007). One 
participant group within the survey, land-loss migrant workers, indicated their significant intentions 
to join the urban old-age pension scheme. Changes in geographical location and employment 
caused by urbanisation were the two reasons for this outcome. 
Land serves as an insurance system in the livelihood of farmers (Townsend, 1994). Prior to 
urbanisation, migrant workers unemployed in the cities could return to their rural hometowns and 
re-cultivate their lands. Land rent could sustain their needs, implying that land functioned as an old-
age pension and unemployment insurance (Van de Walle & Mu, 2011). However, the loss of land to 
urbanisation deprived farmers of this insurance. Therefore, farmers might have considered the urban 
old-age pension scheme as an alternative to support their old-age needs—and had stronger 
intentions to join the pension scheme—more than have workers without the experience of land 
expropriation. 
Moreover, this finding can be explained by the various disadvantages experienced by land-
loss peasants and the disadvantage-remedy function of social security. However, China’s social 
security system can hardly remedy disadvantages of migrant workers due to the policy designers’ 
assumption that peasants could still depend on their rural land. Despite the massive and 
expropriation taking place in recent China, the Chinese Government remains very reluctant to 
establish a comprehensive pension system that can be easily accessed by rural citizens (S.J. Shi, 
2006).  In China, either the state or village collectives own the land (Rozelle & Li, 1998). All urban 
lands belong to the state, whereas all farmlands collectively belong to rural villages. In the process 
of urbanisation, ownership must be legally changed from collective-owned to state-owned before 
rural land can be expropriated (Samuel & George, 2004; World Bank, 2002). Under China’s legal 
framework, land can be expropriated only by the government at prices set by local governments 
(Han, 2006). Land-loss peasants can obtain the following compensation from governments for land 
under expropriation (China’s Land Administration Law, 2004): 
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 compensation for land (six to 10 times the average annual land output in the past three 
years), 
 compensation for resettlement (four to six times the average annual land output in the past 
three years), and 
 compensation for ground attachments and young crops, which is decided by local 
governments. 
Compensation for land-loss peasants appears not to be based on the market price of the land. 
Opaque land requisition often leads to collusion between land developers and local governments, 
and thus undermines the interests of farmers. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, the land expropriation 
in most cases services private commercial interests in China. Without authority in China that 
determines land valuation for peasants, the revenue distribution from land expropriation is mostly 
retained by land developer and local authorities, and the land compensation received by peasants is 
far lower than fair market value (Nelson, 2012). 
Is this compensation for peasants with expropriated land adequate to insure urban old-age 
life provision? The cost of living in cities is the cost of maintaining a certain standard of living, 
which is intertwined with the rate of changes in the price of goods and services, inflation, and other 
economic factors (Boskin, Dulberger, & Gordon, 1996). Compensation, based on rural land output 
in the past three years, is far from sufficient for farmers who will spend the rest of their lives in 
cities with high costs of living. Therefore, land compensation cannot serve as an efficient source of 
old-age insurance for land-loss peasants in cities. 
Some researchers have argued that land-loss peasants can find jobs in cities to replace their 
lost land as a new, substitute insurance. However, there are always less jobs in high-paying formal 
sectors than there are in rural sectors (Todaro, 1995). Rural-urban migration often results not in 
high-paying formal sector jobs, but in employment remunerated by income that is meagre even by 
rural standards (Stark, 1984). The education level of land-loss farmers is low, so they have no 
employment advantage to obtain stable jobs in a fiercely competitive labour market (He, Liu, & 
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Webster, 2009). This situation was confirmed in my survey, with data showing that 64% of workers 
had experienced land requisition, and 34% had worked on short-term labour contracts. Their 
monthly wages mainly ranged from RMB 2,301 to RMB 4,300 per month, lower than the average 
wage in Shenzhen. Therefore, their jobs could not guarantee them an insured old-age provision. 
Without stable jobs and compensation that can sustain their lives in the cities, land-loss 
farmers are vulnerable to various social and economic disadvantages. One major function of social 
security is to remedy the disadvantage (Hill, 2007; Walker, 2005). Land-loss workers are deprived 
of the land that provided their income and wellbeing, and they are in a disadvantageous situation in 
the cities. Therefore, respondents in the survey may have wanted to join the urban old-age pension 
scheme to remedy the disadvantage caused by the loss of land.  
Another interesting finding was that the percentage of expropriated land in participants’ 
families had no significant relationship with their intentions to join the urban old-age pension 
scheme. This suggests that the desire of land-loss workers to find an alternative insurance was not 
affected by the amount of expropriated land, but by whether the land had been expropriated at all. 
The sense of insecurity regarding old-age life provision among the peasants and their desire for 
substitute insurance appeared significant only if their land had been expropriated; regardless of the 
size of the requisitioned land, this desire remained. 
For farmers, land is a multi-functional asset that provides resources and insurance. Once 
farmers lose their land, they are likely to be at risk of losing future resources and insurance as well. 
According to World Bank research on social protection and social risk management (SRM), people 
with high social and economic vulnerability are risk averse, and insurance is one of the major SRM 
strategies that can alleviate the effect of risk once it emerges (Holzmann & Jørgensen, 2001). This 
research finding is supported by Ward and Shively’s (2011) study of peasants and land in rural 
China, which shows that the loss of land can often be managed through risk-sharing insurance 
arrangement or social security programs. These findings may explain why workers with experience 
of land expropriation intended to join the urban old-age insurance scheme once land expropriation 
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was made, regardless of the amount of land requisitioned. Land expropriation could have led these 
peasants to be highly prone to various vulnerabilities in the cities and then made them risk averse. 
Therefore, land-loss workers’ intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme may be seen as 
an insurance scheme to minimise the effect of this risk. 
Overall, the findings indicated that land-loss migrant workers had more intentions to join the 
urban old-age pension scheme than did those without land expropriation experience. This can be 
explained by the insurance function of land, the marginalised status of land-loss workers, the 
disadvantage-remedy function of social security, the risk-averse nature of land-loss workers, and the 
risk-combating function of insurance. The Chinese Government had only remedied the 
disadvantage of land-loss workers in the cities through land compensation and assumed that land-
loss workers could support themselves in cities in the future. However, the results of this study did 
not support the government assumption. Instead, the results showed that the remedy strategy was 
insufficient and should be compensated with an urban pension. Although the Chinese Government 
have made policy attempts to provide these workers with pension insurance, the current low 
coverage of the urban old-age pension scheme among migrant workers indicates the failure of the 
government’s policy attempts. 
4.4.2 Settlement 
The findings showed that respondents who were likely to settle in cities in the future had 
stronger intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme than did those who planned to go back 
to rural hometowns. It was also found that workers who decided to go back to rural hometowns had 
weaker intentions to join the pension scheme than did those with other settlement decisions. This 
outcome was not surprising, as pensions are regarded as devices to guarantee income sufficiency in 
later years. As other pension-related research has stated (Galasso, Gatti, & Profeta, 2008; OECD, 
1977), pensions are seen as devices to sustain people in their declining years and are designed to 
enable workers to enjoy a secure income in their later years, so they can continue to participate fully 
in society. Therefore, an old-age pension is closely associated with people’s settlement plans 
Chapter 4 Factors Influencing Intention to Join the Urban Old-Age Pension 
132 
because of the pension’s relationship to place of pension collection and whether the benefit can 
meet the basic living standards of the place of settlement. When choosing a pension scheme, people 
must ensure that the nature of the pension scheme does not contradict their future circumstances. 
This finding has confirmed the hypothesis on the association between an old-age pension and 
settlement plans of migrant workers 
4.4.3 Policy Implication and Target Recipients 
Once target groups are specified, the government must consider the methods of promoting 
the urban old-age pension scheme among the target group and determine how to encourage 
recipients to take up the policy. This section of the thesis refers to the cooperation component of 
implementation at the bottom level, which will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. As 
I have conceptualised the cooperation component using rationality theory, which considers 
information as key in people’s choice-making (Simon, 1999), migrant workers’ knowledge about 
the pension scheme is crucial to their choice of whether to avail themselves of that scheme. 
Appropriately targeted information will assist their choice-making, whereas a lack of information 
will impede this process. 
Two groups intending to join the urban old-age pension scheme had poor knowledge of the 
pension, with 77.7% of participants who had experienced land appropriation and 68.3% of 
participants with plans to settle in cities choosing ‘do not know at all’ when questioned about their 
general understanding of the pension scheme. Moreover, a majority of respondents also chose ‘do 
not know at all’ when questioned about details of the pension scheme, including the place of 
pension collection and premium rate. 
As discussed, in bounded rationality theory, information on choice is crucial for choice-
makers (Simon, 1956, 1959, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1999, 2010; Simon & Mattioli, 1997). Insufficient 
information hinders individuals from making choices (Gustavo, 2010; Simon, 1976, 1979, 1999, 
2010; Simon & Mattioli, 1997). Without basic information on the pension scheme, the supposedly 
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targeted people in my research could not be in a position to choose whether to take up the pension 
scheme. 
Kerr (1982), with insights from both psychology and sociology, sought to explore both the 
content of the uptake decision and the external constraints that circumscribe it. He claimed that 
schemes that are complex, with many policy rules or vague entitlement criteria, are inherently 
difficult to promote; they complicate and frustrate the design of advertising and other direct 
communication with the target audience and inhibit the diffusion of clear, positive messages 
through social networks. Successful applicants have to perceive that they are in need, acquire basic 
knowledge about the existence of benefits and discern their eligibility for benefits. They must 
recognise a positive utility in claiming the benefits that outweigh any perceived costs and that, in 
the context of comparatively stable circumstances, make the effort of application worthwhile. 
Therefore, the Chinese Government must enhance relevant knowledge on pensions when they 
promote this scheme among target recipients. 
Another key finding is that ‘labour contract’ (with answer options being ‘no labour contract’, 
‘short-term contract’, and ‘long-term contract’) was also among the factors that did not affect the 
intentions of workers to join a scheme. Thus, the intention of a person to join the urban old-age 
pension scheme had no significant correlation with the existence of a labour contract nor with the 
length of such a contract. This contradicts the current Social Security Law, which stipulates that the 
urban old-age pension scheme should be carried out mandatorily among workers with stable labour 
contracts. The aim of the urban old-age pension scheme is to include migrant workers, but the 
current Social Security Law focuses on promoting the pension scheme among workers with stable 
labour contracts. In fact, the characteristics of the workers protected by the law (for instance, having 
a stable labour contract) contradict the established characteristics of migrant workers. A number of 
studies have shown that migrant workers often suffer from employment discrimination and 
exploitation in host cities, and few can work under an employment contract (Démurger, Gurgand, 
Li, & Yue, 2009; Zhang & Luo, 2013) 
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The current law only protects workers depending on the social and economic nature of the 
target recipient. Specifically, the Social Insurance Law implies that only workers with a stable 
labour contract are protected by this law; however, the social and economic nature of migrant 
workers lead most of them to work informally. According to this present study’s findings, 
implementation of the current pension scheme focused on a group that did not have particular 
interests in joining. A mismatch existed between policy intention and the persons actually targeted, 
and the target criteria did not appropriately reflect the true policy objectives. Therefore, I argue that 
the current pension scheme was not efficiently implemented and, thus, resulted in the ill use of 
resources. This observation is based on the standard for efficiency of policy implementation 
(Walker, 2005), which focused on the specification of target recipients and the proper allocation of 
resources. 
In summary, the present study was conceptualised based on implementation theory at the 
bottom level. Findings of this study provided evidence for examining the technical component. The 
policy is only mandatory for workers with stable contracts (for this group, the policy is still 
implemented voluntarily in practice) and still voluntary in practice for the rest of the migrants, and 
the policy objective is to include migrant workers interested in the programme. However, the target 
workers of the current law are only workers with labour contracts. The research findings showed 
that workers with land expropriation experience and those who had plans to settle in cities in the 
future were very likely to join the pension scheme and should thus constitute the target recipients. 
However, the association between policy objective and recipients is ambiguous in the current policy. 
A clear relationship must be established between the policy objective and the target recipients, 
which comprises workers with experience of land appropriation and workers who plan to settle in 
cities in the future. The policy needs to be promoted among these two groups, and resources need to 
be allocated accordingly. Moreover, basic knowledge on the pension scheme must be promoted 
among the supposed target groups because their poor knowledge of the pension scheme hinders 
their decision-making. 
Chapter 4 Factors Influencing Intention to Join the Urban Old-Age Pension 
135 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter employed a quantitative methodology with a specific objective of exploring 
factors that influenced migrant workers’ intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme. 
Findings from this phase contributed information on the variables associated with migrant workers’ 
intentions to join the pension scheme, and these findings were linked with relevant research and 
policy. I identified the limitation that a lack of knowledge about the pension scheme might have 
affected the migrant workers’ perceptions, and thus may have led them to have an unidentified 
intention regarding the pension scheme.  
These findings led to the second phase of the research, the results of which are discussed in 
the next chapter. The second phase involved follow-up interviews with participants to determine 
their perceptions of the pension scheme. The next chapter analyses how respondents’ perceptions, 
such as intention and feasibility of joining the pension scheme, and information and uncertainties 
hindered their reasoning. The next chapter also discusses how respondents’ decision-making 
process affects successful implementation of the pension scheme at the level of policy recipients. 
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Chapter 5: Joining the Urban Old-Age Pension Scheme: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Migrant Workers 
According to the conceptual framework underpinned by bounded rationality theory, 
individuals have a complex cognitive process of weighing gains and losses. Inspired by previous 
research on this cognitive process (Fitzsimmons & Douglas, 2011; McSwain & Glandon, 2008), 
intention and perceived feasibility are adopted in this research as two elements that can be 
conveniently used to study the thinking and decision-making processes of individual migrant 
workers as they perceive the gains and losses of joining the urban old-age pension scheme. This 
decision-making process is limited by the information the decision-makers have and their 
uncertainties about their choices (Koumakhov, 2009; Simon, 1972, 1991). 
When facing the urban old-age pension scheme, some migrant workers may have only a 
vague understanding of the situation. Their choice-making may rely heavily on the information they 
have regarding the costs and benefits of taking up the policy, eligibility, how to join the pension 
scheme and so forth. Uncertainties increase when a migrant worker faces other agents, such as local 
bureaucracies, employers and policy designers that reflect either trust (for instance, if the workers 
perceive these agents would work jointly towards the same goal) or distrust (when workers perceive 
these agents or participation in the pension scheme as adversarial). In such complex situations, 
individuals often make choices without knowing the costs and benefits of given alternatives. As 
indicated in Section 3.1.1, individuals tend to rely on whatever information they can acquire 
through casual conversations and apply heuristics gained from their social and cultural environment. 
This process saves the individual the costs of collecting information, eases the pressure of time 
constraints and reduces the cognitive effort of choice-making. Based on the theory of bounded 
rationality, rural-urban migrant workers also use convenient ways such as word-of-mouth to obtain 
information and apply heuristics shaped by China’s social and cultural environment to save 
perceptual effort in the choice-making of whether or not to join the urban old-age pension scheme. 
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This chapter presents an analysis of the participants’ choice-making process of weighing 
intentions and feasibility when facing imperfect information and uncertainties in the social and 
cultural environment of China, with an aim to answer the second research question and its sub-
questions: 
RQ2. How do rural-urban migrant workers make decisions whether to join China’s basic 
urban old-age pension scheme in China’s broad social, cultural and political context? 
Sub-questions of RQ2: 
 How do migrant workers inform themselves of the scheme? 
 How do migrant workers form intention to join the scheme? 
 How do migrant workers perceive the feasibility of joining the scheme? 
 How do migrant workers’ evaluation of the intention to and feasibility of joining the 
scheme influence their decision whether to join the scheme or not? 
 How do migrant workers evaluate uncertainties of gains and losses of joining the 
pension scheme? 
The analysis draws upon an in-depth exploration of the participants’ perceptions of the 
uptake of the urban old-age pension scheme through themes that emerged from their responses to 
questions about their perceptions. Migrant workers’ intentions and perceptions of feasibility 
regarding the pension scheme are presented as overarching themes, as is the information migrant 
workers had when they compared their perceived feasibility and intentions. Because the barriers and 
uncertainties that the migrant workers have to joining the pension scheme intertwine inextricably 
with their perceived feasibility to join, they are merged as one theme in this chapter. 
The chapter begins with an introduction to the participants and the structure of the theme, 
continues with an analysis of the emergent themes, and concludes with a discussion of the themes in 
context. 
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5.1 Introduction of Participants and the Structure of Themes 
Twelve participants from Phase1 were selected for a follow-up interview regarding their 
perceptions of the urban old-age pension scheme. The selected interview participants were workers 
who had signified their intentions to join the pension scheme but were not already members of the 
pension scheme. The participants were stratified into two groups based on their experience with 
land expropriation. Six had experienced land expropriation, whereas the other six had not. 
The decision to choose land expropriation experience as a selection criterion was based on 
the results of the quantitative study, which showed that land expropriation significantly influenced 
the decision to join the pension scheme. A preliminary analysis was conducted with survey data 
obtained from the first 30 survey participants that had been collected from the time of analysis, not 
from the complete sample. In the pilot survey, land expropriation was the only factor found to have 
a significant influence on the intention to join the pension scheme—this was the dependent variable. 
Table 5.1 shows the demographic features of interview participants. The sample covered a 
wide age range (from 19 to 45 years), with ‘male’ and ‘female’ almost evenly distributed. Both 
married and unmarried migrant workers were captured in the interviews, with the number of 
married respondents slightly outweighing the number unmarried. It should be noted that in addition 
to ‘single’ and ‘married’, other marital statuses—such as ‘cohabitation’ and ‘divorce’—were 
response options in the survey, as was ‘other (please specify)’. However, few participants chose 
these responses. One possible reason for this might be that although the research participants 
worked in the city at the time of the survey, they were rural-urban migrant workers. Thus, they may 
have been affected by traditional rural values and did not want to expose a marital status (such as 
cohabitation or divorce) that challenged the traditional marriage model. The participants’ education 
level (highest degree obtained) ranged from junior high school to bachelor degrees. In this sample, 
the new generation of migrant workers (born after 1980) appeared to have a higher education level 
than the older generation (born before the 1980s). 
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Table 5.1 
Demographic Features of Interview Participants 
 
Figure 5.1 sets out the structure of themes regarding the participants’ intentions to join the 
urban old-age pension scheme. The major themes are linked in the analysis process. It shows 
“Intentions to Join the Urban Pension,” “Perceived Feasibility to Join the Urban Pension,” 
“Uncertainties”, and “Information on /Understanding of the Urban Pension” as main themes of the 
qualitative study, with subthemes under each. The major themes are connected with each other in 
the analysis process. There are several sub-themes under each of the main themes. For instance, 
under the theme “Intentions to Join the Urban Pension”, there are seven themes including Land 
Expropriation, Security for the Future, Propaganda-ridden Environment and Communist Values, 
Children, Risk Management, Trust in the State and Settlement Plan.  
Number 
Name 
(pseudonym) 
Age Gender Marital status 
Number of 
children 
Experience of 
land 
expropriation 
Education 
(highest degree 
obtained) 
1 Ming 44 Male Married 1 Yes Primary school 
2 Jie 24 Male Single 0 No Junior high 
3 Yang 19 Male Single 0 Yes Senior high 
4 Fei 22 Female Single 0 No Primary school 
5 Nan 40 Female Married 2 Yes Junior high 
6 Jin 26 Female Married 1 No Senior high 
7 Hua 31 Male Married 1 Yes Senior high 
8 Heng 23 Male Single 0 No Bachelor 
9 Si 34 Female Married 1 No Senior high 
10 Teng 25 Male Married 1 No Senior high 
11 Ling 45 Female Married 2 Yes Junior high 
12 Jianguo 45 Male Married 2 Yes Senior high 
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Figure 5.1. Structure of themes regarding intention to join the urban old-age pension scheme. 
5.2 Analysis of Themes 
5.2.1 Intentions to Join the Urban Pension 
As a key element of the agent’s decision-making rationale under the theory of bounded 
rationality, intention is characterised by its persistence and reconsideration conditions (Boella, 2002; 
Boella, Hulstijn, & Torre, 2011). Specifically, the intention that motivates an agent to make a 
choice is under the agent’s persistent consideration and evaluation. This, together with the agent’s 
perceived feasibility, compels the choice (Simon, 1991). This means that the development of 
intention is a complex, iterative process that demands in-depth probing.  
In the Phase 2 interviews, the question ‘What are the reasons for you intending to be a 
member of the urban old-age pension scheme? Please elaborate’ delved deeply into the reasoning 
behind each participant’s intentions to join the pension scheme. Responses showed reasons beyond 
those pertaining to the individual’s life (such as future settlement and financial risk management). 
Participant responses also reflected a broader context of perceived changes in China’s social and 
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economic environments over the decades (such as land expropriation in the process of urbanisation 
and kinship dynamic changes influenced by the one-child policy) in their process of reasoning about 
their intentions to join the pension scheme. 
5.2.1.1 Land Expropriation 
Four participants (one-third of all interview participants) from the land expropriation group 
associated land with their intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme. Land had once 
played a major role in providing them with income and long-term economic insurance. As land 
expropriation deprived them of enjoying these benefits of land possession, they developed 
intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme, which could serve some of the functions of 
their lost land. None of the participants from the non-land expropriation group mentioned land as a 
factor in their responses. 
The amount of arable land in China has been declining as urbanisation intensifies. As noted 
in Chapter 1, land has six functions for peasants in China: maintaining a basic standard of living, 
ensuring employment opportunity, providing direct economic income, enabling offspring to inherit 
the land, acquiring compensation after land expropriation and avoiding huge payments for land 
reacquisition (Wang, 2005). These functions disappear when rural farms are converted for 
development. Interview participants conveyed their expectations for the urban old-age pension 
scheme to compensate some of the functions of their lost land, such as direct financial income.  
One participant did not directly respond to the question about his reasons for joining the 
pension scheme. Instead, he explained his perception of the identity of new Chinese peasants: 
As rural land is decreasing, ‘the peasant’ [in China] should be better defined. Peasants are 
supposed to farm, but most Chinese peasants do not farm as their main work. Nowadays, 
you find peasants in the handcraft industry, business, and other areas. They cannot be 
compared to peasants in other countries. Peasants in other countries are genuine peasants 
who farm. One hundred percent of Chinese peasants work and get their income from outside 
the rural areas. (Ming, 44-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) 
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When probed further, Ming explained that migrant workers should have the urban old-age 
pension scheme because of their status as nontraditional peasants who have replaced farming with 
urban work. Further, Ming shared that as arable land has decreased in size, peasants now have to 
work and earn their income in the cities similar to urban workers. Thus, the nonfarm income 
diversification for nontraditional peasants heightened Ming’s intention to join the urban old-age 
pension scheme. This is in line with findings of previous research into nonfarm income in rural 
Africa (Barrett, Reardon, & Webb, 2001), where peasants also experienced land expropriation and 
where the diminishing income generated from shrinking arable land after land expropriation led 
peasants to diversify their income by engaging in nonfarm work. As Ming stated, peasants now 
engage in all areas of employment and collect their income from all sources. Thus, land 
expropriation is a ‘push’ factor that motivates peasants to generate income from other sources in 
addition to cultivating agricultural land, and the pension scheme is such a source. 
Besides the function of direct economic income, another function of land—maintaining a 
basic standard of living—was also embodied in participants’ perceptions of their losses and the 
urban old-age pension scheme. One participant related: 
The mountains and the land, necessities for peasants, were expropriated by them [the 
government] with that tiny compensation. Therefore, I am considering to buy the old-age 
pension scheme. (Hua, 31-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) 
Hua did not associate land with income, but regarded it as a necessity that helped maintain a basic 
standard of living. The old-age pension scheme could serve as a substitute for land, to provide him 
with necessities after the land loss. Thus, Hua had the intention to take up the pension scheme and 
regarded it as a vehicle through which he could obtain necessities. He also indicated that his 
previous land’s function of acquiring compensation after expropriation had not operated well 
because of poor compensation.  
Another respondent also explained land’s function as a tool to maintain the basic standard of 
living: 
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Unlike living in a rural village where you get land and sustain yourself for one year, you 
have to think about life every day in the city. (Jianguo, 45-year-old male, experienced land 
expropriation) 
Jianguo described land as a resource upon which he could rely to sustain himself. However, he had 
to consider alternative resources that could support his basic life in the city. 
In summary, land expropriation was a push factor that led migrant workers living at the 
urban fringe to consider other resources which could perform functions similar to their lost land. 
Migrants developed their intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme based on their 
experience of land expropriation, hoping that the pension could, to some extent, replace their 
diminishing land that once functioned as a tool to provide direct economic income and maintain 
their basic standard of living. 
5.2.1.2 Security for the Future 
The most frequently mentioned reason for intending to join the urban old-age pension 
scheme—and thus the main theme in this study—was security for the future. Ten participants (six 
with land expropriation experience and four without) regarded the pension scheme as a tool that 
could eliminate their concerns and allow them to feel more secure about the future. I categorised 
participants’ concerns about the future into ‘unavoidable worries’ and ‘urban-life-related worries’. 
Whereas ‘unavoidable worries’ pertain to problems that everyone has to confront in their lives, 
regardless of their identities and experience, ‘urban-life-related worries’ are peculiar to people who 
spend their elderly lives in urban regions. The latter type is a reflection of changes in migrants’ lives. 
The most frequently cited ‘unavoidable worry’ was ‘losing work ability in the future’. As 
one respondent stated: 
Without this old-age pension, you would be poverty-stricken without financial sources if 
you lose work ability, or have something emergent in the future. However, with the old-age 
pension, your life would be much better than those without [the pension]. (Jie, 24-year-old 
male, no experience of land expropriation) 
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From Jie’s perspective, losing the ability to work was a major concern, especially when this meant 
he would live without financial resources. The urban old-age pension scheme could compensate for 
the lack of financial resources when he lost work capacity. He believed that the pension scheme 
could help him combat future concerns, making his elderly life more advantageous than that of 
others who had not contributed to establishing this alternative financial resource. 
Three other participants also stated that losing work ability was a concern they had for the 
future. Of these four people who stated ‘unavoidable worries’ when giving their explanation of why 
they had intentions to join the pension scheme, only one had land expropriation experience. 
‘Getting old’ was also an ‘unavoidable worry’ perceived by two interview participants without land 
expropriation experience. 
Most participants with urban-life-related concerns had experienced land expropriation. They 
expressed their anxieties over attaining basic things, such as eating and drinking, in their urban lives 
when they retired. For example: 
When you get old, you have to ensure your basic life. You eat and drink … The life in the 
city needs money every day. I can get some money from the pension. (Jianguo, 45-year-old 
male, experienced land expropriation) 
The social scientific definitions of “peasant” acknowledges that livelihoods of peasants can 
constitute, for example, multiple paths, including farming, wager labourer, pastoralism, fishing and 
hunting, small business (Edelman, 2013). There is a view (Day,2013) that some peasants had led 
self-sufficient lives before their migration to cities and had no concerns about food because they 
could grow enough to feed themselves and their families through farming. However, this capacity 
for self-sufficiency disappeared when they began living in cities. Without money in cities, their 
basic life would be threatened on retirement. Sufficient money provides people with choices that are 
key to successful ageing: security and independent living (Reichstadt, Depp, Palinkas, & Jeste, 
2007). One participant expressed this concern: 
I still need to buy food and clothes in the city after getting old; therefore, I need money from 
the old-age pension scheme. (Ling, 45-year-old female, experienced land expropriation) 
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Ling’s comment shows her awareness of the requirement to satisfy basic needs in the city. Unlike in 
the rural village, where basic needs were achievable through self-sustainability, basic needs in the 
city relied on money.  
People have been found to look realistically at whether they have the resources to turn their 
desires into reality (Olsberg, 1997). For example, when Yang lost land as a resource to turn her 
basic desires into reality, she considered the urban old-age pension scheme as another resource to 
obtain financial support and secure a basic life in the future. 
In general, the participants’ comments indicated that the experience of land expropriation 
played a role in shaping their perceptions about concerns for the future. Participants without land 
expropriation experience tended to have more ‘unavoidable worries’, whereas those with land 
expropriation experience showed more urban-life-related concerns caused by migration and the loss 
of their land, such as concerns about not having access to food that they once obtained naturally 
from self-sufficient farming. Since all respondents’ concerns were associated with financial 
resources or money, it could be argued that respondents were expressing more about their intentions 
to have money rather than to join an old-age pension scheme. Under this assumption, they would 
have shown the same attitude if they had been asked about saving for their elderly life. 
Another argument is that employees have the capacity to save their own money and so have 
no great need for pension schemes. However, it has been demonstrated that many people are not 
effective at saving when left on their own, even though they may understand its importance (Baker, 
Logue, & Rader, 2005). A pension scheme helps people save because it effectively segregates part 
of their income, and the employers’ contribution also assists the pension members’ savings. Pension 
schemes provide the structure necessary to help workers achieve their long-term goals (Hill, 2007). 
5.2.1.3 Settlement Plan 
About half of the interview participants (four with land expropriation experience and one 
without) attributed their intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme, to some extent, to their 
plans of permanently settling in the city. As hypothesised, interview participants with and without 
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land expropriation experience seemed to have different perceptions towards their intentions to join 
the pension scheme. Although the intention to join for the majority of participants with land 
expropriation experience was influenced by their relocation plans, only one participant without such 
experience considered this reason. 
Migration is driven by push and pull factors (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954; Mejia, 
Pizurki, & Royston, 1979). Push factors, such as undeveloped conditions and poor medical care, 
encourage individuals to relocate to other places. Pull factors, such as better living conditions, 
attract migrants to particular areas (Fei & Ranis, 1964; Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954; Todaro, 
1976). Land expropriation is a prominent push factor for rural-urban migration in China (Grosjean 
& Mullan, 2011), and the loss of the family land could force land-dependent peasants to seek a new 
life in the city. According to one respondent: 
Life in the city is better than our life in the rural area. Our electricity and water systems in 
the rural regions are worse than those in the city. The city is more convenient than the rural 
area in terms of food, clothing, lodging and transportation. For instance, you have to be 
taken to a hospital in a distant town if you get sick in a rural area. (Nan, 40-year-old female, 
experienced land expropriation) 
Nan added, ‘Peasants are no longer traditional peasants now. Traditional peasants really worked in 
the rural areas and did demanding farming work’. When asked if she thought nontraditional 
peasants living in the city should have a pension scheme like other urban citizens, she agreed, ‘We 
no longer have land and are already living in the city. We want to take root here in the future’. 
Nan’s comments indicated that her motivation to settle in the city was caused by push and 
pull factors. The poor living and medical conditions in the rural areas, as well as the loss of land 
that changed her to a rural-urban migrant worker, pushed her to leave the village. The lure of city 
facilities tempted her to settle in the city. The combination of these push and pull factors made her 
decide to permanently take root in the city and enjoy the social entitlements, such as the urban old-
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age pension scheme, of urban citizens. Another respondent expressed the same view towards the 
new self-identity of land-loss peasants in the city: 
Because peasants no longer have land, there is no difference between rural and urban people. 
They are the same. We need to earn money and look after our families wherever we are. 
That is why I want a pension. (Ling, 45-year-old female, experienced land expropriation) 
Sharing similar land expropriation experience and shifts in self-identity with Ming, Ling also 
regarded herself as an urban person who demanded income in the city. Because the urban old-age 
pension serves as retirement income in the city, she developed intentions to join it. 
Most of the participants with land expropriation experience attributed their intentions to join 
the pension scheme to their plans to settle in the city and their motivations to enjoy equal social 
entitlements with their urban counterparts. Their intentions were triggered by their pursuit of a new 
self-identity after the loss of their land. By contrast, only one participant without land expropriation 
experience viewed the settlement plan as a particular reason for joining the pension scheme: 
I will stay in the city. The pension scheme of the city can support me when I grow old in the 
city. (Fei, 22-year-old female, no experience of land expropriation) 
Fei did not appear to consider the land factor with other push and pull factors when shaping her 
settlement decision and her intention to join the pension scheme. Living in the city was her personal 
choice rather than a decision that was forced by land expropriation. Based on her decision to spend 
her later years in the city, Fei saw the urban old-age pension scheme as a means to provide her with 
an adequate living allowance that the rural pension could not provide. 
Based on comments from participants with plans to settle in cities, land expropriation—as a 
push factor—led peasants to accept their new identities in the city and consider taking up the social 
security scheme in the new social community during the transition of their identities. However, 
workers who did not experience land expropriation only naturally regarded the urban old-age 
pension scheme as a support for their future settlement in the city. 
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5.2.1.4 Children 
When responding to questions about their intentions to join the urban old-age pension 
scheme, five participants (two with land expropriation experience and three without) mentioned the 
reduction of their children’s burden as a key reason. Their comments indicated that this burden 
relates to the change of kinship dynamics in the population reform of the Chinese Government. Life 
expectancy in China has significantly increased from 40 years in the 1950s to 75.2 years in 2013 
(UN Development Programme, 2014). As a result of the one-child policy implemented since the 
1980s, China’s fertility rate has declined and family size has shrunk (Hammel, Mason, Wachter, 
Wang, & Yang, 1991). Therefore, kinship ties between children and parents have been, to some 
extent, strengthened by the decline in both fertility and mortality (Killgren, 1993). This change of 
kinship dynamics has increased the burden of old-age support, given that there are fewer children in 
a family to take care of their ageing parents (Powell, 2013a). Almost half the participants noted the 
influence of these kinship dynamics on shaping their intentions to enrol in the pension scheme. 
Thus, ‘kinship dynamics’ emerged as a strong theme. 
Analysis was undertaken on the participants who identified the future burden that their 
children—who have fewer siblings and longer-living parents—would have to bear as a key factor 
for their intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme. The analysis revealed that although 
more of these participants had children than did not, some similarities were observed between the 
responses of participants from groups of different ages, marital statuses and education levels. The 
interviews also showed that the absence of land expropriation experience did not appear to be 
associated with a perceived change of ‘kinship dynamics’. One respondent commented: 
The old-age pension scheme is financial support from the state for my elderly life … 
Children nowadays have a heavy burden, don’t they? In the future, they don’t need to [look 
after me]. Although I am very healthy now, I may no longer be healthy when I am old. You 
will have compensation from the state if you are ill. Although children can physically help 
you and look after you, you cannot let them support you financially. As the only kids in their 
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families, their lives are difficult. I don’t want to add to my child’s burden. (Ling, 45-year-
old female, experienced land expropriation, junior high educated, married with one child) 
It might be expected that respondents with children would mention kinship dynamics more 
than those without, but this was not evident. Unmarried participants without children were also 
aware of the burden of old-age support and took their potential children’s burden into account. One 
unmarried participant said: 
The pressure of living in the city would be quite huge when I get old. My sons and 
daughters will have a huge burden. My having an old-age pension, a source of income, can 
alleviate their burden. (Heng, 23-year-old male, no experience of land expropriation, 
bachelor’s degree educated, single with no child) 
It is possible that Heng’s high education level rendered him far-sighted and allowed him to 
consider the effect of the change in kinship dynamics on his future life. However, participants with 
less education also explained this kinship change in their perceived uncertainties caused by the fast-
changing policies: 
For instance, in the time of Maoism, the prevalent social view was ‘more people, more 
strength; raising children for elderly care’. This view was especially popular in rural regions. 
People wanted more children because they can be [better] looked after by more children. 
Children are their support for life. After the reform and opening up, the one-child policy was 
implemented and the prevalent social view changed to ‘having one child is good; the 
government will take care of your elderly life’. Then, people had only one child, as [they 
believed that] when they would become old and retire in the future, the state, the 
government would take care of them. (Jie, 24-year-old male, no experience of land 
expropriation, junior high educated, single with no child) 
Although Jie’s comment was not in response to questions about his intentions, it shows that migrant 
workers without children might also take into account the change of kinship and relate it to their 
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old-age care. The historical change in kinship dynamics led Jie to reflect on how the changing 
social context of China influenced his pension scheme decision-making. 
The findings in this section reflect those of the previous chapter, where marital status and 
education level were shown to have no significant influence on intentions to join the pension 
scheme. Land expropriation experience also did not play a role in shaping respondents’ opinions in 
relation to kinship dynamics. 
5.2.1.5 Risk Management 
Two participants with land expropriation experience (one-sixth of all interview participants) 
based their intentions to join the old-age pension scheme on an expectation that the pension could 
help them manage risks caused by future inflation rates. None of the participants without land 
expropriation experience associated their intentions to join the pension scheme with risk 
management. 
Whether the urban old-age pension scheme could provide pensioners protection against 
inflation was a concern of one-third of participants when they considered joining the pension 
scheme. Inflation poses a major challenge to many elderly persons. The current global economic 
structure of large businesses, unions and governments, together with public and private economic 
security provisions, has created an institutional environment that often encourages wage and price 
increases that are not justified by productivity gains. As a result, high inflation rates have become a 
permanent phenomenon (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe, 2010). The prediction of periods of inflation in 
the years to come demands that people think seriously about appropriate safeguards for their 
retirement. Whereas most old-age pensions are fully or partially inflation protected, personal 
savings do not adjust when the general price level changes (Blake, 2006). 
The following comment reflects one participant’s concern about inflationary pressure and 
how he thought the pension scheme could help him combat the pressure caused by inflation risks: 
The old-age pension is definitely beneficial for the worker. For instance, thousands of RMB, 
even if not being used to pay the pension, would be useless when inflation reaches a certain 
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level in the future. Therefore, placing money there [in the pension account] is worth 
trying … like gambling. (Ming, 44-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) 
Ming used the metaphor of gambling to convey his perception of purchasing the pension. He felt his 
financial assets would shrink in the future due to inflation, so he would prefer to risk his money in 
the pension scheme as a way to stave off devaluation.  
Because retirement can last a long time, even relatively modest rates of inflation can 
seriously erode the purchasing power of a fixed amount of savings (Ward, 2013). As Ming and Jie 
noted, it is possible that the thousands of RMB they contributed would be devalued significantly 
due to high inflation rates. In contrast, land was once a financial asset from which peasants could 
obtain agricultural products whose prices changed in line with inflation rates. Participants who had 
their land expropriated lost a key asset that could have helped ensure income adequacy under 
inflation risks. Other financial assets aside from land that adjust better than savings require 
considerable financial sophistication or have much higher associated risk; for example, real estate 
and corporate stock. The target group of this research lacked the financial resources to make 
sophisticated investments. Thus, migrant workers who have lost their key financial asset—land—
might be concerned about inflation and intend to join an urban old-age pension scheme to manage 
the risk of inflation without requiring much financial sophistication. 
The income support supplied by the urban old-age pension scheme comes in the form of 
monthly benefits that continue throughout retirement and are adjusted periodically to reflect 
changes in prevailing wage or price levels. These arrangements offer a degree of assurance to 
migrant workers—if they contribute an adequate amount to their pension, then they will be likely to 
ensure income adequacy throughout retirement. 
5.2.1.6 Trust in the State 
Two participants with experience of land expropriation (one-sixth of all interview 
participants) indicated that their intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme were 
influenced by their trust in the state. National governments are invariably charged with 
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responsibility for developing and delivering strategic social security policy and regulating pension 
funds activities. One participant expressed trust in the central authority’s ability to achieve this 
responsibility as follows: 
The urban old-age pension scheme is the policy of the state. It can only be good for people 
and will not do any harm to people; therefore, people can only obtain benefits [from the 
pension scheme]. Any policy from the state must be good for people, without any bad 
intention. (Jianguo, 45-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) 
Jianguo examined the pension from both an individual and national standpoint, with considerable 
trust in the state. However, although Jianguo signified his trust in the central government, he 
express trust for the local government engaging in the delivery of benefits. In his survey and 
subsequent interview, Jianguo indicated a negative view of the local government: 
Common folks don’t trust government at the county and town level. First, the money [land 
compensation] cannot fully reach [the peasants]. Second, many policies of the state have 
been changed at the local level. (Jianguo, 45-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) 
Jianguo revealed that his distrust in the local government was due to his experience of being 
exploited by municipalities during land expropriation. In China, where the local government is 
responsible for the delivery and funding of social services, municipalities are granted great power to 
manage social funds, which often leads to corruption at the cost of common benefits (Wedeman, 
2012). All six interviewees with land expropriation experience expressed distrust of local 
governments. However, in Jianguo’s case, his trust in the central authority, along with his 
consideration of other retirement pension functions, outweighed his distrust in municipalities and 
resulted in his intending to take up the pension. 
Although some participants showed trust and confidence in the state, others had suspicions 
that hindered them from joining the pension scheme: 
I have suspicion because a report that I read in the past said the business having the most … 
deficit is the insurance industry. If it suffers deficits and has no ability to pay [the 
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pension] … it has a problem, and I don’t dare to purchase this [pension]. (Hua, 31-year-old 
male, experienced land expropriation) 
Hua’s comments reflect the crisis faced by the pension system in China, as discussed in Section 
2.2.1 (p.42); scholars have described these pension accounts as empty (Chen, 2012; Cozzarin & 
Farid, 2009; Sun & Maxwell, 2002). Empty individual accounts have caused pensioners to lose trust 
in the pension scheme. As Hua stated, many Chinese workers doubt if they will ever receive any of 
the contributions from their individual accounts, including those with added interest, as promised by 
the government (Barris, 2013). 
5.2.1.7 Propaganda-Ridden Environment and Communist Values 
Thus far, participants’ reasons for intending to join the urban old-age pension scheme have 
been associated with self-interest, such as securing their future and to compensate for lost land. This 
is congruent with the literature, which views individuals as self-interested (Kagan, 1989; Miller, 
Lerner, Montada, & Ratner, 1996; Miller & Ratner, 1998). People are expected to have favourable 
attitudes towards a social policy from which they would benefit; motives other than self-interest are 
less common (Miller et al., 1996; Miller & Ratner, 1998). Interestingly, two participants (one-sixth 
of all interview participants) provided unexpected motivations. Their responses went beyond self-
interest and raised the issue of joining the pension scheme within a broader social context.  
The first participant commented: 
This is a social insurance, insurance for the self and also for society. The funds paid by 
young people will go to retired employees who have lost their labour ability. Then later, we 
will lose labour ability and the younger generation will compensate us. This is a revolving 
circle. (Yang, 19-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) 
Yang saw participation in the old-age pension scheme from both a personal and broader perspective 
that was inclusive of the interests of all members of society. He saw participation in the pension 
scheme as being for the common goal of keeping the benefits derived from the pension scheme 
circulating among different generations over time. 
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The second participant who cited social responsibility as a reason for wanting to join the 
urban old-age pension scheme felt that participation was an obligation: 
Society would be unstable [if no one joined it]. No one would be looked after. The elderly 
and children would be left without care. Society would be a total mess. (Nan, 40-year-old-
female, experienced land expropriation) 
Nan considered the elderly and children—and in a broader sense, society—when explaining her 
intention to join the pension scheme. She viewed society as a coalition in which members shared 
common interests and worked for a common goal to achieve stability and avoid any threat to the 
coalition. 
These two respondents appear to demonstrate altruism and concerns for the wellbeing of the 
society. However, their statements are more likely a reflection of China’s political environment, 
where citizens are pressured by the government to embrace the ideology of communism and support 
the ruling Communist Party. Propaganda is widely used in China to maintain the absolute political 
power of the Communist Party. As discussed in Chapter 3, the theory of bounded rationality states 
that individuals’ decision-making heuristics are constructed by memories of the consequences of 
behaviours in a specific society with particular social institutions, cultural values and ways of life. 
Intuitive judgement in the perceptual process is largely influenced by the social and cultural 
heuristics of the choice-maker. Then, the output of this process is examined by deliberate reasoning 
that assesses whether the intuitive judgement would be reasonable and acceptable by social and 
cultural norms (Hayakawa, 2000). In the case of the two respondents, their explanation of how 
social responsibility elicited their intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme could be seen 
as a reflection of the communist values that are intensively inculcated in China and have become 
one of the most essential components in the social and cultural environment of China. The ideology 
of communism is based on common interests, and places an emphasis on equality and fairness 
(Schwartz, 1968). This ideology is reflected in the two respondents’ reasoning that they intend to 
take up a redistributive pension scheme to avoid crippling the functioning of a society with 
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uncooperative behaviours. To fully understand their decision-making process and how their 
supportive attitude towards the government was shaped, the environment where their thinking 
patterns were formed is now analysed. 
Political propaganda is indispensable to China’s social and cultural environment. It includes 
censorship of forbidden views and active cultivation of views that support the Communist Party 
(Lorentzen, 2014). Several government departments operate to censor views challenging the 
Communist Party and to spread pro-Party propaganda. The Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology administers China’s political censorship programme through all layers of its media 
infrastructure. Policies regarding what content is to be proscribed are largely directed by the State 
Council Information Office and the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, with 
input from other government and public security bodies (Smith, 2014). These departments have 
kept a close rein on all types of media to curb discussion on ideas that could challenge the 
Communist Party. The government controls all news media and closely monitors the internet 
(O’Rourke, Harris, & Ogilvy, 2007). The main tool for internet censorship is the Great Firewall, a 
massive surveillance and censorship system blocking China from the rest of the world. With the 
Great Firewall, access to politically threatening websites is blocked, international radio broadcasts 
are scrambled, the publication of ideas that challenge the authority of the Communist Party is 
banned, and dissident journalists can be jailed (Xu, 2015). This tight control means that Chinese 
residents have no internet access to information published by international media recounting 
democratic protests against the Communist Party (O’Rourke et al., 2007). For instance, all online 
references to the 1989 Student Democracy Movement, constant self-immolation protests by 
Tibetans since 2009 and the recent Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong since 2014 are filtered by 
the Great Firewall and not available on the Chinese internet. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese Government has undertaken an extensive propaganda campaign of 
patriotic education as a tool to actively cultivate views that favour the Communist Party. The 
Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, the Ministry of Education and the Central 
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Communist Youth League have launched patriotic education campaigns targeted at each generation 
to stimulate Chinese nationalism among citizens and manoeuvre them into supporting the 
communist regime (Eades, 2016). In China, children are taught from kindergarten to sing 
nationalistic songs and draw pictures of the national flag. All levels of education have curriculums 
that inculcate a love of communism. For instance, Political Thought is a core subject in Chinese 
college entrance exams, and emphasises the development of unquestioning nationalism in students. 
In 2013, the Chinese Government released a list of 100 books as recommended reading materials 
for China’s youth, which included ‘The Story of Marx’, ‘We Have a Mao Zedong’, ‘Old 
Revolutionary Tales’, ‘The Youth Manual of the Communist Party’ and ‘Taiwan, Our Treasured 
Island’ (Nelson, 2013). 
It is widely accepted that China’s stringent censorship and propaganda system has ingrained 
the communist ideology into the minds of the Chinese people. According to Communist theory, an 
individual’s best interests are indistinguishable from those of society (Schwartz, 1968). Democratic 
ideals of freedom of speech, information and the press are incompatible with communism. Without 
exposure to information that challenges the effectiveness and leadership of the controlling party, 
citizens in Communist countries show much more obedience to the government when compared 
with citizens in democratic countries, who tend to be critical of their governments (Jones, 2001). 
The incessant propaganda in China has created a manifesto-ridden environment for its citizens, who 
are provided with politically brainwashing information on a daily basis. The propaganda is simple 
and straightforward, making it easy for Chinese people to justify their Communist beliefs or their 
beliefs conflicting with Communist values.  
Propaganda has a great impact on individuals’ cognitive processes and their cognitive 
dissonance (Stanley, 2015). For instance, the two respondents in this study might initially have held 
two beliefs: that public policy may harm the interests of some groups, and that the government’s 
policies are always in the best interests of the whole society. However, these two beliefs are in 
opposition, a conflict that may have led to cognitive dissonance and a search for information that 
Chapter 5 Joining the Urban Old-Age Pension Scheme: Opportunities and Challenges for Migrant 
Workers 
157 
could reconcile their beliefs. This is where simple, straightforward and persuasive propaganda takes 
effect. If the two interview respondents saw nationalist propaganda that portrayed the Communist 
Party as a political body that represents the universal interests of society, they could reconcile their 
beliefs as follows: government policies are always in the best interests of society, therefore there is 
a social responsibility for individuals to advocate public policies. In this way, intensive Communist 
propaganda in China’s social environment indoctrinates its citizens with Communist values as part 
of their personal beliefs and gradually causes an impairment of autonomy.  
5.2.2 Perceived Feasibility to Join the Urban Pension 
Intention alone is insufficient for people to join the urban old-age pension scheme. 
Following bounded rationality theory, people also have to perceive the pension scheme as feasible. 
Thus, only when migrant workers desire the pension and the choice appears realistic for them could 
they be expected to join. ‘Feasibility’ was found to have four subthemes: attitudes towards 
employers, trust in local government, financial situation and household registration and perceived 
inferiority. 
5.2.2.1 Attitudes towards Employers 
Mentioned by five participants (nearly half of all interview participants), ‘attitudes towards 
employers’ was a significant subtheme regarding feasibility due to the key role employers have in 
implementing the pension scheme. The pension scheme comprises two pillars: a PAYG portion and 
a funded portion. The PAYG portion is financed exclusively by employer contributions of 20% of 
wages, whereas the funded portion is financed by employee contributions of 12%. However, most 
employers have been found to be unwilling to fund migrant workers’ pensions (NBS, 2013a). 
According to the theory of business enterprise (Veblen, 1904), a business usually decides to 
reduce the number of employees in response to a rise in labour cost. As pension contributions 
would add to employers’ labour costs, migrant workers in cities normally choose not to ask their 
employers to participate in the urban old-age pension scheme (NBS, 2013). 
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One respondent felt joining the pension scheme was infeasible because his employer made 
every effort to avoid contributing to the pension: 
Bosses all want to earn as much money as they can. Their profits will be reduced if they 
fund your pension. So, based on their nature, they definitely do not want to pay that money 
for you. Moreover, the surveillance of the government is far from good. If the boss pays 
your salary with cash, the payment will not be recorded by the government, and the 
government has no way to police it. If you report your boss for not paying your pension, the 
government cannot verify it. Besides, even if it [your salary] was recorded … I have a friend 
who works in a formal and big business. However, the business opened two salary accounts 
for him to make his salary look small, as a way to ease the surveillance of governments. 
Because your salary is so small, the government would not ask you [and your employers] to 
buy the pension. On top of that, in the social context of China … especially we rural people 
who work in the city … our awareness of our rights is weak. Sometimes I felt my rights 
were not protected, but I did not know where to make a complaint … So I just let it go to 
avoid offending the boss … [What if] my rights were not protected but I lost my job 
[because of the complaint?] … It is not worth doing. (Jie, 24-year-old male, no experience 
of land expropriation) 
Jie regarded the avoidance of paying pension contributions as being in the nature of all 
employers, because their main pursuit is making as much profit as possible. Also, the loopholes of 
the government surveillance made employers—even those running formal businesses—develop 
various means to avoid pension payments, including paying salaries with cash and breaking the 
employee’s salary account into multiple small accounts to attract less attention from governments. 
Although Jie was aware of illegal behaviour by his employers, he did not want to challenge his 
employer and risk losing his job, and did not know where and how to make a complaint. 
The phenomenon of employers illegally avoiding pension payment appears to be common, 
based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. Unlike Jie, some migrant workers may be unaware 
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that their employers’ behaviour violates the law. For example, another respondent said it was 
feasible for her to join the urban old-age pension scheme, but when asked why she had not joined, 
replied: 
I think not all workers can join the pension scheme. Only workers who have worked in this 
company for a certain length of time can join it. The company is very selective. (Fei, 22-
year-old female, no experience of land expropriation) 
Other participants—Hua (31-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) and Si (33-year-old 
female, no experience of land expropriation)—also stated the same practice kept new employees 
from joining the pension scheme in their factories. Fei, Hua and Si’s employers had their own rules 
for joining the pension scheme and stipulated that only employees with long working experience in 
the business had the right to join. This contradicts the national law, which provides every urban 
employee the right to join the urban old-age pension scheme. Without adequate knowledge of the 
law, Fei, Hua and Si believed their employers’ rules and thought their employers would contribute 
to their pensions after a certain number of years of working in the factory. 
Only one participant stated that his employer was willing to contribute to his pension fund at 
the time of the interview: 
My employer is planning to let us join the urban old-age pension scheme. (Yang, 19-year-
old male, experienced land expropriation) 
In general, analysis of the role of employers in participants’ perceived feasibility of joining 
the urban old-age pension scheme showed that participants tended to accept the rules established by 
their employers and gave up their pension rights if their employer refused or delayed paying their 
pension. The positive feasibility of joining the pension scheme perceived by some participants may 
have been due to their lack of legal knowledge about the pension scheme. The experience of land 
expropriation does not appear to have been a factor that influenced perceptions in the association 
between employers and the feasibility of joining the urban old-age pension scheme. 
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5.2.2.2 Trust in Local Government 
Among the six participants who had experience of land expropriation, five regarded their 
distrust in the local government as a barrier to taking up the urban old-age pension scheme, which is 
implemented by the local government. In contrast, none of the participants without experience of 
land expropriation mentioned this factor when discussing feasibility and barriers to joining the 
pension scheme. 
The unique dual land tenure system in China, inherited from its Communist past, enables 
local bureaucracies to extract revenue by expropriating rural land. China’s land regime divides land 
into urban and rural categories, with each governed by diﬀerent systems of property rights. Urban 
land is owned by the local government, whereas rural land is owned by rural collectives. During the 
rural-urban land conversion, contradictions between the objectives of the central and local 
governments emerge. Whereas the central government is willing to mitigate the urban-rural gap, 
local governments may not properly implement the mitigation. Local bureaucracies are 
economically squeezed by the central government; as a result, they face substantial budget deficits 
(Pan, Huang, & Chiang, 2015; Yang, Ren, Liu, & Zhang, 2015). Thus, they may not be 
economically motivated to carry out the policy. The inconsistent behaviour resulting from this 
complex process might have affected participants’ trust in local governments. When one participant 
was asked what impeded his participation in the urban old-age pension scheme, he gave his distrust 
in the local government as a factor: 
This issue is very complex. The government … [the way it implemented policies in] the 50s 
and 60s was consistent, also in the 70s and 80s. However, after the 80s, I have been feeling 
that the implementation is ineffective. The policy at the central government level is good, 
though. It seems that policymakers and implementers are two separate groups of people. If 
they want me to trust them, policymakers and implementers have to act consistently. It is 
what the government did that makes me unable to trust them. They once expropriated land 
in my hometown. But … for instance, the compensation they claimed was 50,000 RMB, but 
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I only got less than 20,000 at the end. (Ming, 44-year-old male, experienced land 
expropriation) 
The policy changes after the 1980s that Ming noticed were due to the introduction of the 
land-leasehold market in 1988. Since then, rights to the use of land have been separated from land 
ownership rights that can be leased out in the market, which gives rise to massive land 
expropriation. Ming described the central government and local bureaucracies as different groups of 
people. For the central government, land represents a challenge to state legitimacy by threatening 
food security and social stability. For local governments, land is an instrument to attract investors 
and promote the local economy, a revenue source to fulfil unfunded mandates specified in the 
evaluation system (Fan, 2008). These differences in beliefs between the central and local 
governments has made implementation of the urban old-age pension scheme ineffective, as Ming 
indicated. 
Ming also mentioned the shrinkage of compensation. This could again be attributed to 
differing central and local government objectives. The career prospects of local government 
officials are determined largely by their performance, with evaluations based on local revenue and 
local economic development (Edin, 2003; Landry, 2008; Li & Zhou, 2005). Recent statistical 
analysis shows that local officials who contribute more revenue to the central government are more 
likely to be promoted (Sheng, 2010; Shih, Adolph, & Liu, 2012). The unique land system allows 
local bureaucracies to use revenue from land to achieve the targets of revenue extraction and 
economic performance, thereby increasing their chances of career attainment. This may explain 
why local governments at each level try to minimise compensation and save more revenue for their 
future promotion. However, for some peasants whose livelihood depends on farming, land is to be 
used as an income-generating property and insurance provision. When Ming found that the meagre 
compensation he obtained from land expropriation did not reflect this belief, he lost trust in the 
local government and chose not to be a member of the urban old-age pension scheme. Another 
respondent also showed distrust in the local government: 
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Land expropriation at the time was forcible. [The government] did not tell us how much the 
compensation would be. The money they gave me was not enough for leading a life. For 
instance, if one mu (Chinese measurement for an acre) is worth 2,000 RMB, the county 
would take 1,500 RMB, and then the collective would take 400 RMB. We would only get 
around 100 RMB at the end. This is the general proportion. (Ling, 45-year-old female, 
experienced land expropriation) 
Ling’s perceptions of local government were also developed in the process of land expropriation, 
where forcible land requisition and shrinkage of land compensation contributed to his distrust in the 
local government. 
Comments from these five participants show that the experience of land expropriation gave 
rise to participants’ distrust in the local government. This distrust was a barrier to joining the urban 
old-age pension scheme, which the local government also carried out. 
5.2.2.3 Financial Situation 
Four participants (one-third of all interview participants) mentioned their poor financial 
situation as a barrier to joining the urban old-age pension scheme. Three were migrant workers who 
had experienced land expropriation. Their concerns about this perceived barrier related to the 
structure of the urban old-age pension scheme, particularly how members funded their pensions. 
As has been discussed, the current urban old-age pension scheme in China is a hybrid 
system that combines both PAYG and funded elements. Employers contribute 20% of an employees’ 
wages to a social pooling account, and employees contribute 12% of their wages to an individual 
account. The social pool fund is used to provide benefits to current retirees, and the individual fund 
is used to pay the individual when they retire as fully funded (Yang & Zhang, 2012). The high 
contribution rates and the long, 15-year vesting period are key features of the urban old-age pension 
scheme (Lu & Piggott, 2012). However, do these features make it easier for migrant workers to join 
the pension scheme? One respondent’s comments may shed some light on this question: 
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When I look at the salary in my hands … I have some income, but I also have lots of 
expenses. If I pay the pension contribution, I would be worried that my income left over 
may not be enough … So this affects [my decision to join the pension scheme]. (Heng, 23-
year-old male, no experience of land expropriation) 
Heng indicated that the pension contribution would add to his expenses, which were already high, 
and would lead to an insufficient budget for his expenditures; thus, he decided not to take up the 
pension scheme. Ming (44-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) had the same concern. 
Ming’s wife was already a member of the pension scheme at the time of the interview, but Ming felt 
that the family budget might become tight and insufficient if he also needed to set aside some of his 
monthly salary to pay the pension contribution. 
These responses suggest that the current contribution rate of the urban old-age pension 
scheme for employees—12%—might be too high for migrant workers, who live on meagre incomes. 
A minimum wage is supposed to apply for a normal working week with the amount of hours 
specified by law; however, a wage for the illegally extended hours that migrant workers work is not 
protected by law (Du & Pan, 2009). Unpaid or delayed wages are key grievances facing migrant 
workers in China. The Chinese media have described the pay withheld from migrant workers as a 
‘custom’ and an ‘incurable disease’, indicating the prevalence of the phenomenon (Chan, 2010). 
When overtime work and unpaid wages are taken into consideration, a large proportion of migrant 
workers earn significantly less than the legal minimum wage. As the study participants indicated, 
they were pressured to cover basic expenses with a low income and so could not afford to 
contribute 12% of their wage to the pension scheme. 
The urban old-age pension scheme requires participants to contribute to the pension 
continuously for at least 15 years. Are migrant workers, whose income is not stable, able to make 
this long-term pension contribution? One respondent raised this issue when asked about his barriers 
to taking up the pension scheme: 
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With the money earned from doing physical work…[What if I] bought it this year but could 
not afford to continue the payment next year[?] This [problem] is common and normal 
[among migrant workers]. (Jianguo, 45-year-old male, experienced land expropriation) 
Jianguo had uncertainties about his financial capabilities to make continuous pension contributions. 
Thus, he perceived his financial situation (i.e., possibly being unable to pay the pension contribution 
continuously) as a barrier to joining the pension scheme. 
Migrant workers are also social agents whose behaviour is influenced to some extent by 
social customs ingrained in Chinese society. Abiding by some of these social rites and customs can 
be expensive, as one participant revealed when asked about her barriers to joining the pension 
scheme: 
At my age, my child has grown up. I have to prepare the bride’s dowry for her and buy 
property for my family. I have to take into account the reality. The child is a grown up now. 
It does not matter if she is still a kid. Property is expensive. The daily expenses, food and 
drinks all need money. [If] you pay for the old-age pension now, how much money will be 
left for you? You will not be able to buy property. Without property, it is difficult to live in 
Shenzhen. (Nan, 40-year-old female, experienced land expropriation) 
Nan’s financial difficulties reflect Chinese social traditions. She was financially burdened mainly 
by the preparation of a dowry for her daughter and the wish to purchase property before marriage. 
Within the Chinese cultural framework, it is customary for parents to prepare dowries for their 
children’s marriages. As Nan indicated, an adult child in the family could create more financial 
stress for parents than a non-adult child, due to this requirement. Nan also cited purchasing real 
estate as another financial pressure. This is also associated with Chinese culture, wherein ‘property’ 
represents more than accommodation. A Chinese maxim that has lasted a few centuries says, ‘Own 
a home and lead a happy life’. This maxim indicates that a direct relationship between home 
ownership and life satisfaction has long been ingrained in the Chinese psyche, and this relationship 
has made possessing personal property a social expectation in China (Yu, Wei, Li, & Morrissey, 
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2016). The social customs Nan mentioned, as with all other social rules, have a tangible existence in 
Chinese society and in social institutions such as family and community. Thus, financial pressure 
caused by the wish to abide by these social customs are not only limited to Nan, but are felt by the 
wider Chinese society. Following these social traditions places a financial burden on urban citizens, 
and more so on low-income migrant workers. The high cost of adhering to social customs, along 
with the high pension contribution rates on wages, impeded Nan’s uptake of the urban basic old-age 
pension scheme. 
Another finding related to this theme is that three-quarters of participants who indicated a 
financial limitation to joining the pension scheme had experienced land expropriation. Due to land 
expropriation and corrupt officials, the majority of affected peasants have only obtained a small 
portion of land compensation, and have become a new group—peasants without land, living in the 
city without money (Sargeson, 2013). One participant used a Chinese idiom to describe the 
inadequacy of land compensation for his life in the city: 
Quenching the fire of a cartload of firewood with one cup of water. (Ming, 44-year-old male, 
experienced land expropriation) 
With this idiom, Ming compared the financial needs in cities to a cartload of wood on fire and the 
land compensation to one cup of water, meaning that the land compensation is far from adequate to 
address his urgent and severe financial difficulties in the city. After their land is requisitioned, some 
peasants lose a source of livelihoods and a low-cost social safety net. They have to buy food and 
daily necessities in the cities, as do urban residents. However, the peasants’ new lives in the cities 
are financially challenged by their lack of work experience and skills, and by the insufficient land 
compensation caused by corruption of local officials. Because the land compensation is paid in a 
lump sum (Guo, 2001; Ye & LeGates, 2013), it does not reflect changes based on the consumer 
price index. Therefore, migrant workers with land expropriation experience in financial plight in the 
cities might be more economically strained than other migrant workers. 
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The interviews revealed that including migrant workers in the old-age pension scheme 
would require that the pension contribution rate match the migrant workers’ economic situation. 
Their economic situation should be considered within the general context, and also in their unique 
social context—where land expropriation during urbanisation have left them landless and in severe 
financial situations in the cities, but where social expectation requires them to save for expensive 
social customs such as owning real estate before marriage and marriage dowries. 
5.2.2.4 Household Registration and Perceived Inferiority 
Two interview participants (one-sixth of all interview participants) regarded the lack of an 
urban household registration system (‘hukou’) as a hindrance to their participation in the urban old-
age pension scheme. Hukou officially identifies a person as either a rural or an urban citizen, and 
acts as a form of internal permanent residency. Even rural-urban migrants who have lived for years 
in a city will still be defined as rural citizens based on their rural hukou status (Perry & Selden, 
2010; Vendryes, 2011). Peasant workers with a rural hukou status in cities are not eligible for urban 
welfare benefits (e.g., subsidised housing, free health care and public education) (Wang, 2005; 
Chan & Buckingham, 2008). 
Although all migrant workers are entitled to the urban old-age pension scheme regardless of 
their hukou status, some interview participants perceived their lack of an urban hukou status as a 
barrier to joining the pension scheme. For example, when asked what kinds of people are eligible 
for membership in the urban old-age pension scheme, one respondent replied that she thought only 
urban people could join. When asked about how she defined ‘urban’ people, she commented: 
I think people are classified based on their hukou. Therefore, membership should only be for 
people with urban household registration … [A] migrant worker’s [life] is difficult in the 
city. (Ling, 45-year-old female, experienced land expropriation, construction industry) 
Then, when probed, Ling explained further about the difficulty in the city: 
The city life … the houses that we are building are all for others … We do not know what to 
do next after finishing this job. [We] have no stable life. 
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Ling believed hukou separated people into different citizen groups and only urban citizens were 
eligible for membership in the urban old-age pension scheme. She also perceived that citizens with 
rural hukou had a tough life in the city, and did not have the opportunity to access housing that 
urbanites enjoyed. As Ling stated, migrants’ employment is not guaranteed, due to a lack of 
employment assistance services (Mendes & Srighanthan, 2009). Without social support in the city 
in which they conduct their hard work, Ling perceived that her and other migrants’ city lives were 
not stable. 
Ling’s frustration caused by hukou can be traced back to the initial government reasons for 
permitting the rural outflow. The government’s allowing of the rural exodus was to enable rural 
labourers to fill unwanted (mostly manual) work positions in cities, and thus allow the export-
processing industry to continue its development in high gear (Chan, 2009). The potential benefits 
brought by this profit-based strategy were compromised by migrant workers’ rural hukou status 
(Young, 2013). 
As Ling perceived, rural hukou denotes less access to housing and employment services. To 
her, the rural hukou was inferior to the urban one. Therefore, migrant workers had both inherent and 
acquired disadvantages compared to city dwellers. This inferiority made Ling think that 
membership in the urban old-age pension scheme, as well as many other social welfare programmes, 
was an entitlement only for urbanites. 
Another respondent also perceived a similar inferiority. Asked about his perceived barrier to 
joining the urban old-age pension scheme, he declared: 
I am only a migrant worker here with rural hukou. [Because of the rural hukou,] I stopped 
finding further information about the urban old-age pension scheme. (Jianguo, 45-year-old 
male, experienced land expropriation, construction industry) 
When Jianguo described his identity as a migrant worker in the city, he used the word ‘only’, 
suggesting that he perceived his position as a migrant worker as inferior to city dwellers. Because of 
his rural hukou status, he had no confidence of gaining membership in the urban old-age pension 
Chapter 5 Joining the Urban Old-Age Pension Scheme: Opportunities and Challenges for Migrant 
Workers 
168 
scheme and stopped searching for more information about the pension scheme. He also felt that his 
rural hukou status was his main barrier to joining the pension scheme. 
Both Ling and Jianguo’s interviews show their frustrations and feelings of inferiority as 
migrant workers. The negative perception associated with their rural hukou status caused barriers to 
accessing local community services, such as housing and employment services. Previous research 
has documented that perceived unfair treatment of migrants in their new settings may cause a series 
of psychological problems, including anxiety and perceived inferiority. Cognitive appraisal (e.g., 
regarding the environment as discriminatory or unfair) is of primary importance to the way in which 
a disadvantaged individual reacts to the associated anxiety. Whereas positive appraisal allows 
people the spirit and will to adapt to their environment and develop themselves, negative appraisal 
often leads to feelings of exclusion, inferiority and low self-esteem (Richman & Leary, 2009). As 
the rural hukou status blocks migrant workers from entitlements and resources, they are 
discriminated against and socially excluded in the host urban city (Fan, 2008). This experience 
causes a feeling of negative appraisal, which results in their low self-worth in urban social settings. 
This could explain why Ling and Jianguo were not confident in their eligibility for the urban old-
age pension scheme, and why Jianguo even lost incentive to find out information about the pension 
scheme. 
Social stigma could also explain Ling and Jianguo’s passive reactions to their perceived 
ineligibility for the urban old-age pension scheme. Stigma has been conceptualised as socially 
undesirable attributes that exclude some individuals from the mainstream group in a society (Faure 
& Escresa, 2011; Link, Yang, Phelan, & Collins, 2004). Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, and 
Pescosolido (1999) used the word ‘label’ to explain how social stigma is affixed to individuals 
through a social process rather than independently from people. A ‘label’ becomes a ‘social stigma’ 
when it is associated with negative attributes in a society. In this context, ‘worker’ as a neutral word 
would not be stigmatising, but it becomes stigmatising when linked with rural-urban migrants 
having no hukou in cities, lack of entitlements, low social capital and being discriminated against. 
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Like cognitive appraisal, two types of responses are often found in stigmatised people: passive and 
positive. While some migrant workers are positive and deny the negative attributes society renders 
them, some passively accept attributes such as inferiority. Ling and Jianguo could be viewed as 
migrant workers stigmatised by urban society, who respond to this stigma passively by perceiving 
themselves as inferior. 
In summary, the rural hukou status of migrant workers in cities can be seen to institutionally 
constrain their personal development and keep public services out of their reach. The inferiority 
associated with taking work unwanted by urban citizens, without the ability to lead an ‘urban life’ 
(e.g., to access social services that urbanities enjoy), may have stigmatised the interview 
participants and made them unconfident and passive in searching more information and taking 
action to join the urban old-age pension scheme. 
5.2.3 Uncertainties 
Based on the theory of bounded rationality, the choice-making process of weighing intention 
and perceived feasibility is limited by information, uncertainties and time constraints. This means 
that individuals have to roughly assess the probability of gains and losses and quantify the 
information gap between what is known and what needs to be known for an optimal choice. 
Incomplete, ambiguous, or inconsistent information causes difficulties in evaluating uncertainties 
and risks, and assessing the probability of gains and losses arises from each alternative. In the 
interviews, three major uncertainties were found to affect research respondents’ choice-making on 
whether or not to take up the urban old-age pension scheme: instability, information, and life 
expectancy and pension benefits. 
5.2.3.1 Instability 
Two participants (one-sixth of all interview participants) regarded their residential instability 
as one of the barriers to join the urban old-age pension scheme. Due to the high rate of mobility 
among rural-urban migrant workers, the interview participants had some uncertainties about joining 
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the pension scheme in the city where they worked at the time of being interviewed. One participant 
said: 
I am still young and [can] not possibly stay in the same place [for long]. I will eventually get 
married and have a family. But I do not know where I will settle [after having a family] … 
This is the issue of pension transfer. The procedure of transfer might be complex. (Heng, 23-
year-old male, no experience of land expropriation, single) 
As a young migrant worker, Heng was aware that his settlement was not stable due to being 
unmarried. Further, he also realised that his pension would need to be transferred to his future 
settlement place if he wanted to continue the membership. The transfer procedure made him 
hesitant to purchase the pension before deciding where to settle permanently. Another participant 
shared a similar uncertainty: 
If I do not live here in the future, and go back to my hometown … I am not sure about it … 
Then where should I transfer my pension? Henan or Shenzhen? (Jianguo, 45-year-old male, 
experienced land expropriation, married with two children) 
Although married with two children, Jianguo had the same uncertainty as the single Heng regarding 
future settlement and pension transfer.  
Both respondents’ uncertainty was partly attributed to perceived instability, regardless of 
their demographic features in terms of marriage, age, or experience of land expropriation. Under the 
current, fragmented old-age pension scheme in China, members need to transfer their pension when 
they move. This is a challenge for migrant workers who, as indicted by participants, generally have 
little knowledge about the legal procedures of managing their pension accounts and asking for 
services from bureaucracies. Thus, promoting knowledge about pension transfer among migrant 
workers and simplifying the transfer procedure might promote a higher uptake rate of the urban old-
age pension scheme among migrant workers. 
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5.2.3.2 Information 
Participants’ perceived feasibility was also limited by their knowledge of the urban old-age 
pension scheme. All participants had a degree of uncertainty about the feasibility of joining the 
pension scheme, regardless of their experience of land expropriation, as shown by one participant’s 
comments: 
I am not sure [about the feasibility] … the information that I have is really ambiguous … 
The information is not accurate. (Jin, 19-year-old female, no experience of land 
expropriation). 
The ambiguity of information available to Jin made her unable to perceive factors facilitating or 
hindering her participation in the urban old-age pension scheme. 
Other participants were misled by false information when assessing the perceived feasibility 
of joining the pension scheme. One said: 
If everyone can join it, then the government does not need to promote this scheme … just let 
everyone join it … This makes me have a suspicion about the pension scheme … so I feel it 
is not very feasible. (Fei, 22-year-old female, experienced land expropriation) 
Fei did not seem to know the eligibility criteria for joining the urban old-age pension scheme: the 
Social Insurance Law stipulates that only employees in urban enterprises are eligible. 
Similarly, Jianguo seemed unaware of eligibility criteria in his response to why he had not 
taken up the pension scheme: 
Because spending the elderly life in the city … the main barrier is that my household 
registration is not here in Shenzhen. (Jianguo, 45-year-old male, experienced land 
expropriation, married) 
Jianguo thought that household registration was among the eligibility criteria of the urban old-age 
pension scheme; in fact, the Social Insurance Law specifies that all rural-urban migrant workers are 
eligible for membership of, and household registration is not an eligibility criterion. 
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Some participants significantly overestimated the requirements for becoming a member of 
the urban old-age pension scheme. One respondent said that joining the pension scheme was 
infeasible because: 
The pension scheme is hard to reach, and the criteria have excluded most people from the 
pension scheme. For instance, you need to have a company in the city … and a property … 
and money to invest in the city. (Hua, 31-year-old male, experienced land expropriation, 
married) 
Another respondent also believed that participation in the urban old-age pension scheme was 
unrealistic, because: 
Generally, people who buy the old-age pension are rich people … [the old-age pension] is 
for the rich. We are workers who can only make a living. (Teng, 25-year-old male, no 
experience of land expropriation) 
In fact, participation in the urban old-age pension scheme does not require an assessment of 
assets and wealth. All workers in the city are eligible to join the pension scheme, regardless of their 
income levels. Hua and Teng’s statements showed that they significantly exaggerated the 
requirement of joining the urban old-age pension scheme due to lack of information. 
Analysis of comments showed that participants’ development of intention and perceived 
feasibility of joining the urban old-age pension scheme was, to some extent, constrained by 
uncertainties about the pension scheme. Some heuristics about joining the urban old-age pension 
scheme were based on wrong information. Thus, their decisions to join may not have been rational 
and were bounded by the information they had and their uncertainties about the scheme. 
5.2.3.3 Life Expectancy and Pension Benefits 
Three of the 12 interview participants were concerned that their life expectancy would not 
allow them to profit from the urban old-age pension scheme. Under the pension scheme, members 
are required to make insurance payments for 15 years before they are eligible to obtain monthly 
benefits. The pensionable age is 55 for women and 60 for men in salaried cadre positions (Ministry 
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of Human Resources and Social Security, 2011). These ages are set based on the average life 
expectancy of all citizens, rather than that of migrant workers, who do not have as much healthcare 
support as do urbanities. Although China’s average life expectancy rose to 75 years at the end of 
2013 (UN, 2014), migrant workers’ health problems remain relatively high.  
When asked if she had any doubt about joining the urban old-age pension scheme, one 
participant responded: 
Could I benefit from the pension scheme if I pay for it? I am almost 50 years old. For how 
many years could I enjoy the benefits of the pension scheme? (Ling, 45-year-old female, 
experienced land expropriation, construction industry) 
At nearly 50 years old, Ling was unsure if she would live long enough to enjoy the benefits of the 
pension scheme for a reasonably long period. Another respondent expressed similar concerns: 
Can anyone guarantee that they will live to 70 or 80 years old? I am a bit worried about this. 
I am not sure if I could enjoy the benefits of the pension scheme [if I were to buy it]. (Hua, 
31-year-old male, experienced land expropriation, manufacturing industry) 
Likewise, another commented: 
If people paid for eight or 10 years and then died, all the payments they had made would be 
in vain. (Jianguo, 45-year-old male, experienced land expropriation, construction industry) 
These doubts are reasonable. The ‘healthy migrant phenomenon’ assumes self-selection by 
healthy migrants, and that workers with the mobility and entrepreneurship to migrate are in better 
health than workers who do not migrate (Fennelly, 2007). However, migrant workers’ health 
advantages diminish dramatically over time once they work in the host place (Zhang, 2014). 
China’s migrants work under high risk of occupational injury and disease, and they cannot easily 
access treatment when they have health problems (Fitzgerald, Chen, Qu, & Sheff, 2013; Hesketh, 
Jun, Lu, & Mei, 2008). They tend to work the longest hours of all Chinese workers—often over 60 
hours per week—for meagre income, in poor working environments, and exposed to various 
occupational hazards (Mishra & Smyth, 2013). Workplace injuries are common, health insurance is 
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hardly accessible, and paid sick leave is practically non-existent (Zheng & Lian, 2006). China’s 
welfare provision, including its health insurance provision, is described by The Guardian as 
‘inconsistent, inadequate, inefficient, and often riddled with corruption’ (Branigan, 2013). 
Another point worth attention is that two of the above interview participants worked in the 
construction sector, and the third in manufacturing. These two industries were ranked second and 
third, respectively, for highest number of workplace injuries (Gransow, Zheng, Leong, & Ling, 
2014). Such knowledge or experience might have increased the participants’ concerns that their 
health may not enable them to enjoy the benefits of the urban old-age pension scheme for long, 
even if they joined it. 
For any old-age pension scheme, the pensionable age has to be adjusted for changes in life 
expectancy (Hill, 2007; Whitehouse, 2007). Lowering the current pensionable age would provide 
migrant workers, who generally have health and safety risks, longer time to use the pension benefits. 
However, the Chinese Government ministry proposes to raise the retirement age, and the statutory 
retirement age is to be unveiled in 2017 (Han, 2015). This may increase migrant workers’ 
uncertainties about joining the urban pension scheme and decrease their intentions to take up the 
pension policy. 
5.2.4 Information on and Understanding of the Urban Pension 
As discussed in the conceptual framework, the process of weighing intention and perceived 
feasibility in choice-making is influenced by information and perceived uncertainties (Koppl, 2004; 
Koumakhov, 2009; Kuon, Sadrieh, & Selten, 1998; Simon, 1972). Understanding information 
facilitates the choice-making process, whereas lack of information impedes the process (Ibrahim & 
Khaimah, 2009; Simon, 1972). The interviews showed that of all 12 participants, only four (one-
third) had general information about the pension scheme, such as the requested length of 
contribution, while two-thirds had little understanding about the pension scheme. All participants 
lacked detailed information, such as the calculation of benefits and the process of pension transfer, 
and all regarded insufficient information about the pension scheme as a barrier to developing their 
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intentions to join. Also, participants’ perceived feasibility of joining was wrongly formed during 
their choice-making process, owing to their misunderstanding of the pension scheme. Notably, no 
participant was aware that their old-age pension entitlements were protected by the Social Insurance 
Law. The information most desired by the interview participants was the eligibility criteria, process 
of joining the urban old-age pension scheme, adjustment of pension benefits for inflation, and 
pension transfer. 
5.2.4.1 Information and Perceptions of Joining the Urban Old-age Pension Scheme 
Section 5.2.3.2 showed that lack of information hindered participants from shaping correctly 
perceived feasibility of joining the urban old-age pension scheme. Did information also affect 
participants’ intention to join the pension scheme? Five participants (about two-thirds) indicated 
that their intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme had been, to some degree, impeded by 
their concern about the transferability of the pension.  
Although perceiving that joining the urban old-age pension scheme was realistic, one 
participant was hesitant because: 
My main problem is about pension transfer … because I am still young and it is very likely 
that I will change my job later. It might be very complex to transfer the pension. I do not 
know who deals with the transfer. (Heng, 23-year-old male, no experience of land 
expropriation, single) 
As a young worker, Heng’s concerns about pension transfer hindered him from making rational 
choices about taking up the pension scheme. 
Whether the urban old-age pension scheme could provide pensioners protection against 
inflation was a concern of one-third of participants. As recounted in 5.2.1.5, Ming believed that the 
old-age pension could be adjusted for inflation, and thus he had intention to join the urban old-age 
pension scheme. However, in a later interview, he said his concerns about whether the benefit 
increases could keep up with the inflation rate in the future had become the dominant barrier for 
him to develop any further intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme. Another participant 
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also expressed concern about whether the pension benefits would be well adjusted for inflation in 
the future: 
Ten years ago, you could use 100 RMB to treat many people [to a meal], with some money 
to spare. Now, 100 RMB is not even enough [for a meal] for two or three people. There are 
still several decades before we can claim the pension benefits … I am concerned that the 
monthly pension benefits in the future may not even be adequate for the cost of living for a 
week. (Yang, 19-year-old male, no experience of land expropriation, single) 
Although Yang did not use the word ‘inflation’, this was his concern in his calculation of the 
pension benefits.  
Participants’ comments showed that the process of shaping clear perceptions about joining 
the urban old-age pension scheme was impeded by lack of information, particularly information on 
transferability of the pension and its ability to combat inflation. 
5.2.4.2 Access to Information 
Migrant workers’ low education levels and poor pension rights awareness prompted the 
issue of the provision of appropriate information resources. Eight respondents said that they were 
never proactive in seeking pension-related information. The source of information is, therefore, 
crucial in promoting awareness of pensions, especially in the future. 
Interviewees specified different sources for their information, categorised as oral, written 
and electronic. Oral sources included friends, relatives and colleagues, as well as face-to-face 
promotion by the government. Written sources included newspapers and letters. Electronic sources, 
as indicated during the interviews, included the internet and the popular Chinese mobile phone 
application WeChat. 
Seven participants (more than two-thirds) indicated that they usually received information 
regarding the pension through oral sources. Of these seven, three were interested in oral promotion 
from authoritative sources, such as senior officers in the workplace or government officers; others 
preferred to acquire information from relatives or friends. 
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One participant was usually given pension-related information by friends and acquaintances 
during break hours at the workplace. She preferred oral information because: 
You can ask questions if you get the information from an oral source. The written 
information is fixed. (Fei, 22-year-old female, no experience of land expropriation, primary 
school educated) 
Fei’s comments showed that the flexibility of oral information transfer made receiving information 
easier because the situation allowed her to interact with people by raising queries. Moreover, the 
constant presence of friends and relatives made related information more accessible compared with 
other sources. However, oral information sources were reliant on the emotional trust the participants 
had in their friends and relatives, rather than logic and accuracy. Another participant reinforced this 
finding: 
They are your relatives, after all. They won’t cheat you because you have to deal with them 
every day. It is not to their benefit to deceive you. With this relationship, they will be honest 
with you. (Nan, 40-year-old female, experienced land expropriation, junior high educated) 
Although Nan received information from relatives, she also admitted oral sources had limitations: 
Friends are normally from different companies where the rules are different. Therefore, 
some information was misleading. 
Other participants who were interested in oral information would have liked to obtain 
information from senior officers in their companies or from government officers, as they could 
authenticate the validity of the information provided. Despite considering authority to be important, 
these participants still refused to accept written information, which has superior authority. 
One participant said he received information regarding the pension primarily from senior 
officers at his workplace, particularly through oral promotion. Given that the sources were senior 
officers at his factory, he regarded them as reliable sources. In relation to written sources of 
information, such as newspapers, he stated: 
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Peasants have no time and education to read newspapers. We get headaches when reading 
newspapers. (Ming, 44-year-old male, experienced land expropriation, primary school 
educated) 
Based on Ming’s comments, and owing to his level of literacy, oral information with authority from 
senior officers was more trustworthy. However, in Section 5.2.2.1, some participants indicated that 
information from employers might be misleading because they tended to explain information in a 
way that benefited them. Jianguo (45-year-old male, experienced land expropriation, junior high 
educated) was also interested in oral information from authoritative sources; in his case, the 
authoritative sources included the sub-district officers or staff within the community. 
Three participants (one-fourth) trusted the authority of a source and preferred written 
information. One stated that he trusted written forms of information, such as newspapers and 
government websites: 
The information should be in authoritative written form. The oral information you hear 
needs to be verified. (Yang, 19-year-old male, no experience of land expropriation, senior 
high educated) 
When asked his opinion of the effectiveness of government officials promoting information orally, 
he replied: 
I do not think it is effective because I do not know what he [the official] does. I have to 
verify his identity first. 
Yang valued the accuracy and authority of written information. However, as noted by most 
respondents, the lack of interest in reading made it difficult for them to follow written information. 
To ensure balance, one participated suggested: 
Oral information is better when it is supplemented by authoritative written information. A 
promotional meeting for the pension, run by the government, would be effective in terms of 
both authority and easiness. (Teng, 25-year-old male, no experience of land expropriation, 
senior high educated) 
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Four participants stated that electronic forms of information, such as the internet and mobile 
apps, were their preferred source. Fei (22-year-old female, without land expropriation experience, 
primary school educated) and Jin (19-year-old female, no experience of land expropriation, senior 
high educated) agreed that China’s popular mobile voice messaging application, WeChat, would be 
useful for the promotion of pension information. Both participants usually used oral forms of 
information. Jin commented: 
Everyone has a mobile phone now. WeChat is really popular, and the government can send 
pension information through WeChat. 
Participants’ opinions on sources of information for the pension scheme showed that land 
expropriation experience and education did not play a role in their preferences. However, young 
migrant workers preferred electronic sources. 
5.3 Discussion 
In Phase 2 of the research, 12 interviews were conducted to qualitatively explore 
participants’ perceptions of the uptake of the urban old-age pension scheme. Analysis of their 
decisions on whether to avail themselves of the pension scheme was guided by the theory of 
bounded rationality. To examine the reasoning process by which migrant workers make decisions 
on whether to join the urban old-age pension scheme, this research examined four essential 
elements in their choice-making process: intentions, perceived feasibility of joining, uncertainties, 
and information on and understanding of the pension scheme. The results illustrated the choice-
making process and its links to the quantitative results in Chapter 4, and provided a broad 
implementation perspective at the level of policy recipients. 
According to the qualitative analysis, most factors that influenced the uptake of the urban 
old-age pension scheme hindered participants from joining the scheme, although some—such as 
trust in employers—facilitated joining the scheme to some degree. All participants mentioned 
information as a barrier to the feasibility of joining the pension scheme; thus, information was 
explored an independent theme, parallel with intention, feasibility and uncertainty, because lack of 
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information constrains the rationality of weighing intention and feasibility, as bounded rationality 
theory indicates (Bicchieri & Antonelli, 1995; Gilboa, 1989). 
The analysis results confirmed the choice-making process proposed by bounded rationality 
theory. All participants had intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme because they were 
motivated by expectations such as the pension making up for the loss of their land, operating as 
another source of income, easing the financial burden of their only child, and combating future 
inflation risk. However, their actions to take up the pension were hindered by their perceptions—for 
example, of lacking household registration in urban areas—and understanding of information. In 
addition, lack of information made most participants unable to correctly shape their perceived 
feasibility of joining the pension scheme. For some, lack of information on eligibility led to 
incorrect negative assumptions about infeasibility, while others’ lack of information on joining 
requirements led to incorrect positive assumptions about feasibility.  
Lack of information on the operation of the pension scheme and perceived barriers limited 
participants’ rationality and eventually led to their choice not to join the pension scheme. According 
to implementation theory, the ‘cooperation component’, which refers to the target recipients’ 
expected behavioural changes in response to the policy, is key to successful implementation 
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). In this study, migrant workers did not cooperate, making 
implementation imperfect in terms of the cooperation component. 
5.3.1 Land Expropriation as a Group-Dividing Factor 
As a result of the quantitative survey, land expropriation was used as a splitting factor in 
recruiting interview participants. The analysis of the 12 interviews showed that the experience of 
land expropriation influenced participants’ intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme. 
This was reflected in multiple themes in the interview analysis, and it further confirmed that the 
social security provision cannot be researched in isolation from China’s unique land system. 
Participants in the two groups (with and without land expropriation experience) showed 
distinct sets of reasoning for their decisions to participate in the urban old-age pension scheme. 
Chapter 5 Joining the Urban Old-Age Pension Scheme: Opportunities and Challenges for Migrant 
Workers 
181 
Specifically, the processes of developing intention and of perceiving feasibility of joining the 
pension scheme were both influenced by the participants’ experiences with land expropriation. 
Under the theme of ‘intention’, the subthemes ‘land expropriation’ and ‘security for the 
future’ indicated that the urban old-age pension scheme compensated participants with land 
expropriation experience for their land’s functions. The loss of land as income-generating property 
impelled participants to diversify sources of income as nontraditional peasants. The interviews 
indicated that the process of land expropriation changed some participants’ self-identities from 
farming peasants to nontraditional peasants who engaged in urban employment and pursued income 
in cities. This new identity might have made them expect that all sources of nonfarm income in 
cities would compensate for the loss of income from their former land. Thus, these participants had 
strong intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme, which they thought would diversify and 
augment nonfarm income. In addition to its direct income function, participants also signified that 
their land once functioned to maintain a basic living standard and enable the participants to be self-
sustained. The urban old-age pension scheme’s potential to ensure the basic living standard for the 
future thus generated their intentions to invest. 
To some extent, as a push factor, land expropriation also initiated some participants’ plans to 
settle in the city and further triggered their intentions to enjoy urban social entitlements by joining 
the urban old-age pension scheme—as shown in the subtheme ‘settlement plan’, under ‘intention’. 
In addition, the subtheme of ‘risk management’, under ‘intention’, indicated that peasants with land 
expropriation experience wanted to join the pension scheme because, as a social insurance 
programme, the urban old-age pension scheme could combat inflation risk. Unlike savings from 
their urban income, the prices of agricultural products produced on their lost land used to change 
with inflation rates. After losing their land, the participants intended to join the urban old-age 
pension scheme to prevent their savings from being devalued. 
Land expropriation also hindered participants’ action of taking up the urban old-age pension 
scheme. The subtheme ‘trust in the local government’, under the theme of ‘feasibility’, showed that 
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participants did not trust local governments because local governments had exploited participants 
during land expropriation; thus, these participants were concerned that local governments would 
also misuse the pension funds due to corruption. 
These findings confirmed the quantitative survey results of Phase 1, which also showed that 
migrant workers who had experienced land expropriation were more likely to intend to join the 
urban old-age pension scheme. Moreover, the qualitative analysis provided an in-depth exploration 
into how this experience influenced participants’ perceptions of the pension scheme, including the 
reasoning behind how the loss of their land affected intention and perceived feasibility. It captured 
the cognitive process, and included participants’ perceptions of the functions of their lost land, their 
changes in self-identities influenced by the lost land, and their outlooks on future life as 
nontraditional peasants. These findings supplemented the survey results with a rich and detailed 
picture of how land expropriation shaped participants’ heuristics in being members of the urban old-
age pension scheme. 
This chapter has explored the participants’ reasoning process in deciding to join or not join 
the urban old-age pension scheme. As rational agents bounded by limitations of information and 
perceptions, participants showed their perceptions in key pillars of the theory of bounded 
rationality—that is, in the context of this research, intention and feasibility of joining the urban old-
age pension scheme. How these perceptions are linked with the survey findings to reveal the urban 
old-age pension scheme implementation gap among migrant workers, and what implication the two 
parts of the research could offer stakeholders of the urban old-age pension scheme, will be 
elaborated on in the discussion chapter. 
5.3.2 Decision-making in China’s Social, Cultural and Political Environment 
The data analysis of the qualitative interviews explored 16 themes. Interestingly, all of these 
themes are associated with China’s social and cultural environment. Eight of these themes directly 
reflect China’s unique social and cultural environment. They are ‘land expropriation’ caused by 
privatisation of land ownership in China, ‘settlement’ issues complicated by China’s rural-urban 
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segregation, ‘children’ issues associated with the one-child policy, ‘trust in the state’ and ‘trust in 
local government’ triggered by China’s stove-piping and decentralised political system, 
‘propaganda-ridden environment and Communist values’ created by the Communist Party, 
‘attitudes towards employers’ prompted by China’s ineffective legal and justice system, and 
‘household registration and perceived inferiority’ related to the hukou system. This reflects the 
impact of social, cultural and political elements on individuals’ perceptions, and confirms that 
decision-making cannot be independent of this environment. 
The migrant workers interviewed preferred fast and frugal algorithms that enabled them to 
make decisions under realistic circumstances without generating considerable information 
collection and processing costs. The cultural transmission mechanism in China’s society enables 
migrant workers to short-cut the costs of searching and processing information and experimentation, 
and thus they capitalise on the cumulative experience observed in the behaviour of other social 
members. Social and cultural norms in China, such as land expropriation, Communist values, 
common perceptions of urban and rural hukou, and social injustice, are spontaneously transmitted 
among individuals, and thus assist in saving costs of decision-making for the interviewees. For 
instance, some interviewees intended to join the pension scheme due to a sense of social 
responsibility, which reflects China’s social and political Communist propaganda environment. 
Communist values are deeply rooted in Chinese individuals, and are then circulated among 
individuals through social learning, observation and communication. Rural-urban migrant workers’ 
intentions to join the pension scheme and their sense of social responsibility were developed 
through their belief that supporting the Party’s public policies contributed to the fairness and equity 
of society. 
The remaining themes were also associated with the social, cultural and political context of 
China, although indirectly. For instance, in the theme ‘instability’, interviewees’ uncertainties 
regarding joining the urban old-age pension scheme were caused by their frequent mobility. 
Mobility in China is moderated by the hukou system, which maintains a clear distinction between 
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residencies in different regions and causes severe difficulties when people holding hukou in one 
region migrate to other regions. Thus, this theme is also context-related. Another example of the 
indirect manifestation of social and cultural elements can be found in the theme of ‘risk 
management’. Only participants with land expropriation experience regarded the pension scheme’s 
risk management functions as reasons to join. Compared to rural-urban migrant workers who have 
land assets back in their rural hometowns that stave off currency devaluation, workers who have 
had land expropriated need other insurance to substitute the functions of their lost land. Thus, their 
intentions to take up the urban old-age pension scheme partly result from the social phenomenon of 
land expropriation. 
In summary, this qualitative phase of the research has proved the importance of social, 
cultural and political environment in decision-making bounded by uncertainties and information. 
Choices made by individual depend crucially on such environments. Migrant workers participate in 
the economy not as economic abstracts with idiosyncratic taste, but as whole persons with a variety 
of legitimate social, cultural and political concerns and motivations that are very much part of the 
choices they make towards public policies. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and Key Findings 
The aim of this study was to explore gaps in the implementation of the urban old-age 
pension scheme at the migrant worker level within the complex social, cultural and economic 
context of China. Informed by the theory of implementation (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981), 
successful policy execution at the bottom level demands the identification of policy recipients so 
that a clear linkage between the recipients and the goal of the policy can be established (the 
technical component).34 It also requires the cooperation of target recipients to take up the policy (the 
cooperation component). This study undertook research on these two components in the urban old-
age pension scheme to contribute to building a complete picture of successful implementation and 
exposing gaps in the current implementation of the policy. 
As the urban old-age pension scheme is in effect voluntary for migrant workers in China, 
policy recipients are migrant workers who intend to join such a scheme. However, the 
characteristics of these migrant workers—such as gender, age, education level, family structure, 
past experience and future plans—had not been identified prior to this research. Thus, the research 
questions for this study were: 
RQ1. What are the main factors that influence rural-urban migrant workers’ intentions to 
take up the basic urban old-age pension scheme in China? (Among the following factors, A. 
land B.enterprise C.settlement D.individual) 
RQ2. How do rural-urban migrant workers make decisions whether to join China’s basic 
urban old-age pension scheme in China’s broad social, cultural and political context? 
Sub-questions of RQ2: 
How do migrant workers inform themselves of the pension scheme? 
How do migrant workers form intention whether to join the pension scheme? 
                                                             
34. Implementation at the bottom level mainly comprises recipients of a policy and their interaction with the policy. 
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How do migrant workers perceive the feasibility of joining the pension 
scheme? 
How do migrant workers’ evaluation of the intention to and feasibility of 
joining the pension scheme influence their decision whether to join the pension 
scheme? 
How do migrant workers evaluate uncertainties of gains and losses of joining 
the pension scheme? 
To address these questions, two complementary phases of research were undertaken. Phase 
1 of this study conducted a quantitative survey of 252 migrant workers who were not members of 
the urban old-age pension scheme to statistically identify factors that influenced their intentions to 
join the pension scheme. Phase 1 also researched the technical component of the policy with an aim 
to improve successful implementation. It was found that migrant workers with experience of land 
expropriation were more likely to intend to join the pension scheme than were those without such 
experience. Further, migrant workers with plans to settle in cities in the future were more likely to 
intend to join the pension scheme than were those planning to return to rural regions. Thus, it was 
found that the technical component of the urban old-age pension policy implementation could be 
improved by targeting migrant workers whose land has been expropriated and who plan to settle in 
cities. This phase also revealed that lack of information about the policy might influence 
participants’ perceptions of the pension scheme. 
According to the theory of implementation, even if recipients are targeted and a clear link 
established between recipients and a policy, implementation could still fail because of lack of 
cooperation by target recipients (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981). To address this cooperation 
component, Phase 2 of this study conducted 12 qualitative semi-structured interviews with migrant 
workers to provide a rich, detailed picture of why they did not take up the policy despite their 
interest in and perceptions about the policy. As individuals’ rationality in decision-making is 
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limited, the theory of bounded rationality was employed as the theoretical framework for the 
decision-making process.  
The interviews confirmed the quantitative findings that experience of land expropriation and 
plans to settle in cities influenced intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme; further, the 
interviews revealed participants’ reasoning behind their intentions. Migrant workers who had lost 
their land, which had provided direct economic income and maintenance of a basic living standard, 
now sought alternative means to compensate for this loss. They viewed the urban old-age pension 
scheme as serving similar economic and standard of living functions as their lost land. Respondents 
with plans to settle in cities identified themselves as non-traditional peasants who now lived 
similarly to urban people and no longer farmed; thus, they viewed the urban old-age pension 
scheme as suiting the economic and standard of living needs of their new urban lifestyles. The 
interview results also showed that experience of land expropriation was a push factor for migrant 
workers adopting a new identity in an urban community. Consequently, they viewed joining the 
urban social welfare scheme as part of their transition to their new identity. However, those without 
land expropriation experience simply regarded urban pension as a form of support for their future 
settlement in cities. The interviews further revealed additional factors that influenced participants’ 
intentions to join the pension scheme, including children, risk management, confidence in the state 
and social responsibility.  
Phase 2 found that the action of taking up the pension scheme was either facilitated or 
hindered by issues of trust in local government, employers’ compliance, household registration and 
perceived inferiority, financial situation, life expectancy, and pension benefits and instability. As 
was suggested by findings in Phase 1, lack of information hindered the Phase 2 interviewees’ 
perceptions towards the uptake of the pension scheme, and made them believe that joining was 
impossible. Many did not know how to take action to join the pension scheme or understand their 
eligibility. Another example of lack of information was that some participants perceived that they 
were not able to join the pension scheme due to their rural household registration; they did not 
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know that urban household registration was not an eligibility criterion. Participants who moved 
frequently were also concerned that they would not be able to transfer their pension; they did not 
know that the urban old-age pension is made transferable by law. This finding supports the 
literature (see Section 2.1.1.2) that indicated local governments may not be eager to promote 
policies regarding pension transfer among migrant workers due to their fear of losing local pooling 
funds. Thus, it is possible that unwillingness of local governments to promote the urban old-age 
pension scheme may negatively affect the cooperation component of the policy; however, future 
research on all stakeholders in the urban old-age pension scheme is required to confirm this. 
Phase 2 probed participants’ reasoning in respect to the unique social, cultural and political 
context of China. Their responses reflected changes in policies over several decades and how these 
historical policy changes, in a broader context, influenced their perceptions of taking up the urban 
old-age pension scheme. For instance, some participants perceived that the urban old-age pension 
scheme could alleviate the heavy caring responsibility of their only child that resulted from changes 
in kinship dynamics due to the 1979 one-child policy. In addition, the inaccurate concerns of some 
participants regarding household registration requirements for the pension scheme reflect the effects 
of the 1940s household registration system, which divided urban and rural communities. 
The next section of this chapter explores the policy implications of these findings, with an 
aim to developing implementation strategies to facilitate migrant workers taking up the pension 
scheme. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
This section presents policy implications that are aimed at supporting migrant workers’ 
intentions to join the pension scheme and removing barriers to their participation. Because a lack of 
information was found to hinder migrant workers’ decision-making processes, promoting 
information among migrant workers is also discussed as a major policy implication. 
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6.2.1 Targeting Interest Groups to Reinforce Intentions to Join the Pension Scheme 
The quantitative findings indicated that when creating and implementing policy, the 
government should target the following two interest groups: (1) migrant workers with experience of 
land expropriation, and (2) migrant workers who have plans to settle in the city. Policy promotion 
could also focus on these two groups because they are the groups most likely to be interested in 
joining the pension scheme. This study identified specific factors important to these two interest 
groups, which are addressed in the following policy implications. 
6.2.2 Security for Workers with Land Expropriation Experience 
Most interview participants were concerned about their financial resources in their old age 
and regarded the urban old-age pension scheme as a way to reduce these concerns and feel secure in 
their future. Thus, when promoting the policy, the government should emphasise the financial 
benefits for retirement to better inform and support migrant workers’ considerations.  
Interviewees who had experienced land expropriation were also interested in joining the 
pension scheme because they viewed it as a financial resource for the future that was particularly 
necessary in part due to their lost land. Therefore, the government could target these migrant 
workers by emphasising the function of the pension scheme as a tool to secures one’s financial 
future—and, to some extent, to substitute as a financial provision for the lost land. 
6.2.3 Risk Management 
Risk management was found to be a reason for interest in joining the pension scheme. 
Respondents realised that the buying power of their own savings would shrink in the future because 
of inflation, and they perceived that the pension scheme could help manage future inflation risk. 
The current urban old-age pension scheme does not explicitly explain how the pension scheme 
deals with inflation; therefore, it is suggested that this information be directly addressed in policy 
promotion.  
In addition, this study found that workers who regarded the pension scheme as a risk-
management tool had also experienced land expropriation. Before land expropriation, agricultural 
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products from arable land provided peasants with inflation-adjusted returns. Land expropriation has 
impelled these workers to seek another tool that could keep their finances in line with inflation rates. 
Thus, policy promotion could also include an explanation of the inflation-adjusted nature of the 
urban old-age pension scheme and its similarity to land as an economic tool. 
6.2.4 Propaganda of Communist Values versus Unbiased Information 
Social responsibility was found to contribute to workers’ intentions to join the urban old-age 
pension scheme. Some interview participants perceived that all social members had to support the 
urban old-age pension scheme; otherwise, the policy system would fail and society would become 
less stable. This study’s analysis indicated that these views may have resulted from China’s 
Communist propaganda, which may have deprived participants of independent thinking and led to 
them acquiring knowledge from unbiased reality. As a consequence, they might make choices that 
could harm their interests. For instance, the Great Leap Forward35 Campaign undertaken by China’s 
Communist Party in 1958 exaggerated the country’s economy and covered up information on 
natural disasters and government shortfalls. More than 20 million Chinese people who joined this 
campaign based on misinformation were killed by famine (Dikötter, 2010). Thus, for the best 
interests of rural-urban migrant workers, unbiased information on the urban old-age pension scheme, 
and possible benefits and losses of being a pension member, should be provided to the public. 
6.2.5 Trust in the State 
Some interview participants indicated that they developed intentions to join the pension 
scheme because of their trust in the government. This means that enhancing migrant workers’ trust 
in the central government might boost membership of the urban old-age pension scheme. Trust is a 
                                                             
35 The Great Leap Forward was Mao’s second Five Year Plan that took place from 1958 to 1961. It was an economic 
and social propaganda campaign that aimed for China to rival the US by 1988 with rapid industrialisation and 
collectivisation (Harvey, 2013). During this campaign, it has been argued that political ambition took precedence over 
common sense, and the Communist Party of China inflated production numbers. Mao was reported to have said, ‘The 
state may not want it (grain). Peasants themselves can eat more. Well, they can eat five times a day’. The Great Leap 
Forward has been cited as a leading cause of the Great Chinese Famine, which killed 20 million people from 1959 to 
1962 (Dikötter, 2010). 
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form of encapsulated interest (Hardin, 1999), and citizens trust the state because they presume it is 
in the state’s interest to act in a way that is consistent with citizens’ interests (Levi, 1999). However, 
there is evidence that migrant workers in China have been socially, economically and legally 
exploited (Wang & Fan, 2012). Encouraging the constructive aspects of the government while 
constraining its capacity for exploitation would increase public trust. 
According to 2012 government statistics, the contribution of migrant workers to the 
development and construction industry of Beijing is worth nearly US $1.6 trillion (Ngo, 2014). 
Despite this, these workers have endured routine physical abuse, delayed or unpaid wages, and 
hazardous working environments (Afgeh, 2014), indicating a lack of reconciliation of interests 
between the state and the workers. To enhance migrant workers’ trust in the state and their 
intentions to take up the pension policy promulgated by the state, the government needs to design 
more public policies focusing on the protection of rights and creation of favourable living and 
employment environment for migrant workers.  
6.2.6 Trust in Local Governments and Bureaucratic Corruption 
Lack of trust in local governments was found to be the main barrier to joining the urban old-
age pension scheme for most participants with land expropriation experience. The root cause of this 
barrier appears to be their experience with the country’s political system. China is a centralised 
polity without centralised authority (Lampton & Lieberthal, 1992). Section 2.1.2 discussed how 
hierarchical trust in China is connected with citizens’ low level of trust in local governments. The 
process of land expropriation in China could explain this low level of trust. Because the land 
expropriation policies could be manipulated at different government levels, some local bureaucrats 
took advantage of the fragmented system and embezzled land compensations that were intended for 
peasants (Sargeson, 2013). As the interviews showed, a large majority of participants with land 
expropriation experience had been exploited by local governments during the process, and were 
therefore wary of taking up a pension scheme implemented by the same local governments. While a 
complete change of the political system is unlikely, the central government could strengthen 
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surveillance of local government bureaucracy and curb corruption, especially during the process of 
land expropriation. 
6.2.7 Children 
The interviews revealed that changes in kinship dynamics over the past three decades have 
played a role in people’s intentions to join the old-age pension scheme. Participants with only one 
child in the family regarded the pension scheme as a way to alleviate that child’s future financial 
burden of caring for ageing parents. This indicates that promoting the urban old-age pension 
scheme to one-child family migrant workers would be more effective, because these workers are 
more likely to intend to join. 
6.2.8 Employer Behaviour: Avoiding Pension Contributions 
The research showed that attitudes towards employers influenced the perceived feasibility of 
joining the urban old-age pension scheme. This factor could be either a barrier or a facilitator due to 
the important role employers play in implementing the pension policy.  
Some respondents regarded joining the pension scheme as infeasible because of their 
employers’ unwillingness to support their pension. They revealed various means through which 
their employers avoided paying their pension contributions, including paying salaries in cash or 
splitting salary accounts of employees into accounts of smaller amounts. Therefore, to facilitate 
migrant workers’ membership in the pension scheme, there needs to be more effective enforcement 
of the rules and legislation regulating employer responsibility. Under the current Social Insurance 
Law, employees working on a non-fixed basis can join the urban old-age pension scheme 
voluntarily. Because migrant workers are highly mobile and few have stable work, the pension 
scheme is not mandatory for them. There are few legal liabilities for employers in practice if they 
do not fund migrant workers’ pension accounts (see Section 1.4), and many employers have taken 
advantage of legal loopholes to avoid pension contributions for migrant workers (World Bank & 
Development Research Center of the State Council, the People’s Republic of China, 2014). It is 
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recommended that laws and policies be significantly amended to strictly define each stakeholder’s 
legal responsibilities and liabilities and thus close the current loopholes. 
Conversely, some participants saw employers as a facilitator to the feasibility of joining the 
pension scheme because these employers showed willingness to support their pensions. However, 
this willingness involved promising to make pension contributions for interview participants in the 
future, not immediately. The interviews revealed that some employers create their own rules about 
the pension scheme and use these rules as excuses to delay pension payments. Thus, participants 
who viewed employers as facilitators may have done so due to misinformation. This indicates that 
incentive mechanisms may be required to increase employers’ willingness to cooperate with the law. 
6.2.9 Pension Age and Occupational Injury 
Some participants did not want to take up the pension scheme because they were concerned 
about not living to the current pension age (60 years for males and 50 to 55 years for females). 
Because migrant workers are concentrated in high-risk occupations, they face considerable risk of 
work-related injuries due to excessively long working hours and high physical and mental stress at 
work (Hesketh et al., 2008; ‘Migrants’ Health in China’, 2014). Such occupational injuries affect 
migrant workers’ health and longevity, which is why some participants were concerned about their 
life expectancy in relation to the old-age pension scheme. This indicates that policymakers might 
need to lower the pension age for migrant workers in industries with frequent exposure to health 
hazards that affect their longevity. However, at present, the Chinese Government plans to delay the 
retirement age due to potential labour shortages hindering economic growth. The Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security revealed that by 2020, the retirement age is likely to be five 
years higher than it is now (Zhou, 2013). This plan might effectively ease the workforce shrinkage 
and drive economic growth, but it might also deter migrant workers from joining the urban old-age 
pension scheme. Policymakers thus need to balance economic growth against the old-age welfare of 
migrant workers when reforming the old-age pension policy. In addition, improving work safety 
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and work-related injury prevention could make migrant workers more confident that their long-term 
health would allow them to benefit from the pension scheme. 
6.2.10 Affordability 
The current employee contribution rate of 12% for migrant workers hindered some 
interview participants from joining the pension scheme. The current contribution rate is the same 
for all pension scheme participants, regardless of their occupation and economic situation. Migrant 
workers, who are concentrated in low-paid jobs and lead marginalised lives in cities, are more 
concerned by their current financial situation than their future old-age lives, as indicated by 
interview participants. This suggests that the current pension contribution rates are beyond the 
affordability of migrant workers.  
Previous studies have explored solutions to these high contribution rates, including raising 
the retirement age, reforming employment policies, or reducing contribution rates taxes (Croix, 
Pierrard, & Sneessens, 2013). However, simply adopting one solution may have negative side-
effects (Blair, 2014). For instance, reducing pension contribution rates would potentially undermine 
pension benefits. A better solution might be to redesign the financing method for the current 
pension system. Previous research found that compared to flat-rate and earning-related benefits, a 
social insurance programme (such as that of Australia) that comprises income-tested benefits 
financed out of progressive contributions was most redistributive (Leschke, 2009). Adopting a 
progressive pension system in China could reduce the contribution rate for low-income groups such as 
rural-urban migrant workers. 
6.2.11 Social Stigma Resulting from the Dual-Citizenship System 
The current system of household registration was found to create barriers to migrant worker 
entry into the urban old-age pension scheme. The household registration system has been described 
as an apartheid against rural citizens (Ending apartheid: The rural-urban divide, 2014). Without 
urban household registration, migrant workers are denied access to health care, education for 
children and other welfare enjoyed by city residents. Accordingly, tens of millions of migrant 
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workers’ children are left in rural hometowns because they struggle to access education in the cities 
(Branigan, 2014). The unfair treatment that migrant workers suffer in cities due to their lack of 
urban household registration also leads to social stigma and feelings of being marginalised (Kuang 
& Liu, 2012). The interviews revealed that migrant workers’ passive physiological feelings made 
them less confident about joining the urban old-age pension scheme. The latest hukou reform in 
China aims to grant urban hukou to 100 million rural-urban migrants. Although a significant 
number, this is still far from covering all the migrant workers (Tiezie, 2016). Thus, it is of 
importance to build more outreach programs that allow migrant workers to lead a more equal urban 
life and have confidence that they can join the urban old-age pension scheme. For instance, 
providing free legal assistance services to rural-urban migrants could help to ensure the equality of 
opportunity for employment and social welfare. 
6.2.12 Education and Knowledge Acquisition 
Current promotion of the urban old-age pension scheme in China is mainly conducted 
through television news, newspapers and online news outlets and government websites. However, 
many migrant workers have limited access to television and the internet. It is true that TV has a 
significant penetration rate in China. However, it may not be the case for rural-urban migrant 
workers who live in poor conditions and work long hours. Becker (2014) have found that only 36 
percent of migrant workers could access TV, and 16 percent could use the internet. The most 
popular information source for rural-urban migrant workers was fellow workers (46 percent). This 
research also found that migrant workers preferred to obtain information on the pension scheme 
through word-of-mouth from relatives and colleagues, and from face-to-face promotion by 
government officials. Thus, the Chinese Government should consider implementing more face-to-
face promotion in places that migrant workers frequent, such as factories, dormitory buildings and 
workers’ rural hometowns. Officials could hold pension scheme workshops and question and 
answer sessions in these places. 
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6.3 Implications for Using Bounded Rationality Theory 
The process of exploring migrant workers’ perceptions of the urban old-age pension scheme 
led to developing and applying the theory of bounded rationality in the area of policy 
implementation. Bounded rationality has been widely used in psychology (Gigerenzer & Selten, 
2002; Kahneman, 2003; Koumakhov, 2009) and economics research (Schilirò, 2013; Tisdell, 2003). 
However, little prior research has used this theory to examine issues that arise when implementing 
social and public policies (Munro, 2009). 
Based on the findings of this study, Figure 6.1 illustrates the perceiving and heuristic 
procedures that people, as policy agents, use when deciding whether to uptake a policy. These 
procedures are influenced by the agents’ subjective environments and distinctive social and 
institutional settings. 
 
Figure 6.1. Perceiving and heuristic procedures of policy agents. 
Previous research on bounded rationality has modelled the process by which people develop 
their perceptions and heuristics when making choices within their subjective environments and 
within a general, objective environment (Barros, 2010; Jones, 1999; Simon, 1982, 1991, 2000). 
However, few studies have specified the objective environment or how cultural and political 
systems shape agents’ heuristics and subjective environments. Further, because limited research has 
applied this theory in understanding policy implementation, the process by which agents’ 
procedural judgements about choices are influenced by the policy context and unique circumstances 
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of a society is unclear. This study addressed this gap by modelling the process through interviews 
with rich, in-depth data revealing the development of agents’ heuristics for taking up an old-age 
pension policy in a society with domestic passport systems, significant land expropriation, fertility 
restrictions, and other unique social and policy features. 
In this research, the policy agent at the bottom level of policy implementation in China is the 
migrant worker. In the process of deciding whether to take up the urban old-age pension scheme, 
migrant workers were found to use heuristics developed within their subjective environment. This 
subjective environment is influenced by the objective environment of the unique economic, social 
and policy situations in China. All these aspects of Chinese society interact when forming the 
agents’ objective environments. For instance, when elaborating their heuristics for pension 
participation, some participants perceived their financial situation as a barrier to taking up the 
pension scheme. One participant revealed that her wish to follow social customs—namely, 
purchasing property and preparing dowries for unmarried children—took priority over her pension 
when using her limited budget. Without spare income to support a pension account, she had decided 
not to join. This example shows how social and cultural environments influence the policy agent 
when making decisions to take up a policy. 
Previous and current policies were found to influence agents’ perceptions of policy uptake. 
For example, some participants perceived that joining the urban old-age pension scheme was 
beneficial because it could alleviate future financial burdens on their only child. Participants 
discussed how these perceptions of old-age care were influenced by changes in dynamic kinships 
caused by the one-child policy. The household registration system was also found to be a hindrance 
to pension scheme uptake. Since lack of permanent urban residency excluded migrant workers from 
most social welfare available in cities, participants incorrectly surmised that they were also 
excluded from the urban old-age pension scheme. 
Interview participants’ heuristics for joining the urban old-age pension scheme were also 
shaped by their experience with land expropriation, which resulted from recent urbanisation in 
Chapter 6 Discussion and Conclusions 
198 
China. Participants viewed the pension scheme as a tool that could substitute some economic and 
insurance functions of their lost land; however, participants’ experience of local government 
corruption during land expropriation made them suspicious of the urban old-age pension scheme, 
which local governments also implement. 
These findings illustrate the process by which migrant workers, as policy agents, develop 
their perceptions and heuristics when making decisions about taking up the urban old-age pension 
policy. Heuristics about whether to accept a policy are developed based on the agents’ experiences 
and perceptions of living in the unique economic, social and policy environment of a particular 
society. Societies and policies are ever changing. Thus, when applying the theory of bounded 
rationality in policy implementation research, policy agents’ procedural judgements should be 
studied in a broad, historical social context that takes into account social customs and policy 
histories. 
6.4 Limitations and Strengths of the Study 
Several limitations of this research need to be acknowledged. First, a possible limitation in 
the quantitative study was survey participants’ lack of knowledge. In particular, 80% of participants 
chose ‘not at all’ when questioned about their general understanding of the urban old-age pension 
scheme. This indicates that most participants may not have had sufficient information, which could 
have influenced their responses regarding ‘settlement decisions’ and other factors in the hypotheses 
of the quantitative study. This issue has also appeared in other studies on migrant workers (N. Lan, 
2009; Y. Li & Chui, 2011). Determining the effect of lack of knowledge on the outcome of the 
quantitative study is impossible at this stage. However, qualitative data in the form of semi-
structured interviews provided an in-depth understanding of migrant workers’ perceptions of the 
urban old-age pension scheme, including their perceptions of the intent to join the pension scheme 
and information they possessed about the pension scheme. Thus, the effects of the lack of 
knowledge of participants on quantitative research were contextualised with complementary 
qualitative data in the second phase of the study. 
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Second, regional policies in the study’s setting of Shenzhen might have positively or 
negatively influenced the research participants’ intentions to join the urban old-age pension scheme. 
This could affect the generalisation of the research findings to the national level, as discussed in 
Section 3.3.5. Moreover, the majority of factories selected in the survey were in the processing and 
manufacturing industries. These factories were randomly selected from the business directory in the 
Longgang District. Thus, some bias (e.g., gender) might be caused by the dominance of 
manufacturing and processing factories in the sample. 
Third, only land expropriation was used as a stratifying factor for recruiting interview 
groups, which may have limited the results. This was the only factor that was pre-identified as a 
significant influence on joining the pension scheme in the preliminary test of the quantitative study. 
Due to time and budget limitations, interview recruitment began before complete data analysis of 
the main survey, which revealed additional significant factors. Thus, the recruitment process 
considered only participants with or without experience of land expropriation. In future, other 
factors such as demographics, settlement plan, family and education could be used to group 
interview participants for research in this area. A variety of migrant worker features may reveal 
further differences in perceptions of joining the urban old-age pension scheme. 
Fourth, as acknowledged in Appendix A and B, research participants were limited to 
migrant workers who were non-participants in the pension scheme. This was because this study 
specifically examined the implementation gap of the policy at the migrant worker level and non-
take up by target groups. The selection of the sampling frame excluded migrant workers who were 
participants in the pension scheme, as well as other pension scheme stakeholders such as employers 
and officials in central and local governments. Thus, this research could not show a complete 
picture of the implementation of the policy at all levels. 
Despite these limitations, this research has several strengths. First, the survey sample size of 
252 is well above the minimum sample size of 114 required for multiple regression. A large sample 
size such as this can increase data accuracy in predicting the research target behaviour. Moreover, a 
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large sample size results in a reasonable sample size in each sample subgroup, enabling data to 
more accurately reflect the behaviour of people in each category. In this study, the sample size of 
each subgroup ranged from 10 to 197, meaning each group of migrant workers was represented. 
Further, the study respondents are proportionately representative of the population of 
migrant workers in Shenzhen, based on their business ownership and age. This proportional 
sampling ensures representation of specific groups with significant characteristics, and provides 
better precision than a simple random sample of the same size. 
Unlike most existing studies on Chinese internal migrant workers (Han, 2012; Su et al., 
2014), which have analysed only the effect of single factors on worker behaviour, this study applied 
a regression multivariate model with a set of factors to predict certain behaviours. Individual actions 
and thoughts are likely to be influenced by a set of factors, rather than by a single factor. Hence, the 
multiple regression model allowed the results of the study to more closely reflect real-life situations 
by testing the effect of a combination of factors on a dependent variable. Therefore, this research 
was conducted in a manner that more closely resembled the behaviour and thoughts of migrant 
workers. 
The interview method depends on participants being willing to give accurate and 
comprehensive responses (Breakwell, Hammond, & Fife-Schaw, 2000). They may not respond to 
interview questions honestly, owing to feelings of embarrassment, confusion, unease with a stranger, 
or memory loss (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). However, interview participants in this study were 
relaxed and candid, and the interactions were conducive to obtaining rich data. Instead of hesitating 
to talk about their stigma in cities and sensitive topics related to the government and employers, 
participants elaborated on their feelings of inferiority in cities, unfair treatment in the experience of 
land expropriation and distrust in local officials. Some participants went as far as to reveal how 
their employers avoided making pension contributions for them. In addition to topics apparently 
associated with the urban old-age pension scheme, such as the government and employers as policy 
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stakeholders, participants related their perceptions of the pension scheme to diverse issues 
influenced by China’s unique social circumstances and social policy changes. 
Participant responses influence interview data validity and reliability (Breakwell et al., 
2000), and so the elaborate answers provided by the participants in this research enhance the 
validity and reliability of the study’s qualitative component. The frequent use of examples and 
metaphors made the participants’ perceptions more vivid. They used common metaphors in 
everyday speech when explaining their perceptions, which made their views clearer and easier to 
understand. For instance, when a participant elaborated on his concerns about whether the central 
government would be able to fill the empty accounts of the old-age pension in the future and pay 
benefits to pensioners, he compared pension benefits to rice and funding accounts to pots. He 
commented that his pot would not be filled with any rice if the central government’s pot did not 
have rice. Such metaphors conveyed complex issues in a simple way, allowing participants to 
accurately respond to questions regarding their complex perceptions. 
This research employed mixed methods to provide a more complete picture of the 
implementation of the urban old-age pension scheme at the migrant worker level. In addition to 
statistical tests of factors that influence migrant workers’ intentions to join the pension scheme, 
qualitative interviews explored workers’ perceptions in the uptake of the pension scheme. This 
made research on both the technical and cooperation components of policy implementation possible 
and more complete than would either a quantitative or qualitative method alone. These two methods 
offered insights into each other’s results, increasing the validity and reliability of the research 
findings. 
6.5 Future Areas of Research 
The scope of this study was limited to the implementation of the urban old-age pension 
scheme among migrant workers from specific perspectives. Future research could be conducted 
with a broader outlook to supplement the findings of this research and offer more insights into 
implementing the urban old-age pension among migrant workers in China. 
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More stakeholders could be examined in future research. The translation of policy into 
practice is an intrinsically complex course of actions undertaken by multiple public and private 
agents with different interests in policy design, delivery and uptake (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). 
In addition to the cooperation of policy recipients at the bottom level of implementation, 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983, p.147) have outlined further conditions for effective 
implementation that need to be achieved by other stakeholders, including policymakers and 
legislators issuing clear organisational structures, policy implementers having recognised and 
effective leadership, and active constituency groups offering support throughout the implementation 
process. Thus, future research could be carried out on the central government as policymakers and 
legislators, local governments and employers as implementers of the urban old-age pension scheme, 
examining their behaviours and skills in implementing the pension scheme among migrant workers. 
Research could incorporate a wide variety of actions, including planning, information dissemination, 
personnel and finances. 
Noting that public policy implementation is a challenging and legitimate concern in 
developing countries (Lazin, 1999), the effects of political uncertainty and the institutional 
environment in China cannot be ignored in future research studying policymakers and implementers. 
In the context of a one-party government committed to maintaining a permanent monopoly on 
power, striking a balance between the authoritarianism of the Communist Party and the effective 
execution of policymakers and legislators in implementing the urban old-age pension scheme is a 
crucial issue to consider in future research (Dreyer, 2000). Further, it should be taken into account 
that under the Chinese political system, the promotion of bureaucratic officials depends largely on 
local revenue, including land revenue (Tao & Yang, 2008). Local officials are partial to 
conspicuous public projects, such as urban construction, known in China as economic and political 
achievement projects (Kuang & Chen, 2014). Thus, a challenge for future research is how to 
motivate revenue-maximising bureaucracies to effectively deliver a long-term social welfare policy 
that may not bring as much revenue as ostentatious public projects. At the employer level, labour 
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protection legislation in China reflects a political agenda or manifesto, rather than a design for 
effective enforcement (see Section 1.4). Thus, future research could take into account the imperfect 
legal system when examining employer behaviour. 
As previously discussed, this study only included migrant workers who were non-
participants in the urban old-age pension scheme. Future research could also include an examination 
of participants’ choice-making process by which uncertainties and incomplete information are 
overcome, and their status and their perceived outcomes of the participation. This could provide 
insights into how to improve the pension scheme, in light of results on facilitating factors to join the 
pension scheme and gaps between expectations and perceived outcomes. 
As discussed in Section 6.4, future research could consider migrant workers from more 
industries and compare their results with those of this study. In addition, random sampling could be 
employed to select migrant workers and other policy stakeholders, and factors other than land 
expropriation could be used to group interview participants, in order to obtain a wider variety of 
results. 
Future research could utilise theories other than bounded rationality to frame stakeholders’ 
perceptions and behaviours. For example, planned behaviour theory takes into account social 
pressure, has predictive power with inclusion of perceived behavioural control, and has been used in 
examining bureaucratic behaviour in previous research (McSwain, & Glandon, 2008; Schmidt, 
2000). Thus, when researching local governments as policy implementers, the theory of planned 
behaviour could be used to explore how bureaucracies balance their belief in revenue-maximising 
and control with the pressure to carry out low-revenue-boosting social welfare schemes.  
A larger range of variables in the policy environment could also be examined in future. Due 
to time limitations, the set of variables included in this study is relatively small compared with the 
many alternative sets in this research area. Other dimensions that could be examined include 
variables reflecting migrant workers’ subjective environments, such as life satisfaction and sense of 
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belonging in cities. Similarly, when investigating other stakeholders’ perceptions and behaviour, 
variables that embody economic, statutory, institutional and subjective aspects could be considered. 
This doctoral study placed rural-urban migrant workers in the policy implementation context 
of China’s urban old-age pension scheme. It explored these workers’ perceptions of taking up this 
scheme as individuals whose attitudes were shaped in both the objective and subjective 
environments of Chinese society. Institutional and political factors were taken into account in 
analysis to give a broad picture of the environments in which China’s rural-urban migrant labourers 
seek a better life, make contributions and become marginalised. This study adds to the 
understanding of the urban old-age pension scheme’s relation to China’s rural-urban migrant 
workers by considering both policy and individual psychology contexts. The findings also suggest 
new directions for future reforms of China’s urban old-age pension scheme in order to improve its 
coverage of rural-urban migrant worker populations. This study’s clearer criteria for targeting 
migrant worker interest groups and evidence on migrant workers’ perceived barriers and facilitators 
to taking up the urban old-age policy could allow the Chinese Government to target migrant worker 
groups more accurately, alleviate barriers and enable more migrant workers to avail themselves of 
the urban old-age pension scheme. 
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Appendix A: Justification of Not Interviewing Employers 
The thesis has acknowledged that the successful implementation of the urban pension policy 
requires that a range of actors, including central government, local governments, employers and 
migrant workers, subscribe to the goals of the program (see Section 3.1, para.1). However, this 
thesis only explores the policy gap at the bottom level, where migrant workers intend to but decide 
not to take up the urban pension policy. 
Public policy is defined as ‘the sum of government activities, whether pursued directly or 
through agents, as those activities have an influence on the lives of citizens’. (Peters & Falk, 2005, 
p. 3). China’s urban pension policy is the sum of activities of governments and employers that 
affect the decision-making of migrant workers. The outcome of a public policy is a process of 
interaction among all policy actors (Theodoulou & Cahn, 2013). In this study, migrant workers’ 
perceptions of taking up the urban pension policy were influenced by other policy actors such as 
employers and local governments. Thus, although employers and government officials were not 
interviewed in the study, their attitudes towards and behaviour responsive to the urban pension 
policy were reflected in migrant workers’ perceptions of the policy. For instance, in Chapter 5 
(Section 5.2.2.1 ‘Attitudes Towards Employers’), migrant workers revealed various means through 
which their employers avoided paying their pension contributions, including paying salary in cash 
and splitting salary accounts of employees into accounts of smaller amounts. In Sections 5.2.1.6 and 
5.2.2.2 they revealed their trust in the central government, and lack of trust in local governments 
caused by local bureaucracies’ priority for increasing economic revenue. These research findings 
have also been acknowledged in Section .6.2.5 ‘Trust in the State’, Section 6.2.6 ‘Trust in Local 
Government’, and Section 6.2.8 ‘Employer behaviour: Avoiding pension contributions’ as policy 
implications. 
However, this thesis acknowledges that including all policy actors involved in the urban 
pension policy, encompassing central and local governments, employers and migrant workers, could 
better examine the policy implementation process of the urban pension policy. This 
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acknowledgement is stated in Section 6.4 (p.199, para. 3) as one of the limitations of this PhD 
study. In addition, as stated in Section 6.5 (p.203, para. 3), including other stakeholders involved in 
the urban pension policy will be one of the future research areas of the implementation of the urban 
pension scheme among migrant workers. 
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Appendix B: Justification of Not Interviewing Migrant Workers Who 
Were Participants of the Urban Pension Policy 
The selection of migrant workers without membership of the urban pension scheme as the 
research participants of this study was conducted from a policy perspective. This study examines 
the implementation gap of urban pension policy at the level of migrant workers and explores the 
reason why target groups choose not to take up the policy despite their intentions. As discussed in 
Section 1.4.3, the urban pension scheme is voluntary in effect because of loopholes in the Social 
Security Law and other related legislations. For this voluntary pension program, migrant workers 
who were participants of the urban pension scheme had already had both intention and resources 
that allowed them to take up the policy. As participants of the urban pension scheme had supported 
the policy implementation by taking up the urban pension policy, their behaviour did not contribute 
to the formation of the implementation gap of the policy. Thus, only non-participants of the urban 
pension scheme were interviewed in this study for their perceptions of the scheme to account for the 
policy gap where migrant workers intend to but decide not to take up the urban pension policy. 
From the perspective of the theory of bounded rationality, however, it shows that individuals’ 
perceptions of a choice are influenced by uncertainties and information that they have regarding the 
choices (Simon, 1956; 2010). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that some participants of the urban 
pension policy had also experienced uncertainties and imperfect information before they decided to 
join the urban pension. Factors that assisted in overcoming uncertainties and incomplete 
information, participants’ status and participation outcomes would shed light on how to encourage 
non-participants to take up the urban pension policy. Therefore, from this angle of analysis, migrant 
workers who were participants of the urban pension scheme could also be included in the research. 
As the overall aim of this study concerns the implementation gap, the study was designed 
from the policy perspective and excluded migrant workers who were participants of the urban 
pension scheme from the interview. This exclusion has also been acknowledged in Section 6.4 
(p.199, para. 3), as one of the limitations of this PhD research. In the future research, both 
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participants and non-participants of the urban pension policy will be included as research 
participants for their perceptions of the urban pension policy, as stated in Section 6.5 (p.203, para. 
2). 
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Appendix C: Rationale for the Sampling Strategy 
The sampling frame in this study was built based on the workplace rather than on 
households. Most previous studies on migrant workers used workplace as the sample frame because 
a great proportion of migrant workers live in the dormitory provided by their employers (Hesketh, 
2008, p. 258; RUMiCI, 2010, p. 305; Tang, 2011, p. 309; Zhao, 2011, p. 310). Thus, using the 
household survey would lead to the exclusion of these migrant workers. 
Furthermore, for cultural reasons, the household survey would lead to low respondent rates. 
Normally, the Chinese do not respond to strangers. Many westerners realise this fact when they 
greet passing Chinese on the street and not a single person responds (Katzman, 1982, p. 275). 
Hence, knocking on the doors of people’s homes and asking them to complete surveys as a stranger 
would not result in a significant response rate. The migrant workers in this study were stratified into 
four groups by age and ownership of enterprise, and a specific number of workers had to be 
recruited in each group. Thus, using a household survey with a low response rate to recruit a 
specific number of workers in each cell was not feasible, given the limited research funding and 
time frame. Since the enterprise was one of the stratifying factors, using enterprises as a sampling 
frame could facilitate the recruitment. More importantly, safety is a major concern for the 
household survey. Criminal rates among migrant workers are high. In 2010, one-third of the crimes 
committed in China were by young migrant workers (China Daily, 2011). Young migrant workers 
comprise the majority of samples in this study. Thus, the survey needed to take place in a public 
area. Given the discussion above, the sampling frame in this study was defined on the basis of 
enterprises. 
Random sampling was used at the first stage to sample enterprises of different ownerships 
from the business dictionary. Afterward, migrant workers in each stratum were purposively selected 
from the chosen enterprises. Although probability sampling can help to achieve higher 
representativeness compared with non-probability sampling, it is also widely recognised that the 
high mobility of migrant workers makes probability sampling difficult to administer. Most previous 
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studies on migrant workers have also used non-probability sampling (Hesketh, 2008, p. 258; Qiu, 
2012, p. 307; Tang, 2011, p. 309), such as convenience or purposive sampling. Among the few 
surveys that used probability sampling, I examined a longitudinal survey by Australia National 
University in 2010 (RUMiCI, 2010, p. 305) that used random sampling to select migrant workers 
from their workplace. To use the random sampling, the authors first obtained a list of the total 
number of workers (there might have been thousands of workers). Then, they chose all of the 
migrant workers from that list by filtering out the local workers. Next, the migrant workers were 
randomly selected and the researchers met the participants. However, selecting migrant workers 
from a full list of workers and scheduling the participants’ different times of availability are 
daunting tasks. These difficulties make meeting 250 workers within a limited time frame and 
research budget impossible. In addition, as mentioned in the literature review, 80% of employers 
choose to underreport the number of migrant workers in their business. Thus, any list of employees 
obtained from employers is most likely to be inaccurate, making it difficult to achieve real random 
sampling in this topic. 
Realising the constraints in using random sampling for migrant workers, some researchers 
claim that respondent-driven sampling serves as a good alternative for random sampling in 
recruiting migrant workers with probability sampling (Qiu, Yang, & Ma, 2012, p. 307). However, 
this sampling type is difficult to administer by one person. As there is no fixed time frame for 
participants to recruit their peers, the researcher may need to ask all participants about their 
recruitment process. For some casual workers without an employee card, it is also difficult to know 
their real identities (McCreesh, Johnston, Sonnenberg, Copas, Hayes, & White, 2012). Moreover, 
the recruitment process is highly dependent on migrant workers as seeds for recruitment because 
they will have to explain the survey to the new enrollees. 
Hence, this study used non-probability sampling to select migrant workers from enterprises, 
following the strategy used by most of the previous studies on migrant workers. To assure adequate 
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proportions of migrant workers in each stratum could be surveyed, purposive sampling was applied 
to draw samples of migrant workers from each enterprise. 
Despite the weakness of generalisation to the population caused by this sampling strategy, 
the findings obtained in a short time with limited PhD research funds still provide directional 
information. The researcher is well aware of this strategy’s weaknesses in terms of generalisation. 
The findings from samples in this study were not used for inferential purposes, and they were only 
used for producing directional insights, which will lay the foundation for the researcher’s future 
probability study surveys. The findings from this survey were critically evaluated by considering 
groups that are systematically excluded and groups that are overrepresented. Furthermore, the 
researcher also verified findings generated from other studies using different samples. 
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Appendix D: Survey Questionnaire 
Project Title: The implementation of China’s urban pension scheme at the level of migrant 
workers 
Researcher: Yuan Wang 
PhD Student 
Ph: (61) 0451977759 (mobile, Australia) 
or *******(mobile, China) 
Email: yuan.wang3@uqconnect.edu.au 
Section A. Migration background 
Now I would like to ask you some questions about your migration background, such as your motivation to 
migrate, migration of family members, and the rural land in your hometown. 
A01 The name of your home 
province: Please fill in the information 
as appropriate. Home province: __________ 
A02 Why did you leave your rural 
hometown? Please circle the most 
important one. 
1. Did not like farming 2. Had been studying, could not farm 3. Did not like 
rural lifestyle 4. Too poor at home, want to assist with family expenditure with 
work 5. Prefer city lifestyle 6. Broaden horizon to accumulate work 
experience for future 7. Many other villagers are doing well in the city, would 
like to try 8. Have family members in the city 9. Land was taken over 10. 
Introduced to a job by other people 11. Slack season in farming 12. Better 
education for children 13. Other_________(Please specify)  
A03 In what year did you first come to 
the city? Please fill in the information 
as appropriate. In the year________ 
A04 How many times have you come 
to the city and then returned back 
home? Please fill in the information as 
appropriate. ________ times 
A05 In what year did you most 
recently come to the city? Please fill 
in the information as appropriate. In the year________ 
A06 What is the total number of years 
that you have spent in cities? Please 
fill in the information as appropriate. ________years 
A07 Where is the current primary 
residential place of your spouse or 
partner located? (Please skip to the 
question A09 if you do not have a 
spouse or partner.) Please circle one 
answer that is correct for you 
1. Rural regions 2. Same city 3. Other city 
A08 Does your spouse/partner 
currently work in city as a migrant? 
Please circle one answer that is correct 
1. Yes  2. No 
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for you 
A09 Where is the current primary 
residential place of your children 
located? (Please skip to the question 
A12 if you do not have children.) 
Please fill in the blank with the right 
answer 
The first child_________ 
The second child__________ 
The third child__________ 
The fourth child __________ 
The fifth child __________ 
The six child__________ 
 
1. Rural regions  2. Same city  3. Other city 
A10 Do you have any children who 
are still in school now? Please circle 
one answer that is correct for you 
1. Yes  2. No 
A11 Where do your children receive 
education? Please fill in the blank with 
the right answer 
The first child in school _________ 
The second child in school__________ 
The third child in school__________ 
The fourth child in school __________ 
The fifth child in school__________ 
The sixth child in school__________ 
 
1. Rural regions  2. Same city  3. Other city 
A12 If policy allowed, how long 
would you like to stay in the city? 
Please circle one answer that is correct 
for you. 
1. 1 year  2. 1-3 year  3. More than 3 years  4. Forever  5. Not sure 
A13 What is your settlement planning 
in the future? Please circle one answer 
that is correct for you and fill in the 
information as appropriate. 
1. I plan to settle in the city. 
2. I am a seasonal migrant worker, and will eventually go back to my rural 
hometown. 
3. Other (Please specify: ______ ) 
A14 Thinking about your future 
settlement plan, how much likely are 
you to settle in the city or go back to 
your rural hometown in the future? 
Please check one box for each 
statement. 
 
Not 
at all likely 
 
 
Slightly 
likely 
 
 
 
Moderately 
likely 
 
 
Very likely 
 
 
 
 
 
Extremely 
likely 
I will settle in the city in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 
I will go back to the rural home town 
in the future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
A15 What is the size of your family 
farm land? Please fill in the 
information as appropriate 
_______Mu (‘Mu’ is Chinese measurement of land; 10,000 square metres = 
15 mu) 
A16 Have you ever experienced land 
expropriation in your rural hometown? 
(Land expropriation happens when 
your leased land is taken by the 
government.) Please circle one 
1. Yes  2. No (Please skip to next section) 
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answer that is correct for you. 
A17 How much land in your family 
has been taken by the government? 
Please fill in the information as 
appropriate 
_________Mu 
A18 Suppose that following is the 
total space of land in your family, 
please draw a picture inside to show 
how much space of land in your 
family has been expropriated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Total space of 
land 
Expropriated land 
Example 
Qualitative 
study 
 
 
Total space of 
land 
Appendices 
272 
Section B. Information on Employment and Labour Union Membership 
Now I would like to ask you a few questions about your employment and participation in a labour union. 
B01 What is your primary 
occupation? (Please refer to the 
occupation code form, and fill in the 
blank with the correct code.) My primary occupation is_____  
B02 What is the ownership status of 
the company of your primary job? 
Please circle one answer that is 
correct for you. 
1.State-owned, collective enterprise (including state-holding or collective-
holding enterprise), government organ or institution 
2.Other categories (e.g., private enterprises or self-employed) 
3.I don’t know 
B03 Do you have an employment 
contract for your current primary 
job? 
Please circle one answer that is 
correct for you. 1. Yes  2. No 
B04 On what basis are you currently 
employed? 
Please circle one answer that is 
correct for you and fill in the 
information as appropriate. 
1. Permanent 
2. On fixed-term basis on ____ months 
3. On a casual basis 
B05 The nature of your current 
primary job 
Please circle one answer that is 
correct for you and fill in the 
information as appropriate. 
1. Long-term contract (one year and above) 
2. Short-term contract (less than one year) 
3. No-contract temp 
4. Other (Please specify: ______ ) 
B06 Does a labour union operate 
currently in your company? 
Please circle one answer that is 
correct for you. 1. Yes  2. No  3. I don’t know 
B07 Are the workers with your 
employer allowed to join a labour 
union if they want to? Please circle 
one answer that is correct for you. 1. Yes  2. No  3. I don’t know 
B08 Are you currently a member of a 
labour union? Please circle one 
answer that is correct for you. 
1. Yes  2. No 
B09 Thinking about the reason for 
being a member of a labour union, 
how much do you agree or disagree 
with each of these following 
statements? Please check one box for 
each statement. Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
disagree nor 
agree Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1. Membership protects me against 
unfair treatment by my employer 1 2 3 4 5 
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2. Membership helps ensure I am 
paid a fair rate of pay 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I was asked to join by a union 
representative 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I was pressurised to join by other 
workers 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Being a member helps ensure 
workplace representation 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I feel solidarity with co-workers 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Being a member of a labour union 
is important to me 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. My employer asked me to join 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Because of my previous labour 
union experience in the city 1 2 3 4 5 
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Section C. Participation and understanding of the urban pension scheme 
Now I would like to ask you questions about your perception regarding the taking up of the urban pension 
scheme and your understanding about this scheme. 
C01 Please think about 
your intention to join the 
urban pension scheme, 
and circle the answer that 
shows how much you 
agree or disagree with the 
following statement. 
I intend to join 
the urban pension 
system. 1. Agree  2. Neither agree nor disagree  3. Disagree 
C011 If agree, do you 
strongly agree, somewhat 
agree, or somewhat agree? 1. Strongly agree  2. Somewhat agree 
C012 If disagree, do you 
strongly disagree, 
somewhat disagree, or 
somewhat disagree? 1. Strongly disagree  2. Somewhat disagree 
C02 To what extent do 
you intend to join the 
urban pension scheme? 
Please check one box. 
Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 
C03 I am expected to 
join the urban pension 
scheme. 
Please check one box for 
this statement.  
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
disagree nor 
agree Agree Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
C04 Please think about 
your participation in the 
urban pension scheme, 
and choose the answer 
that best shows how 
realistic you think your 
participation in this 
scheme is. 
Please check one box. 
Not at all 
realistic Slightly realistic 
Moderately 
realistic 
Very 
realistic 
Extremely 
realistic 
1 2 3 4 5 
C05 Please rethink about 
your participation in the 
urban pension scheme, 
and check one box that 
shows how much you 
agree or disagree with the 
following two statements. 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
disagree nor 
agree Agree Strongly agree 
I think I have 
opportunities to join the 
urban pension scheme. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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My current situation 
allows me to join the 
urban pension scheme. 
1 2 3 4 5 
C06 Is it difficult or easy 
for you to find 
information about the 
urban pension scheme? 
Please check one box 
Very difficult 
to find 
Difficult to find Fair Easy to find 
Very easy to 
find 
1 2 3 4 5 
       
C07 This is some 
information about the 
urban pension scheme. 
We are interested to know 
how much knowledge 
people have of the urban 
pension scheme. Please 
check one box to show 
how much you know about 
the information listed. 
(This is NOT a test of 
your knowledge and 
your responses are 
anonymous). 
 
 
I don’t know it at 
all 
I know a 
little 
I know 
some 
I know 
it well 
I am confident 
that I know 
every detail 
about it 
Premium rate 1 2 3 4 5 
The place of 
pension 
collection 
1 2 3 4 5 
The premium 
payment 
period 
1 2 3 4 5 
Pension 
benefits 
1 2 3 4 5 
Pension 
transfer 
1 2 3 4 5 
Employers’ 
responsibility 
in this pension 
scheme 
1 2 3 4 5 
Local 
governments’ 
responsibility 
in this pension 
scheme 
1 2 3 4 5 
C08 Do you have any 
other knowledge of the 
urban pension scheme? 
If yes, please add it in the 
blank provided. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
C09 You might be facing 
some of the following 
problems when deciding 
whether or not to join the 
urban pension scheme. 
For each, please rate the 
uncertainty by checking 
the box. 
Not at all 
problematic 
Slightly 
problematic 
Moderately 
problematic 
Very 
problematic 
Extremely 
problematic 
1. Employers’ avoidance 
of pension obligations  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Local governments 
defaulting on pension 
1 2 3 4 5 
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funds 
3. Not sure about the 
future plan 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Not satisfied with the 
life in the city 
1 2 3 4 5 
C10 Do you have any 
other problems when 
deciding whether or not to 
join the urban pension 
scheme? If yes, Please 
specify these problems in 
the blank provided. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
___________________________________ 
C11 Please show how 
much do you agree or 
disagree with each of 
these following 
statements. Please check 
one box for each 
statement. 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
disagree nor 
agree Agree Strongly agree 
1. I trust my employer. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I trust the local 
government. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I have a clear future 
plan. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I feel confident about 
my future life in the city. 1 2 3 4 5 
C12 Is there anything else 
about participation in the 
urban pension scheme you 
would like to add? If yes, 
Please specify these 
uncertainties in the blank 
provided. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________________ 
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Section D. Individual Information 
Now I would like to ask you questions about yourself 
D01 Gender 
Please circle the answer that is correct for you. 1. male  2. female 
D02 Your age based on the lunar calendar ______ years 
D03 Your age based on the solar calendar _______years 
D04 Marital status 
Please circle one answer that is correct for you 
and fill in the information as appropriate. 
1. Single  2. Married  3. Cohabiting  4. Divorced 
5. Others____ (Please specify) 
D05 How many children do you have? Please fill in 
the information as appropriate. I have _______ children 
D06 At which grade level did you leave school? ________  
D07 Years of schooling  ________ years  
D08 Highest level of education completed  ________  
D09 Net amount of your wage is  ________RMB/month 
D10 Does your employer pay your wage regularly? 
Please circle the answer that is correct for you. 
1.Yes  2. Late with the payment less than one month  3.Late 
with payment more than one month 
 
Contact Information 
Please fill in your contact information. Your contact information will only be used for discussing issues with you 
in relation to this study.  
Your email ______________ 
Your mobile phone no. ______________ 
 
Follow-Up Interview 
There will be a follow-up interview regarding your perception of taking up the urban pension scheme after this survey. 
This interview will take about 1 hour, and the questions in the interview will be similar to those in the section C of this 
questionnaire. As a part of my PhD research, this interview might be important for improving the protection of 
migrant workers’ labour rights. Your participation will help us out!  
 
If you are interested in this interview, please provide your pseudonym and first name below. These details will only be 
used in this research. The participation of the subsequent interview is voluntary, and you will be offered a 
reimbursement of AUD $2 for your participation in the interview. 
 
Pseudonym ______________ (Please do not use your real 
name, names of your relatives, and names that are 
inappropriate for academic work.) 
 
First name ____________ 
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In order to protect your privacy and make sure that you will not be identified in the interview recruitment process, the 
researcher will separate this page and the next page from the questionnaire after the survey, and will only use 
information on these two pages instead of your full information to recruit interview participants. Therefore, please 
answer the following questions again to offer enough information for our interview recruitment. 
01 Have you ever experienced land 
expropriation in your rural hometown? 
(Land expropriation happens when 
your leased land is taken by the 
government.) Please circle one answer 
that is correct for you. 1. Yes  2. No 
02 Do you have an employment contract 
for your current primary job? 
Please circle one answer that is correct 
for you. 1. Yes  2. No 
03 To what extent do you intend to join 
the urban pension scheme?  
Please check one box.  Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
04 Please think about your participation 
in the urban pension scheme, and choose 
the answer that best shows how 
realistic you think your participation 
in this scheme is. 
Not at all 
realistic 
Slightly 
realistic 
Moderately 
realistic 
Very 
realistic 
Extremely 
realistic 
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Occupation Code Form 
1 Boss of private enterprises 6 Manufacture and transportation worker 
2 
Technical personnel in various 
industry 
 61 Builder/construction worker 
3 Administrative staff and manager 62 Stevedore/cargo handling labour/delivery man/driver 
4 Businessman/commercial staff 63 Worker (manufacturing/processing) 
 
41 Vendor 
(Vegetable/fruit/grain/ 
other agricultural byproduct) 
or (beverage/ 
snack) 
64 Servicing and manufacturing service worker 
42 Waste reclamation 
worker/other relevant worker 
 65 Other kind of worker 
43 Salesman 7 Self-employed individuals 
44 
Other business personnel 
 71 Boss of agricultural self-employed individuals (producing and 
processing in industries of agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry, fishery) 
5 
Service personnel 
 72 Boss of non-agricultural self-employed individuals 
(food/construction/transportation/sales/servicing/ 
hotel) 
 
51 Restaurant/hotel 
waiter/waitress 
 
8 
  
Other (please specify your occupation in the questionnaire) 
52 Maid, housekeeping 
maid/time work 
housekeeping maid 
53 Barber 
54 Vehicle repair, household 
electric appliances 
maintenance man 
55 Sanitation workers 
56 Cook, assistant cook 
57 Other service personnel 
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Education Grade Code Form 
1 Elementary School, Grade One 21 Polytechnic College, Grade Two 
2 Elementary School, Grade Two 22 Polytechnic College, Grade Three 
3 Elementary School, Grade Three 23 
TV university/correspondence/long-distance 
education, Grade One 
4 Elementary School, Grade Four 24 
TV university/correspondence/long-distance 
education, Grade Two 
5 Elementary School, Grade Five 25 
TV university/correspondence/long-distance 
education, Grade Three 
6 Elementary School, Grade Six 26 
TV university/correspondence/long-distance 
education, Grade Four 
7 Junior Middle School, Grade One 27 
TV university/correspondence/long-distance 
education, Grade Five 
8 Junior Middle School, Grade Two 28 Undergraduate (Bachelor’s Degree), Freshman 
9 Junior Middle School, Grade Three 29 Undergraduate (Bachelor’s Degree), Sophomore 
10 Senior Middle School, Grade One 30 Undergraduate (Bachelor’s Degree), Junior 
11 Senior Middle School, Grade Two 31 Undergraduate (Bachelor’s Degree), Senior 
12 Senior Middle School, Grade Three 32 
Undergraduate (Bachelor’s Degree), The Fifth 
Year 
13 
Vocational Senior Secondary School, 
Grade One 33 Postgraduate (Master’s Degree), The First Year 
14 
Vocational Senior Secondary School, 
Grade Two 34 
Postgraduate (Master’s Degree), The Second 
Year 
15 
Vocational Senior Secondary School, 
Grade Three 35 Postgraduate (Master’s Degree), The Third Year 
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Highest Education Level Code Form 
0 
Never been to school   
1 Five-year Elementary School 
Graduate 15 
Small Secondary School (For Junior Middle School Graduates) 
Graduate 
2 Five-year Elementary School 
Leave before Graduate 16 
Small Secondary School (For Junior Middle School Graduates) 
Leave before graduate 
3 
Six-year Elementary School 
Graduate 17 
Specialised Secondary School (For Senior Middle School Graduates) 
Graduate 
4 Six-year Elementary School 
Leave before Graduate 18 
Specialised Secondary School (For Senior Middle School Graduates) 
Leave before graduate  
5 Two-year Junior 
Middle School 
Graduate 19 
Polytechnic College 
Graduate 
6 Two-year Junior 
Middle School 
Leave before Graduate 20 
Polytechnic College 
Leave before graduate 
7 Three-year Junior 
Middle School 
Graduate 21 
TV university/correspondence/long-distance education 
Graduate 
8 Three-year Junior 
Middle School 
Leave before Graduate 22 
TV university/correspondence/long-distance education 
Leave before graduate 
9 Two-year Senior 
Middle School 
Graduate 23 
Undergraduate (Bachelor’s Degree) 
Graduate 
10 Two-year Senior 
Middle School 
Leave before Graduate 24 
Undergraduate (Bachelor’s Degree) 
Leave before graduate 
11 Three-year Senior 
Middle School 
Graduate 25 
Postgraduate (Master’s Degree) 
Graduate 
12 Three-year Senior 
Middle School 
Leave before Graduate 26 
Postgraduate (Master’s Degree) 
Leave before graduate 
13 Vocational Senior Secondary School 
Graduate 27 
PhD 
Graduate 
14 Vocational Senior Secondary School 
Leave before Graduate 28 
PhD  
Leave before graduate 
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Appendix E: Interview guide 
Beginning question 
When you think of joining the pension, what thoughts come to your mind? 
Theme 1 and 2. Intention and feasibility to join the urban pension scheme 
Do you intend to join the urban pension scheme? 
What are the reasons for you intending or not intending to join the urban pension scheme? Please 
elaborate. 
Do you think it is feasible to join the urban pension scheme? 
What are the reasons for you to think it is feasible or not feasible to join the urban pension scheme? 
Please elaborate. 
Theme 3. Uncertainties regarding the participation of the scheme 
What problems, if any, are you facing when you consider the participation of the urban pension 
scheme? Please describe these problems. 
How have these problems influenced or not influenced your choice-making on taking up the urban 
pension scheme or not? Please elaborate and give me some examples. 
Theme 4. Information on the scheme 
What do you know about the urban pension scheme (e.g., eligibility, stakeholders involved, pension 
transfer)? Please list the information you have about this scheme. 
Do you think you have sufficient information about the urban pension scheme? 
If you do not think you have enough information regarding this scheme, in what ways do you need 
more information? Please elaborate. 
Ending question 
Is there anything more you would like to add? 
